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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Takaful is an Arabic term meaning solidarity, which is used to describe a system of 
Islamic insurance that functions as an alternative to conventional insurance. Takaful, as a 
form of insurance, is entering a fast growing global market, promoted by the growth of 
the Asian economies and economic prosperity in the Middle East. The Takaful system is 
based on the principle of cooperation or mutual assistance, and is Tabarru (Voluntary), 
meaning that the attendant risks are spread collectively across the group of volunteers.  
The Takaful system is best understood as a pact (or policy) ascribed to by a group of 
participants who choose to jointly guarantee themselves against loss or damage suffered 
by individual signatories, as confirmed in the policy. The prediction is that Takaful will 
be the default choice for citizens in Islamic countries in the near future. The combination 
of the system’s financial efficacy, combined with principles underwritten by religious 
correctness has accentuated the attractiveness of this, and similar, Islamic banking and 
financial products to Muslims. 
By examining the Saudi insurance sector, which is a market leader in the region, this 
thesis delivers a brief history of insurance in general and of the Saudi insurance legal 
framework in particular, and by so doing sheds light on Islamic insurance Takaful 
applications worldwide. It also engages in an evaluation of insurance products available 
in Saudi Arabia to determine whether the facilities offered by the insurance companies 
operating in the country incorporate obstacles and obstructions, which may impact on the 
effectiveness of governmental regulations and supervision in relation to setting a 
legislative framework. This influences the extent to which the foundations for the 
insurance market are secured in Saudi Arabia. The aim of the present study also leads to 
some suggestions and recommendations for future practice. 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 overview  
 
The Saudi insurance sector has become an important and leading market throughout the entire 
Middle East and North African region. This thesis aims to provide a brief history of insurance 
in general and the Saudi insurance legal framework in particular, and by so doing to shed light 
on Islamic insurance Takaful applications worldwide. It will then critically analyse insurance 
policies in Saudi Arabia and evaluate the facilities offered by some insurance companies in the 
country to highlight obstacles and obstructions which may impact on the effectiveness of 
governmental regulations and supervision in relation to setting a legislative framework to 
establish the foundations for the insurance market in Saudi Arabia. The present study 
discusses some suggestions and recommendations. 
 
1.2 The context 
1.2.1 ISLAMIC INSURANCE TAKAFUL     
 
In 2009, the global Islamic insurance Takaful market was at an early stage of development, 
with two thirds of global premiums, $4.8bn out of an estimated $7.2bn in 2007 based in Iran 
where Takaful is the compulsory form of insurance. Global Takaful premiums have doubled 
from $3.6bn over the three years since 2004. The Takaful market is mainly concentrated in 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Iran1. 
 
The global market remains at an early stage of development with premiums estimated to have 
reached $16.5bn in 2011. This includes an estimated $4.5bn generated in Iran where takaful is 
the compulsory form of insurance2. 
 
                                                
1 ThecityUK. Islamic finance report 2009  available online at:  http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-
work/reports-list/islamic-finance-2009/ Retrieved 20-08-2012. 
2 ThecityUK. Islamic finance report 2012 available online at:  http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-
work/reports-list/islamic-finance-2012/ Retrieved 20-08-2012. 
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The world population is almost 7 billion3, 25% of whom are Muslims. Contemporary 
pressures arising from the globalisation of industry and trade, increased air travel, 24/7 news 
media, the internet etc. are bringing an increasing awareness that we are all part of a "global 
village", revealing the various influences of ethnic diversity and the empowerment of affinity 
groups worldwide.4  
 
The fastest growing sector in the field of financial services is Islamic Banking, which is 
seeking to address the needs of an untapped market. Over 40 countries have a Muslim-
majority population and an additional 15 countries have Muslim-minority communities whose 
businesses and families share the same value system5.  
 
Research by Ernst & Young predicts that by the end of 2015 the global Takaful market could 
reach a value of $25bn (£15bn), up from $9.2bn in 2010. Simon Burtwell, partner at Ernst & 
Young confirms that we are heading towards $12bn this year. Furthermore, there is a 
substantial fast growing market worldwide, which the growth of Asian economies and Middle 
East are helping to drive. We can expect that Takaful is going to be the default choice for 
Islamic countries in the near future.6 The combination of financial efficacy and religious 
correctness has made Islamic banking and financial products attractive to Muslims. Every 
Muslim is held accountable for how he / she manages wealth and investment so as to comply 
with Sharia and declare clean profits by giving a portion to charity (Zakat). 
 
The question then arises how do Muslims save for the future? Today's Muslims share similar 
challenges to non-Muslims as they progress through their life phases: how to finance 
education, marriage and the demands of family formation, as well as how to save for 
retirement or create an emergency fund to cover expenses that may arise from prolonged 
illness, or tragic misfortune. Such important yet mundane needs are typically addressed by 
                                                
3 Population Reference Bureau available online : http://www.prb.org/ Retrieved 20-08-2012.  
4 Fisher, O. and Taylor, D. (2000) Prospects for Evolution of Takaful in the 21st Century. [Available online at: 
http://www.takaful.com.sa/m4sub3.asp,	
  Retrieved 20-08-2012.	
   
5	
  Ibid.	
  
6Barrett,	
  S.	
  (2011)	
  Post	
  online.co.uk	
  http://www.postonline.co.uk/post/feature/2105374/takaful-­‐insurance-­‐
future-­‐potential,	
  	
   ThecityUK. Islamic finance report 2012, op. cit. Supra 2. 
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conventional life insurance and associated long-tem savings instruments that commonly 
contain elements that are not permitted for practicing Muslims. 7  
 
The Islamic form of commercial insurance policy is Takaful commercial Insurance; this is a 
contract between the insurer and the insured, known as the policyholder, which determines the 
claims which the insurer is legally required to pay. The purpose of insurance is to relocate the 
possibility of a loss (risk) to another person (the insured), which in turn spreads out the costs 
of unexpected losses to many individuals. Though insurance will not eliminate the risk of 
death, illness, injury or property damage; insurance does disburden the insured from the 
financial losses brought about by this risk.  
 
Takaful commercial Insurance is not a new concept in Islamic commercial law. Contemporary 
jurists acknowledge that the foundation of shared responsibility or Takaful commercial 
Insurance was prescribed by the system of ‘Aaqilah’8, which was an arrangement of mutual 
help or indemnification customary in some tribes at the time of the Holy Prophet; it was 
intended that the community contribute until the loss has been indemnified. Similarly, the idea 
of Aaqilah in respect of blood money or any disaster is based on the concept of Takaful, 
wherein payments by the whole tribe distribute the financial burden amongst the entire tribe9.  
 
1.2.2 ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW 
 
Sharia law delineates all Islamic instructions that addressed in Holy Quran and Sunnah of the 
Prophet Mohammed. Therefore, the Saudi government in Article (1) of the General Principles 
of the Statute of Governance Law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia indicates that the Kingdom 
                                                
7	
  Fisher	
  and	
  Taylor,	
  op.	
  cit.	
  Supra	
  4.	
  	
  
8 Alaaqlah are the male factions of a tribe whom relevant to the killer from his father’s side. Here, Arab 
traditions advocate that, in the case of murder, the Alaaqlah collect blood money (Diyah) from each of the tribe’s 
males to be paid to the victim’s family. See,Almirdawy.A(1480) Alinsaf. Ministry of Islamic affairs, Saudi 
Arabia. Volume 26, p50 
9 Ma’sum Billah. M (2007). Applied Takaful and Modern Insurance law and practice. Asia: Sweet &Maxwell, 
p.5. 
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has taken as the Holy Quran and Sunnah10 of the Prophet (peace be upon him) as its 
constitution.11 
1.2.3 SAUDI INSURANCE LAW  
 
In recognition of the fact that there has been a continuously increasing importance attributed to 
the role of the Saudi insurance sector, in 2003 the Saudi government officially published the 
Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and assigned the mission of 
supervising the insurance sector to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which in 
turn declared in 2004 The implementation of regulations to interpret the execution of a new 
Insurance Law.  
 
1.3 Motivation 
 
The implications of the motivations of this thesis are derived from three main inspirations: 
1. There are serious arguments between Islamic Sharia scholars regarding the conflict of 
some articles in laws and the insurance regulations published in 2003 and 2004 in 
Saudi Arabia, in relation to the Islamic Sharia rules and the General Principles of the 
Statute of Governance Law in the country. 
2. The remarkable growth of the Saudi insurance market has been attributed mainly to 
expanded compulsory insurance outlets especially in the medical and car insurance 
sectors. Moreover, gross written premiums increased by 33.8% in the year 2009, a rise 
of $ 3.9 billion (S.R. 14.6 billion) which is predicted to rise to as much as 8 billion by 
the year 2015.12 Furthermore, The Ernst & Young World Takaful Report 2012 states 
that takaful premiums increased by 19 per cent in 2010 with global contributions 
totaling $8.3 billion. The GCC accounted for $5.6 billion of these contributions of 
                                                
10 Sunnah is an Arabic term referring to all of the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings. 
11 The Basic Law of Governance. (2003) Part one, General Principles, Article.1, Translation of Saudi law, Series 
2, pp.17. 
12	
  Hodgins,	
  P.	
  and	
  Beswetherick,	
  M.,	
  2009,	
  Insurance	
  Regulation	
  in	
  the	
  Kingdom	
  of	
  Saudi	
  Arabia,	
  Clyde	
  &	
  co,	
  
International	
  Law	
  Firm	
  [	
  was	
  Available	
  online	
  at:	
  http://www.clydeco.com/knowledge/articles/insurance-­‐in-­‐the-­‐
kingdom-­‐of-­‐saudi-­‐arabia.cfm,	
  viewed	
  1	
  July,	
  2010]	
  (	
  not	
  available	
  now).	
  Reattributed	
  by	
  SAMA	
  Insurance	
  
Market	
  Report	
  2010.	
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which Saudi Arabia cooperative insurance market accounted for $4.3 billion (or 51 per 
cent of global contributions)13. 
3. My Sharia14 background and personal interest to investigate and read about Islamic 
finance led me to acquire a diploma in Islamic Finance15 which highlighted the need 
within Islamic finance to research and evaluate models of Takaful contracts as an 
alternative solution to conventional insurance which has been forbidden in Islamic 
Sharia.  
 
1.4 Purpose 
 
The purpose of the paper is to evaluate whether Takaful commercial Insurance can operate in 
Saudi Arabia, within the constraints of Sharia Law; further, to assess whether the legal 
regulations in Saudi Arabia comply with Sharia law. 
 
1.5 The objectives of the thesis 
 
The objectives of the thesis are as followed: 
1. To illustrate a well-structured understanding of Takaful insurance, insurance contracts 
and insurance law, and discover its similarities and differences in reference to the 
global model of commercial and personal insurance. 
 
2. To identify the Takaful as an Islamic provision and determine its various applications 
on the basis of Sharia law, as affected by the different opinions expressed at Fiqhi 
(jurisprudential) schools. 
 
                                                
13 Hodgins. P and Owen.M. The Saudi Arabian Cooperative Insurance Market: The premier League of Islamic 
Insurance. Clye & co. Available online: http://www.clydeco.com/insight/updates/the-saudi-arabian-cooperative-
insurance-market-the-premier-league-of-islami 20-08-2012.   
14	
  I	
  graduated	
  from	
  Imam	
  Mohammed	
  bin	
  Saud	
  Islamic	
  University	
  in	
  Riyadh.	
  
15	
  This	
  diploma	
  was	
  obtained	
  at	
  The	
  Markfield	
  Institute	
  of	
  Higher	
  Education	
  (MIHE).	
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3. To discuss and analyse the Islamic Sharia perspective in insurance contracts and 
demonstrate the views of the modern Muslim scholars. 
 
4.  To determine the legal conflict between the law of Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies and its implementation regulations in Saudi Arabia and the most 
significant barriers towards these.  
 
5. To examine the effects of implementation regulations upon companies’ performance 
and to observe whether or not they comply with Sharia law. Also, how the requirement 
of Islamic insurance Takaful works under Saudi Law. 
6. To confirm how the Islamic vision reflected by Islamic experts and scholars impacts 
upon insurance companies and those applying and implementing regulations.  
 
7. Finally, to attempt to find rational solutions to enhance the legal steps to provide an 
Islamic legal safe ground corresponding with the needs of the national market and the 
growth of Takaful industry. 
These considerable issues are an attempt to provide Islamic legal solutions that are in 
compliance with the growth of the market, and which also meet the requirements of Islamic 
law. 
 
1.6 The significance of the thesis 
 
The significance of this thesis is derived from the importance of its subject; it will not seek to 
justify commercial insurance forbidden by Islamic law, but rather to enhance the Saudi 
insurance laws so as to benefit from the highly developed regulations and applications 
worldwide. 
Therefore, this thesis is not going to introduce a hypothesis for a form of insurance, so as 
affecting the financial engineering business, it is instead intended to legally prove that an 
Islamic Insurance Takaful application is applicable and profitable, by studying the models of 
Takaful worldwide. In addition, it seeks to assure that forms of solidarity between 
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policyholders, so as to cooperate with and guarantee each other with regards to whether one of 
they can be successful. 
Furthermore, one of the significant contributions of this thesis is that it going to identify the 
extent to which governments or companies are not applying Sharia rules. To achieve this it 
will critically analyse Saudi insurance laws, regulations and companies’ applications as 
evidence of compliance or non-compliance with Islamic Sharia. 
 One of the most important and significant impact of this thesis is access to resources. I refer 
in this thesis to numerous books in Arabic which are considered as primary and secondary 
resources in Islamic law and Insurance. Thus, considerable effort has been expended to 
translate many important legal insurance and Sharia texts from Arabic to English; an effort 
which represents a significant addition and positive contribution to researchers working in the 
Islamic insurance field.  
     
1.7 study capacity and justifications 
 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) is the department responsible for the regulation 
and supervision of the insurance industry in Saudi. Article 1 of the law of Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia held that “Insurance in the Kingdom shall 
be undertaken through registered insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner as it 
is provided within the article establishment of the National Company for Cooperative 
Insurance and in accordance with the principles of Islamic Sharia”16. However implementing 
the regulation for this law clearly conflicts with this article as does making it comply with 
conventional insurance instead of the cooperative insurance subject matter, which raised a 
considerable number of legal issues as discussed among legal experts, lawyers, judges and 
economic experts. Their opinions can be summarised as: 
• The implementing regulation does not disclose the nature of cooperative insurance or 
its criterion.  
• In Article 61, relating to the investment account, it is not permitted to invest in 
governmental and foreign bonds which are prohibited in Sharia law because of Riba.  
                                                
16 Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia. Published by Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) available online on; http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar/control/procedure/Insurance.pdf 
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• They confirm that the implementing regulation must comply with the provision of the 
Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies.  
 
1.8 Methodology 
 
Commercial and Family insurance in its conventional format contravene many Islamic Shariah 
Injunctions such as prohibition of Riba (Interest), the business of speculative transactions and 
al-maisir (gambling). On the other hand commercial and family insurance are increasingly 
becoming the basic need for the people. This research is aimed to explore the Islamic Sharia 
literature to develop a framework to provide necessary insurance framework while complying 
with the Shariah injunctions as laid out in Quran and Sunnah, the two major sources of law in 
Islam.  
Creswell (2003)17 suggested that in social science research is conducted to perform one or 
many of the following tasks: 
• Explore and idea 
• Probe an issue 
• Solve a problem 
• Make an argument that compels us to turn to outside help 
This research is an attempt to explore the idea of insurance in Islamic framework and develop 
a model to meet the 21st century requirements of people in the Muslim world, especially in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In its very nature this is a primary research in the field of Islamic 
law where an attempt is made to study the features of the commercial and family insurance 
and develop a Sharia compliant framework to develop an insurance product to meet the needs 
                                                
17 Cresswell, J. W. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
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of people. The research is conducted in the context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Nonetheless, the findings and model formulated in this research is applicable to all the 
Muslims world. 
In this research an inductive approach is adopted to answer the research questions and achieve 
the aims of the research. 
While epistemologically this research followed an Interpretivism approach. Bryman (2008) 
suggests that interpretivism18 is an approach where researcher is aiming to place the 
interpretations that have been elicited into a social scientist framework. In this research an 
effort is made to interpret other’s interpretations and later these interpretations are associated 
with the concepts, theories and literature on Sharia law and conventional law of commercial 
and family insurance. 
In order to achieve the aims of this research, a careful study on the writings of Sharia law 
scholars and conventional Insurance discipline is important. The writings of conventional law, 
economics and finance helped to understand the framework and practices of the insurance 
industry while Shairia writings were studied to development an argument against the current 
practices of insurance industry. The research also provide an in depth analysis the law and 
practices of Insurance industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Later an effort was made to 
develop a purposeful argument to chalk out a sharia compliant framework to provide 
commercial and family insurance. In order to place the established ideas of the fiqh scholars 
into a proper context the literature developed by contemporary Islamic economists and finance 
experts were also reviewed.  
In summary an interpretive research approach was adopted to conduct an inductive and 
analytical study of insurance in Islamic framework and later to develop a Sharia compliant 
model of Insurance.  Furthermore, the research explores the Takaful i.e. Sharia compliant 
                                                
18 Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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insurance in the context of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and developed a general model based 
Sharia guidelines which could be implemented across the Muslim world.  
 
1.9 Contribution and Originality of the Thesis  
 
The thesis, is an evaluation of the legal and jurisprudential concept of Takaful Commercial 
Insurance and its application in Saudi Arabia, as an Islamic insurance concept, which is 
grounded in Commercial transactions (Muamalat), and observes the laws and regulations of 
Saudi Arabia in accordance with Sharia (Islamic law); which was established more than 1431 
years ago.  
Therefore the originality and contribution of the work can be outlined as follows: 
1. I was interested in writing my thesis and yet found that it was not an easy task to deal 
with two mentalities and two languages; namely (Arabic and English). Furthermore, 
using primary and secondary resources in Islamic law to transfer knowledge from one 
to another was the most difficult challenge I faced, and I found it of significance to this 
thesis. Therefore, the huge amount of Arabic resources used in this thesis will make it 
original. 
2. All the Takaful models applied worldwide were dispersed in books, at companies’ 
websites and with financial reports, and I gathered them all together in one book with 
critical analysis and evaluation according to Islamic Sharia. These tasks were not 
entirely linked to my reading and I do believe they will make a good addition to the 
Islamic law and finance library. 
3. Saudi Arabia is an important country within the Muslim world and all Muslims 
confirm that the Saudi government applies Sharia in all its transactions, and there is 
rarely ever a critical analysis of Saudi insurance laws published, from either a legal or 
a financial perspective. Therefore, studying Insurance laws in Saudi Arabia and 
implementing its regulations and conducting a critical analysis involves enhancing this 
important law based on considerable recommendations that will legally benefit the 
Insurance sector financially not only in Saudi Arabia but also in other Muslim 
countries. 
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4. I have studied the practices of the largest two companies in Saudi insurance market: 
the National Company for Cooperative Insurance NCCI (Tawuniya) and Al Rajhi 
Company for Cooperative Insurance (Al Rajhi Takaful) as case studies in this thesis; 
applying qualitative and quantitative methods, thus all recommendations and results 
will certainly benefit the companies themselves and their clients.  
 
1.10 Research Questions 
 
The questions proposed by this thesis are;  
1. Do Takaful applications provide suitable solutions to resolve insurance 
problems? 
2. To what extent does the legal framework of insurance in Saudi Arabia comply 
with Sharia law?  
3. Do applications of Takaful companies in Saudi Arabia meet Sharia law 
requirements? 
 
1.11 The scope of thesis   
 
To answer the questions above I have divided my work into six chapters: 
 
Chapter 1: Commercial Insurance from the perspective of Islamic Sharia Law, 
This chapter will present a historical background to the insurance development; I will identify 
the concept of insurance and its principles in relation to Islamic Sharia, as an introduction to 
the research.  
 
Chapter 2: The Models of Takaful Contract,  
This chapter will describe and critically analyse the Models of Takaful (Mudarabah, Wakalah 
(agency), Wakalah with Wakf) and Family Takaful and the differentiations of opinions 
between the different schools of Islamic Sharia law. 
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Chapter 3: Critical analysis of the Saudi insurance system from the perspective of Islamic 
Sharia Law.  
In this chapter I will undertake a critical study of Saudi insurance law and its consistency 
within the Saudi regime, and of Islamic Sharia as a constitution for the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Chapter 4: Applications of Islamic Insurance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (using National 
Company for Cooperative Insurance (Tawuniya) and Al Rajhi Company for Cooperative 
Insurance (Al Rajhi Takaful) as case studies). 
In this chapter I undertake a legal evaluation for the applications of Islamic Insurance 
Companies in Saudi Arabia using the National Company for Cooperative Insurance 
(Tawuniya) and Al Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance (Al Rajhi Takaful) as case 
studies.  
 
Chapter 5: Evaluation of the Application of Islamic Insurance Takaful. 
This chapter will evaluate the formulas and methods applied for attaining both Islamic and 
conventional insurance, considering commercial insurance, mutual insurance, and Islamic 
insurance. At the close of this chapter I will include some ideas for the possible enhancement 
of the Islamic insurance field. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter will give a summary of the key point of the thesis following by recommendations 
and suggestions for further work.    
  
1.12 Summary 
 
This introduction has provided a brief synopsis of the Legal and jurisprudential concepts 
associated with Islamic Mutual Cooperative Insurance Takaful and its application in Saudi 
Arabia; also covering some personal reflections; the purpose, aim, methodology and scope of 
work.  
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The next section, Chapter 2, will examine the distinctiveness of Conventional Insurance under 
Islamic Sharia law, logically presenting a chronological timeline for Insurance, its features, 
principle and pillars of insurance per se, and the role and effects of Fiqhi [Islamic 
Jurisprudence] on the legality or otherwise of Insurance in Saudi Arabia.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: COMMERCIAL INSURANCE FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Islam is a global phenomenon; its influence on both people, and the economy, is widespread.  
For a long time, Muslims have conducted their lives and businesses abiding by the extensive 
teachings associated with Islamic principles. These principles confirm equality, advocate 
mercy and promote cooperation and shared responsibility among those undertaking business 
transactions. However, as the insurance business routinely deals with the uncertainty of loss, 
and does not conform to Islamic conventions, insurance has long been discouraged within 
Islamic society. Nevertheless, this same society has awaited development with regard to this 
important aspect of life. 
 
In view of the above, Chapter 1 will examine the distinctiveness of commercial insurance 
under Islamic Sharia law, covering the following points: a global and historical overview of 
commercial insurance considering Takaful Commercial Insurance as an alternative solution; 
significant and distinctive features of insurance; pillars and principles of insurance; the 
developmental effects of Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), and the views of Muslim scholars, 
experts and economists, influencing changes introduced over the last 3000 years.  
 
2.2 Global Development of Commercial Insurance 
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The following section highlights the global development of commercial insurance throughout 
the ages, concluding by depicting the current position. Initially, for example, Vaughan, E. 
J.(1997) has confirmed that early methods of transferring, and/or distributing, risk were 
practised by Chinese and Babylonian traders as early as the 2nd and 3rd millennia BC1. Here, 
                                                
1Vaughan, E. J., 1997, Risk Management, New York: Wiley. quoted from   
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_insurance . Retrieved 2012-08-06. 
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Chinese merchants travelling over treacherous river rapids would redistribute their wares 
across many vessels in order to limit losses due to individual boats capsizing.2 
 
2.2.2 THE EMERGENCE OF INSURANCE 
 
Established in 1750 BC, Hammurabi’s Code pioneered the processes and procedural aspects 
of insuring goods and protecting citizens by applying ‘just and fair’ practices. One thousand 
years later, the inhabitants of Rhodes developed the concept of ‘general averages’. Merchants 
whose goods were shipped together, en masse, would pay a proportionally divided premium 
intended to reimburse any merchant whose goods were jettisoned during storm or wreckage.3  
The Achaemenian monarchs of Ancient Persia, were first to insure citizens in an official 
capacity by registering the insurance process in governmental notary offices. An insurance 
ceremony was performed each year in Norouz4 where the heads of different ethnic groups 
willingly presented gifts to the monarch. The most important gift was presented during a 
special gathering. When a gifts value exceeded 10,000 Derrik (Achaemenian gold coins) the 
gift was registered with an assigned office. This system was advantageous to those who 
presented costly gifts. For others, less expensive offerings were impartially assessed by 
confidants of the court; these assessments were then registered via designated offices5. 
In short, this early example of an inventory system meant that those registered as having 
presented gifts at court, would be assisted by both the monarch, and the court itself, in times of 
need. Further, wherever the registered amount exceeded 10,000 Derrik, donors would be 
eligible to receive twice this amount in aid.6 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 Ma’sum Billah. M (2007). Applied Takaful and Modren Insurance Law and Practice. Sweet &Maxwell Asia 
2007. P5 
4 The Beginning of the Iranian New Year. 
5 Iran Law. Insurance in Ancient Iran. available online at : http://www.iran-law.com/article.php3?id_article=61 . 
Retrieved 2012-08-06. 
6 Ibid. Also  available as well at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_insurance . Retrieved 2012-08-06.  
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2.2.3 THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF INSURANCE  
 
In c. 600 AD, Greek and Roman citizens fanned the origins of health and life insurance via 
forming guilds known as ‘benevolent societies’. These guilds provided care for families, and 
paid funeral expenses for subscribing members upon death.7 
 
Further to this, Macpherson observed that in the year “51”, of the first century, Claudius, the 
Roman emperor, invented ship insurance by encouraging import merchants to buy corn 
(important to Roman survival), all year round including the winter months. The emperor stated 
that this would protect against losses and accidents which might arise from “the inclemency of 
the season”, and he also made the importers could be sure of a certain rate of profit.8 
Nevertheless, Park claimed that insurance was ‘wholly unknown’ to the ancient world, 
insisting that there is little to intimate “the smallest proofs of the existence of such a custom 
have not come down to the present times”. Park undertook an exploration of the history of the 
insurance contract and examined the laws of Rhodes, Romans, Amalfi, Oleron and Wisbuy, 
yet found no evidence of these practices.9  
 
However, in Holdsworth’s ‘History of English Law’10, the author unearthed a number of 
contracts modelled on insurances, presenting various samples of stipulations that Greek and 
Roman traders would include in contracts of carriage. These stipulations were designed to 
modify the risk of damage to cargo carried out on either the consignees’, or the carriers’, 
behalf.11 
 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Macpherson, David, Annals of Commerce, (London: Nichols, 1805).Vol. I,  p. 151. Although Macpherson 
believes that this event is the only possible origin of insurance, personal enquiry has prompted me to disagree 
with him on this point. It seems to me that support was provided to merchants by the emperor (Claudius), as the 
highest authorised power, outweighing any support from government, during extraordinary economic 
circumstances in order to safeguard the economy, and empire, from national suffering. Also, Macphersons’  
example does not seem to constitute a commercial contract between two parties, where one undertakes action, in 
consideration of a premium, to indemnify the other for losses caused by certain events. Therefore, to me, 
insurance was not yet established during this period of time, but instead, can be recognised as a governmental 
guarantee, rather than a commercial transaction. 
9 Algamdi, E. (2006) Insurable Intrest in property insurance: A Comparative study amongst English, Canadian 
and Saudi Arabia Laws. University Of London University College London Faculty Of Laws 2006. For more 
information see the Author’s comments in the footnote. P 26. 
10 Holdsworth, William S., A History of English Law, (London: Methuen & co. ltd., 1925). Vol. 8, p. 274. 
11 Holdsworth, Ibid. 
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A range of legitimate Islamic insurance provisions have been issued throughout both recent, 
and distant, history. The first of which is in the form of a quotation from Ashhab, one of the 
Maliki scholars who lived during the second half of Hijra in the year (815, approx.). Ashhab 
stated that “A guarantee should not centre on a certain price, but must instead involve 
agreement, from one man to another, to assure a commodity for a certain length of time.  If 
not, paying guarantor money for a matter other than sale or purchase, essentially represents 
uncertainty and gambling”.12 
 
It has also been claimed that insurance was established by the Jewish population as a result of 
being exiled from France by Philip Augustus in 1182. In fact, The Talmud deals with several 
aspects of insuring goods. According to this perspective, after settling peacefully in Italy, past 
experiences stirred this community to secure their property, should they be banished again. It 
is said, the success of this insurance contract was noticed by merchants in northern Italy, who 
“were struck with its utility, were prompted to adopt and extend its use”13.  
 
Indeed, Marshall stated that, “…, according to Cleirac, bills of exchange and policies of 
insurance are of Jewish birth and invention, and have nearly the same name, Polizza di 
cambio, Polizza di sicuranza. He adds that the Italians and Lombard’s, who were spectators of 
this Jewish intrigue, and the instruments employed in conducting it, preserved the forms of 
these instruments, which they afterwards well knew how to avail themselves of, in conveying 
out of Italy the effects of the Guelph’s, when driven from thence by the Gibbelines.”14  
 
Although Marshall did not accept this view, Duer, with some scepticism, did. On this point, 
Duer states that “the sagacity of the Jews, in matter of finance is well known, and they were 
placed in circumstances of difficulty and distress that were well calculated to sharpen their 
invention. That they would resort to some expedient for averting or diminishing the losses to 
which they were exposed, we may certainly believe, and the expedients of insurance and bills 
                                                
12  Alswailam, S. (2009). stoppages in Insurance Issue.  International Islamic Bureau for Economic and Finance. 
Available online http://www.sfhatk.com/vb/uploaded/471_21252008374.rar. Retrieved 2012-08-06 
13 Duer, J. (1945), “The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance”, (New York: J.S. Voorhies). Vol. I,, p. 30. 
14 Marshall, Samuel. (1805), “A Treatise on the Law of Insurance”, (Boston: Printed by Manning and Loring, 
for D. Johnson).p 4.   
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of exchange which they are said to have invented, at the same time, admirable suited to 
accomplish their object.”15 
 
Duer presented factual, linguistic evidence that the insurance contract originated in the early 
13th century in Italy, and claimed that “The Italian, alone explains its meaning and propriety. 
The word "Polizza," in Italian, signifies any note or memorandum in writing, creating, or 
evidence of a legal obligation; and hence the name is applied, with the same propriety, to a bill 
of exchange, a promissory note, and even to a receipt for money as to the written agreement of 
insurance. It seems a safe conclusion that insurance originated in the country, the language of 
which, has given to the agreement of the parties its distinctive appellation”16.  
As previously mentioned, during the thirteenth century, the Lombards, a group of Italian 
merchants, adopted insurance agreements, and according to Park, were the first to present 
these contracts of insurance to the world.17  
 
According to Marshall, the Lombards played an important role in Europe. During the 12th and 
13th centuries, the commerce of Europe was almost entirely in the hands of the Italian 
Lombards, with companies and/or factories based in almost every European State. From 
thence, they became the only contending merchants and bankers, and “in those times, rivalled 
… the Jews themselves in the art of usury”18. 
 
Ahmed Ben Yehia (1436), a Muslim scholar, stated that any “Guarantee for stolen or sunken 
objects is null void”19. This assertion is fully applied in both maritime insurance and fire 
insurance. 
 
Furthermore, El Qorra Daghi (2006), has suggested that these fatwa’s20 do not constitute 
decisive evidence that the issue of insurance was known to Islamic Sharia scholars at this time. 
                                                
15  Duer, supra ,footnote 13 , pp. 30, 31. 
16 Duer, ibid, p. 29. 
17 F. Hildyard, J. A. Park, A System of the Law of Marine Insurance (1842), (Abingdon, Oxon.: Professional 
Books, 8th ed., 1987).), Vol. I, lxviii .  
18 Marshall .supra footnote 14, p.10 
19  Ahmad ibn Yahya (840H) (1436). Albahar Alzaikher. Alrisalah Establishment Puplisher. Beirut. 
20  Fatwas is an Arabic term meaning a formal opinion offered by a highly respected and well known scholar or 
institution. 
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Nevertheless, El Qorra Daghi (2006) added that, particularly in the case of maritime law, it 
might be possible that insurance already existed and prevailed in the West before Ahmed Bin 
Yehia’s time21. 
 
Dickson (1960) confirms that some forms of insurance had developed in London by the early 
decades of the seventeenth century. For example, the will of the English colonist Robert 
Hayman mentions two "policies of insurance" taken out with the diocesan Chancellor of 
London, Arthur Duck. To the value of £100 each, one policy relates to the safe arrival of 
Hayman's ship in Guyana, and the other, is in regard to "one hundred pounds assured by the 
said Doctor Arthur Ducke on my life". Hayman's will was signed and sealed on 17th 
November 1628. However, this was not verified until 163322.  
UK Insurance, as we know it today, can be traced to the Great Fire of London, which in 1666 
devoured more than 13,000 houses. The devastating effects of the fire converted the 
development of insurance “from a matter of convenience into one of urgency, a change of 
opinion reflected in Sir Christopher Wren's inclusion of a site for 'the Insurance Office' in his 
new plan for London in 1667.”23  
 
Nevertheless, a number of attempted fire insurance schemes came to nothing. However, in 
1681 Nicholas Barbon, and eleven of his associates, established England's first fire insurance 
company, the Insurance Office for Houses, at the back of the Royal Exchange. Initially, 5,000 
homes were insured via Barbon's scheme.24  
 
Toward the end of the seventeenth century, London's growing importance as a centre for trade 
increased demand for marine insurance. In the late 1680s, Edward Lloyd opened a coffee 
house, a popular haunt for ship owners, merchants, and ships’ captains. Lloyd’s coffee house 
thereby became a reliable information centre regarding the latest shipping news. The cafe 
                                                
21 El Qora Daghi.A (2006). Islamic Insurance. Dar Albashaer Alislamiah. Beiruit, Lebanon.  
22 Dickson, P.G.M. (1960). The Sun Insurance Office 1710-1960: The History of Two and a half Centuries of 
British Insurance. London: Oxford University Press. pp.324. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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became the meeting place for parties wishing to insure cargoes and ships, and those willing to 
underwrite such ventures25.  
 
Today, Lloyd's of London26 remains the leading market for marine and other specialist types 
of insurance. 
 
According to Dickson, the first insurance company in the United States underwrote fire 
insurance and was formed in Charles Town (modern-day Charleston), South Carolina, in 
1732. Benjamin Franklin helped to popularise, and make standard, the practice of insurance, 
particularly against fire, in the form of Perpetual Insurance. 
 
In 1752, Franklin founded the Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from 
Loss by Fire. Franklin's company was the first to make contributions toward fire prevention. 
Not only did his company warn against certain fire hazards, it refused to insure certain 
buildings where the risk of fire was too great, excluding all wooden houses for example.  
In the period loosely dated between 1770 and 1820s, Britain experienced an accelerated 
process of economic change, transforming a largely agrarian economy into the world's first 
industrial economy. This phenomenon is referred to as the "industrial revolution", since 
changes were all encompassing and permanent.27 
 
The first Arabic scholar to talk about conventional insurance provision was Ibn Abideen 
(1836) stating “It is tradition that if/when traders rent a boat from a non-Muslim, they pay him 
a wage however, an extra amount is paid to another person living within the native country; 
this extra money was called (SOKRAH28)”. Here, should any possessions/money perish via 
fire, wreckage or theft, the native guarantor holds this money against what has been lost. 
Abideen then noted “I think that traders have no right to take compensation for damages”29. 
 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Note that it is not an insurance company. 
27 Ibid. 
28 This word (SOKRAH) originally derived from a French word ‘securite’, and in Arabic dictionaries means 
insurance or guarantee. Altwajery. A (2009). Altaameen almua’asir fi muzan alsharia .king Saud University. 
Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. P22.  
29 Ibn Abideen(1836), Ibn Abideen Comment, Dar ehiaa Alturath, Beirut, v 3, P. 249-250 
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In Arab countries, an explanation of relations between contracting parties is considered 
definition of contract. Representing the most ancient principles, Egyptian civil law defines a 
contract as “…an agreement by virtue of which the insurer is committed to pay the insured, 
and/or the beneficiary, an amount of money, revenue and/or financial reimbursement, in the 
event of pre-agreed incident or danger, against a premium or any other financial payment paid 
by the insured to the insurer”30.  
 
This definition has been adopted by Kuwaiti civil law, article no. (773)31, Syrian civil law, 
article no. (713) and Libyan civil law, article no. (947)32.  
 
Imported to Arab countries from the west in the 19th century, Commercial Insurance was 
considered a foreign pact intended for Muslim Arabs. The emergence of the insurance contract 
in Arab and Muslim countries motivated Islamic scholars and legal experts to consider this 
matter closely.  
 
At this juncture, Scholars and Islamic institutions made every effort, using Islamic 
jurisprudential methodology, to understand and form logical critical analyses of the insurance 
contract; further highlighting the features of this type of contract, including what makes it 
distinct from others. Scholars also provided an in-depth analysis, dividing the contract into 
pillars and submitting an appropriate description for each pillar according to Islamic Sharia 
Law. 
 
In December 1906, the Egyptian Court resolved that the act of claiming compensation for life 
insurance is legally void due to being impermissible33.  
 
In 2008, the G20 countries suffered economic meltdown with the collapse of governments, 
high-street and investment banks, and insurance companies being declared bankrupt. Millions 
of people throughout the world have since been affected by the financial chaos, dishonesty and 
                                                
30 El Sanhoury.A (1964) El Wasit in Explaining Civil Law, Dar Alnahadah alarabiah, V 7, P. 1084. 
31 Sharaf El Din. A (1983) Insurance Provisions in Law and Judiciary, Kuwait University Edition, P. 18. 
32 El Gammal. G (2007), Commercial Insurance and Islamic Alternative, Dar El Eatesam Edition 2009, Cairo, 
Eisa Abdo (2004), Insurance Between Permission & Prohibition, Dar El Eatesam Edition 2004, P. 8. 
33El Qora Daghi. A (2006). Supra footnote 22. 
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lack of transparency34. The cornerstone features and pillars which Takaful, is based on, are 
now under threat. To date, the insurance market is in turmoil. Takaful is proposing to reinforce 
the Islamic pillars of service excellence via the following principles: policyholders co-operate 
among themselves for the common good; every policyholder pays a subscription to help those 
that need assistance; losses are divided and liabilities spread according to the community 
pooling system; Uncertainty is eliminated in respect of subscription and compensation, and no 
one member of the scheme derives advantage to the cost of others. 
 
2.3 Principles of commercial insurance 
 
Insurance is deemed to be one of the most important financial tools and one of the main 
supports of the global economy. This is due to the financial liquidity provided by these 
companies, which enhances the state economy and supports its indicators.  
Established principles of insurance give confidence to the investor, particularly when aspects 
of danger are multiplied over sea and air and, in addition, the ratio of crime has risen in 
economic countries. However, the mechanisms involved in applying these Principles have, in 
the past, been met with religious opposition from the global Christian church. What is more, 
this rejection was consolidated by Muslim scientists following the emergence of Islam.  
 
More significantly, in order to form the foundations, and to develop the shape, of insurance, 
Holdsworth argued that, in the 14th century, insurance was modelled on maritime loans, 
developed into Bottomry contracts. With the maritime loan, “the debtor declares that he has 
received an advanced sum, and promises to restore an equivalent sum upon the safe arrival of 
the ship and/or goods, as compensation. In this instance, the insurer plays the part of the 
debtor, declaring that he has received the amount for which the ship and/or goods are insured, 
and promises to repay this sum in the event of the ship and/or goods failing to arrive 
safely”.35  
 
                                                
34Anup Shah (2010). Global Financial Crisis. Global Issues webpage. Available online at: 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis Retrieved 10- 08 -2012.   
35 Holdsworth, William S, supra footnote 10, p 277 
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Holdsworth further stated that, “It was only natural … the earliest insurers should be ship 
owners”, since these merchants could “…charge a smaller premium because they…” were 
better placed to “…guarantee a safe arrival”. Therefore, the author concluded, “…it was 
inevitable that those who drew up the earliest agreements should be the same people drawing 
up contracts of loan based on Bottomry”. Hence, it was from the latter contract that much of 
the most important, technical terms were originally taken, such as "policy" and "premium" for 
instance. These terms remain applicable to the present day36.  
 
Thus, Holdsworth identified two principles of insurance law based on this concept. The first, 
was the principle of insurable interest. This meant that “the insured must be the owner, or at 
least have some interest in the property insured”. “A man cannot transfer to another, what he 
does not own”37.  
 
Therefore, Holdsworth inferred, “from the outset, the insurance agreement was a true contract 
of indemnity, as opposed to a mere wager on the safe arrival of a ship or its merchandise”. The 
second principle upheld that, “if a ship or goods did not arrive safely, and the Resolutive 
Condition38 failed, the insurers were entitled to as much of the insured property as could be 
recovered”39. 
 
Both recently, and formerly, the Principle of insurance has been met with support regarding 
the concepts of joint liability, solidarity and the decrease and/or removal of risk. 
2.3.1 INDEMNITY 
 
Indemnity – Insurance is essentially a contract of indemnity where the insurance company 
indemnifies the insured against certain risks for a consideration known as a premium40. 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37Ibid. 
38 Resolutive condition is, in civil law, a condition that, upon fulfilment, terminates an already enforceable 
obligation and entitles the parties to be resorted to their original position. B. A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary, 
7th ed., (1999), p. 290. 
39 Ibid, 278. 
40 Mehr. R and Camack. E. Principles of Insurance. Richard D Irwin, 6th edition, 1976, pp 34 – 37. 
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2.3.2 INSURABLE INTEREST 
 
Insurable interest – signifies the loss of goods or services which directly affect the insured.41 
 
2.3.3 UTMOST GOOD FAITH 
 
Utmost good faith – refers to both the insured, and the insurance company, agreeing that 
neither should wilfully hide anything of relevance from the other.42 
 
2.3.4 MITIGATION 
 
Mitigation – denotes that the insured will behave responsibly and take due care so that risk of 
loss, or actual loss, is minimised.43 
 
2.3.5 Subrogation 
 
Subrogation – means the insurance company acquires the legal right to act on behalf of the 
insured i.e. the insurance company steps into the shoes of the insured.44 
 
2.3.6 PROXIMATE CAUSE 
 
Causa Proxima or Proximate Cause – involves establishing the reasons behind loss in order to 
ascertain whether this loss is covered under the policy. 45 
 
During the reign of Charles II’s and Queen Anne, new forms/policies of insurance were 
developed via expressed agreements. These policies discharged a merchant from having an 
interest in the insured object and/or subject matter. In addition, the insurer promised to pay the 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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insured upon occurrence of risk, regardless of the presence of interest in the insured entity. 
This kind of policy was considered valid and legal46 and incorporated terms such as "interest 
or no interest" and "without further proof of interest than the policy" and "without benefit of 
salvage to the underwriter" and Policy Proof of Interest, for example.47  
 
According to Clark, "Much insurance…did indeed consist of underwriting on purely 
speculative contingencies such as the outcome of siege, the timing of birth, and especially the 
longevity of individuals.”48  
 
As a matter of fact, English courts regularly accepted wagering agreements in the guise of 
marine insurance so long as this did not give rise to questions regarding breach of public 
interest49. Nevertheless, invested parties were required to express mutual intention of 
wagering upon conclusion of an insurance policy, and/or to include a declaration such as 
"interest or no interest"; otherwise, as Algamdi (2006) confirmed, courts would interpret the 
policy as a contract of indemnity which the insurer would be obliged to indemnify the insured 
for a real loss. Therefore, the latter party was obligated to declare his interest in the insured 
subject matter in order to be insured50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46 Colinvaux, Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average, Vol. I, 1981, para.331. 
47 Algamdi.E (2006). Supra footnote 9. P34. 
48Geoffrey Clark, Betting on lives: The cultural of life insurance in England, 1695-1775, (1999), p. 3.  
49 See the argument of Lord Mansfield in Da Costa v Jones, (1778) 2 Cowp. 729, 735, ER. 98, 1331; Good v 
Elliott (1790) 3 T.R. 693, ER. 100, 808; Allen v Hearn (1785) 1 T. R. 56, ER. 99, 969; Jones v Randall (1774) 1 
Cowp. 37, 39, ER. 98, 954. 
50 Algamdi.E (2006). Supra footnote 9. P 35. 
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2.4 Conventional insurance from an Islamic contract perspective 
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As previously mentioned, commercial insurance was imported to Arab countries from the west 
in the 19th century and was viewed as a foreign contract intended/for/by Muslim Arabs. The 
emergence of the insurance contract in Arab and Muslim countries inspired Islamic scholars 
and legal experts to pay close attention to this matter. Therefore, this section will focus on the 
distinctive, but significant attributes of conventional insurance viewed under the gravitas of 
Islamic scholars. These points include salient features, pillars, principles and a consideration 
of the Jurisprudential (Fiqhi) interpretation of conventional, commercial Insurance, based on 
the opinions of Islamic, Sharia based scientists. 
 
In the past, it seems that insurance was not legally acceptable, but was instead considered an 
infringement to laws against usury, constituting both sin and crime 51.  Religious concerns 
universally emphasised the potential for corruption and greed regarding insurance, as noted 
below: 
 
Muslim scholars have varying views on insurance. Insurance policies that earn interest are 
generally considered to be a form of Riba (usury). Further, some consider policies that do not 
earn interest to be a form of gharar ( uncertainty). However, it may be argued that gharar is 
not a salient concept due to the application of actuarial science and underwriting.  
 
Jewish rabbinical scholars have also expressed reservations regarding insurance, considering it 
“…an avoidance of God's will”; although, most find the idea acceptable in moderation52.  
Some Christians believe insurance represents a lack of faith53 and there is a long history of 
resistance to commercial insurance in Anabaptist communities including Mennonites, Amish, 
                                                
51 Usury and gambling were prohibited in Islamic Shari’a law rendering insurance contracts invalid. See.  El 
Qora Daghi.A (2006). Supra footnote 22.p134-160. 
52 Jewish Association for Business Ethics - Insurance".  http://www.jabe.org/insurance.html. Retrieved 2012-08-
06 
53 CIC Insurance - Insurance and the Church".  http://www.cic.co.ke/template/t02.php?menuId=72. Retrieved 
2012-08-06. 
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Brethren in Christ, and Hutterites. However, many of these denominations participate in 
community-based self-insurance programs to spread out risk within their communities.54  
 
Thus, in view of the above, insurance was regularly disguised using an alternative form of 
contract such as a sale, an exchange or a maritime loan, in order to avoid questions about 
legitimacy55 in relation to the fulfilment of conditions regarding the potential risks befalling 
lenders. In the 13th century, for instance, some contracts, such as sale or loan contracts, were 
concluded via insurance formulae known as "commenda"56 and "mutuum"57 58.  
 
Historically, separate insurance contracts (i.e., stand alone policies independent of loans or 
other kinds of contracts) were devised in Genoa in the 14th century, as were insurance pools 
backed by pledges made against landed estates. These new insurance contracts allowed 
insurance to be separated from investment. This separation of function first proved useful in 
marine insurance. Insurance became far more sophisticated in post-Renaissance Europe, when 
specialised varieties were developed.59 
 
Based on historical information, Marshall asserts that, “The law of insurance is considered as a 
branch of marine law…It is also a branch of the law of merchants, being found in the practice 
of merchants, which is nearly the same in all the countries where insurance is in use…”, thus, 
“The law of merchants not being founded in the particular institutions, of local customs of any 
particular country, but consisting of certain principles which general convenience has 
established to regulate the dealings of merchants with each other in all countries, may be 
considered as a branch of public law”.60 
                                                
54 Rubinkam, Michael (2006). Amish Reluctantly Accept Donations. The Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/05/AR2006100501360.html. Retrieved 2012-
08-06. Insurance. Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online, Insurance". Available online at 
http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/I583ME.html.   Retrieved 2012-08-06. 
55 For more discussion on the history of usury laws, see, Holdsworth William S, supra footnote 10, p. 100 
56 “A business association in which one person has responsibility for managing all business property” Garner, 
supra, n 12, at 262. 
57 “A transaction (sometimes referred to as a bailment) in which goods are delivered, but instead of being 
returned, are replaced by other goods of the same kind. In common law, such a transaction is regarded as a sale or 
exchange, and not as a bailment, because these particular goods are not returned.” Garner, supra, n 12, at 1041. 
58Holdsworth William S, supra footnote 10, p 275. 
59 Algamdi.E (2006). Supra footnote 9. P 30- 32. 
60 Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Insurance, .supra footnote 14,  pp. 18, 19. 
40 
 
The Insurance Contract per se, includes principles and features which determined relations 
between the insurer and the insured namely, reimbursement paid against insurance premiums. 
Commercial insurance has a considerable range of features, some of which comply with 
Sharia law, and some which do not. 61  
 
2.4.2 THE DEFINITION OF CONTRACT (AQD) IN ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW. 
 
The Arabic word of Contract “Aqd” which means tying or tightening, like “tying rope” or 
“tightening it”. Thereby, in linguistic uses Arabs used the root verb to derive a noun meaning 
“firm belief” or “resolution”.62  
 
In Islamic sharia Aqd in general recognition is applied to every act which is undertaken in 
earnestness and with firm determination regardless of whether it emerges from a unilateral 
intention such as waqf, remission of debt, divorce, undertaking an Oath, or it result from 
mutual agreement such as sale, hire agency and mortgage.  Aqd in this sense is applied to an 
obligation irrespective of the fact that the source of this obligation is a unilateral declaration or 
agreement of tow declarations63. 
 
However, in the specific recognition it has been defined in different ways. The common 
feature of all definitions is that it is a combination of an offer an acceptance which is gives rise 
to certain legal consequences.64 In Islamic sharia terminology, Kharofa. A (2002) stated that a 
contract is “the legal bound between the speech of one party to the other’s, in a manner 
showing the “place”, which is the object of the contract”65.  Al-Inayah defined it as “a legal 
                                                
61 For more details, refer to Abdel Razzakk El Sanhoury (1964), supra footnote 26. El Wasit in Explaining Civil 
Law, Dar alnahdah alarabia for publishing, (7/1084), Sharaf El Din. A (1983) Insurance Provisions in Law and 
the Judiciary, Kuwait University Edition, P. 18, El Gammal. G, Commercial Insurance and the Islamic 
Alternative, Dar El Eatesam Edition, P. 62, Eisa Abdo, Insurance between Permission & Prohibition, Dar El 
Eatesam Edition, P. 8, Mohamed El Zaabi (1982), Insurance Contracts, PHD from Faculty of Law, Cairo 
University, P. 164. 
62 Kharofa. A (2002). The Loan Contract In the Islamic Law. International Islamic University Malaysia. first 
edition 2002. P3 
63 Masouri. M (2006). Islamic Law of Contracts and Business Transactions. Adam Puplishers & Distributiorors, 
New Delhi, 2006. P20 
64 Ibid. 
65 Kharofa. A (2002). The Loan Contract In the Islamic Law. International Islamic University Malaysia. first 
edition 2002. P4 
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relationship created by the conjunction of tow declarations, from which flow legal 
consequences with regard to the subject matter”, Al-sanhuri. A confirmed “Contract is 
concurrence of two wills to create an obligation or to shift or to relinquish it”.66 
 
Mansouri confirmed that contemporary Muslim scholars prefer the definition of the Al-Inayah 
referred to the above, because it much more comprehensive, and covers all the ingredients of 
contract: 
• Agreement based on offer and acceptance. 
• Contracting parties. 
• Completion of offer and acceptance in a legal manner, and 
• Subject matter.67 
 
2.4.3 BASIC PRINCIPLES AND FEATURES OF ISLAMIC INSURANCE  
 
As mentioned above, emergence of the insurance contract in both Arab and Muslim countries, 
has prompted Islamic scholars and legal experts to award this issue a high degree of 
prominence. At this point, the distinctive features of Asian, European and Islamic insurance 
contracts, formed by respective financial governing bodies (e.g. the SAFSA and FSA), are 
detailed below. However, as previously stated, some conform to Sharia law and some do not; 
thereby establishing good reason for Islamic scholars to jurisprudentially study insurance 
contracts and their effects. 
   
• Insurance as an obligatory contract 
An insurance contract is considered an obligatory agreement binding both parties upon 
completion of legal procedures.  In short, neither party may break their contractual obligations. 
This means that the insured is duly obligated to pay an agreed premium to the insurer, on 
                                                
66 Masouri. M (2006). Islamic Law of Contracts and Business Transactions. supra footnote .P21. 
67 Ibid. P22. 
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contractually specified dates, and commits the insurer to pay the agreed amount upon 
occurrence of the insured incident68.  
Thunayan (1993) has criticised this, asserting that these two commitments are not equal. To 
explain, the insured commits to pay a fixed premium on a fixed date based on an indefinite 
possibility. This possibility is certain neither in time, nor in amount/cost. Regardless of this, 
he/she is obligated to pay the agreed amount on time. On the other hand, as opposed to being 
fixed, the insurers’ commitment is merely probable regarding time and amount, since the 
incident may, or may not, occur. Here, the insurer must pay the whole amount if an incident 
wholly occurs, part of the amount if the incident partly occurs and, in cases where the incident 
does not occur, he/she/they will pay nothing at all. Also, in terms of time probability, if the 
incident occurs and the insurer is uncertain of the time of occurrence, insurer obligation 
becomes unclear thereby affecting validity according to Islamic Sharia rules69.   
 
However, Contracts in Islamic Sharia law vary. For example, some contracts are optional to 
fulfil, such as the Mudarabah contract, and some are obligatory70.  
 
• Insurance; a contract regarding financial reimbursement. 
The Financial Reimbursement Agreement represents a contract in which either party takes a 
return against what he gives. Further to this, in Islamic Sharia law, a contract of sale must be 
free from the qualities of gambling, interest (Riba), uncertainty (Gharar) and ignorance 
(Jahalah)71. This contradicts any contract based on donation/charity transaction in which one 
party gives to the other without return. Thus, the Insurance contract is considered a 
reimbursement agreement, where the insurer, or the insured, takes a return against premiums, 
and the insurer takes a return against what he commits to pay. What is more, the insured gain a 
return against premiums towards insurance maturity, if and when conditions are fulfilled. 
                                                
68 In the event that either party decides to cancel the agreement however, for practical reasons, todays insurance 
companies often state that the insurer is entitled to cancel the policy after notifying the other party within a 
certain period. Also, the insured is entitled to terminate his/her insurance policy with the insurer after notifying 
the other party within a certain period and paying the due amounts68. See Lloyds TSB insurance available online 
on: http://www.lloydstsb.com/insurance/car/car_insurance.asp  
69 Al Thanayan. S (1993), Insurance & its Provisions, Dar ibn Hazim for publishing, Edition 2003, Beirut, P. 91-
92. 
70 For further information, see Ibn qudamah (1223AC)(620H). Almugnee, Dar alkutub for publishing, edition 3, 
1997, Beirut.V 6.  
71 Melhem. A (2002) Islamic Insurance, Dar Almaarifah for publishing, P. 30 
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• Insurance; a time contract  
El Qora Daghi (2006) asserts that insurance is a time measured contract in which time is a 
basic element. To illustrate, the insurer is committed to incur the insured dangers, over a 
specific period, as of a certain date72. Therefore, the obligations of either party begin at a 
specific hour upon the date of commencement. Conversely, the contract ends at a specific hour 
upon the date of contract termination. During this period, the contract is considered 
continuous; thus legal experts have labelled it a continuity contract. 
 
What does this mean? Basically, that if the contract is cancelled either by both parties or by 
one, it shall be deemed irrevocable, i.e. the insured will lose the right to redeem any paid 
premium, whatever the amount. Also, in cases where the commitment of any party is negated, 
such as if the insured property is damaged under circumstances other than those it is insured 
against; the contract will be cancelled and the insured shall lose the right to redeem any paid 
premium73. This feature has prompted Islamic scholars to pay close attention regarding the 
outcomes of insurance contracts. 
 
• Insurance is a civil contract  
El Qora Daghi (2006) asserts that insurance is, in essence, a civil contract, that may become a 
commercial contract where an insurance company takes the form of a joint stock company 
based on the principles of commercial insurance, i.e. via fixed premium. In this instance, all 
business activities would be considered commercial. However, cooperative insurance 
companies tend not to be considered commercial because they are non-profit making and are 
not joint stock companies.  
 
However, some laws do not differentiate between insurance types, whether commercial or 
cooperative. El Qora Daghi (2006) points out that Kuwaiti trade law stipulates, in article 5/9, 
that “all kinds of insurance are considered commercial”74. The onus of differentiating “civil” 
                                                
72 El Qora Daghi. A (2006). Supra footnote 22. P. 18 
73  Thunayan. S (1993) supra footnote 50, P. 91-92, Abdel Razzak Farag (1962). Insurance Contract, Damascus 
University Edition, P. 120-121. 
74 Thunayan. S , Ibid. 
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from “commercial” belongs to the presiding authority and judiciary in terms of claims and 
procedures.   
 
• Insurance as a submission contract 
 
El Sanhoury (1964) defines the submission agreement as a contract in which the dominant 
party alone possesses the right to set contract conditions, and the opposing party must accept 
or reject these conditions as a whole75. 
 
So, submission is a contract founded on the basis of “take it, or leave it”. Melhem (2006) 
argues that the dominant party in this contract is the insurance company, as it sets contractual 
conditions that the insured must accept if he/she desires the insurance. Much of these 
conditions are pre-printed and some are oppressive, harming the insured persons’ interests76.  
 
A number of countries have intervened to limit oppression and grievance triggered by these 
conditions thereby, protecting their citizens.  Indeed, in Egyptian law, the legislator sets 
restrictions for protecting the weaker party via controlling legislation, regulating the law and 
regulating the interpretation of text within contracts, so as doubt is interpreted in favour of the 
insured, although he/she is the debtor. For instance, article 753 (based on civil law), declares 
that “each agreement, violating provisions stipulated in this chapter, is null and void, unless it 
is in favour of the insured or the beneficiary”. This article is upheld by the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation77. 
 
• Insurance as a probable contract 
The term probable contract signifies that both contractors are unaware of the amount of loss 
incurred. This, in Islamic Sharia law, establishes an element of contractual uncertainty 
(Gharar) and ignorance (Jahalah).  
 
                                                
75 El Sanhoury. A (1964), Supra 26, Part 2, P. 1176-1177  
76 Melhem. A (2002), Islamic Insurance, supra footnote 52, P. 31. 
77 El Qora Daghi. A (2006). Supra footnote 22, P. 20. 
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Melhem (2006) explains that here, the insurer, and the insured, remain unaware in terms of 
factors such as the time taken to set up the contract, the amount taken or the amount paid, as 
this depends on the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of the insured danger. He confirms that 
uncertainty (Gharar) present in this type of contract is the most severe since it is not included 
in the compensation amount, but instead the amount is obtained upon maturity78. Therefore, 
legislators consider insurance contracts to be Gharar contracts, which include gambling and 
mortgages79. 
 
• Insurance is a contract based on utmost good faith: 
The principle of good faith originates from the general principles applied to all contracts. The 
insurance contract is distinct from other contracts as good faith plays a pivotal role, potentially 
affecting the conclusion more than is the case in any other contract. Therefore, the insurer, in 
approving data provided by the insured, adopts the principle of good faith, as he must take, on 
good faith, the insured persons account of data. This doctrine is also applied while setting up 
and implementing the contract80.  
 
Furthermore, section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 specified the general 
principles of good faith for inclusion in the insurance contract: “The MIA contract is a 
contract based upon utmost good faith and, if this principle is not observed by either party, the 
contract may be voided by the other party.”81 
 
2.4.4 PILLARS OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT FROM AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE  
 
Islamic experts usually use a distinctive method of analysis when addressing an important 
topic, i.e. the insurance contract, by establishing a core base constructed of three main pillars. 
In order to aid readers understanding, a description regarding the core content of these pillars 
is given below. These pillars were the outcome when Islamic scholars and economists dealt 
with insurance as a new matter.  
                                                
78 Melhem. A (2002), Islamic Insurance, supra footnote 52,, P.30 
79 El Sanhoury. A (1964), Supra footnote 26,V 7. P1140 
80 Sharaf El Din. A (1983), Supra footnote 48, P. 118 
81 Peter .M .Eggers (2004) Good Faith and Insurance Contracts. London Singapore, second edition, p33 
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Islamic Insurance contract consists of: 
 
1. Contracting parties. 
2. Contract wording. 
3. Contract subject matter (Mahalul-Aqad), which consists of:  
A. Risk. 
B. Premium.  
C. Amount of the insurance (the compensation). 
 
1. The contracting parties  
 
The two parties are the insurer (the company), the insured (including the insurance applicant), 
mutually obligated to meet the requirements of financial contracts including capacity of 
payment. In commercial insurance, the insurer is the company, while in co-operative mutual 
Insurance, the insurer is the Society and in current Islamic insurance, the insurer is the 
insurance account, subscribers’ group or insurance fund.  
 
Any Islamic corporate licensed insurance, acts as an agent for such an account whereas, the 
insured are either individual people or corporate bodies.  
 
However, El Qora Daghi (2006) adds that there are a number of mediators between 
contracting parties such as: Authorized Agents, Delegates with General Power of Attorney and 
Brokers. The authority of each may vary according to their respective capacity:  
 
An Authorized Agent has the broadest authority where he is entitled to directly enter into 
contract with customers on behalf of the insured person. He also has the right to modify the 
contract, receive premiums and settle compensation82.  
 
On the other hand, a Delegate with a General Power of Attorney is responsible for signing the 
most advantageous contract in terms of general insurance, but has no right of amendment or 
addition therein83.  
                                                
82El Qora Daghi. A (2006). Supra footnote 22. P 32.  
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A broker has the narrowest level of authority; however, this may expand depending on 
conditions determining a specific task, such as the mediation of contracts otherwise 
impermissible for brokers to surmount. This is normally the case where the authority of agents 
has not been clearly defined. Further, a broker has some powers regarding the implementation 
of a contract, as well as receiving premiums and payable compensation84.  
 
• The validity of both parties’ consent:  
Whenever we state the term two parties, we mean both insurance companies and the insured 
person. There appears to be no fundamental difference between Islamic law and other laws, in 
this regard. Billah (2007) stated that the parties to an insurance policy under Islamic law are 
the same as those in an insurance policy under Common law85.  
 
As for a company’s valid consent, whether a joint stock company or a mutual cooperative, it is 
not the place to talk about capacity due to the availability of legal requirements and legal 
personality, as it is represented by the authorised signatory on behalf of the Board of 
Directors.  
 
Matters are different concerning the insured party. For example, in Egyptian civil law, as far 
as “El Sanhoury” is concerned, there should be clauses for mental capacity including the 
capacity to administrate, as well as the verification of legal age and adulthood. 
In relation to minors, it is impermissible for a young person to draw up an insurance contract 
unless he/she is authorised to trade and form contracts by his/her guardian (Alwali). If she/he 
does not obtain consent, then the contract will be void unless later approved by a guardian or 
conceded whenever she/he reaches mature mind (Alrushud)86. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
83Ibid.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ma’sum Billah. M (2007) stated that the parties to an insurance policy under Islamic law are the same as those 
in an insurance policy under the Common law. 
86 Alsanhoury.  supra footnote 26. P1146. 
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Nevertheless, according to Islamic Fiqhi schools, the Hanafi, Shafaee and Hanbali assert that 
the age of mature of mind (Alrushud), is 15; whereas, in maliki schools, the age is 17 
regardless of gender87.  
 
In Malaysia (2007), the Islamic Fiqhi Academy, confirmed that the age of a discerning minor 
(Tameez) is 7 years (decision no 168( (  )).6/18 Also, the age of mature mind is 15 for worship 
purposes, however, in terms of a financial and criminal onus, the legal authority has the right 
to determine appropriate age according to place and environmental conditions88.    
 
In Islamic law, acts regarding minors are fairly concordant, as both the Hanafi and Maliki 
divide statutes, relating to minor’s, as follows:  
§ A purely beneficial act, which is useful to him/her such as accepting the gift and 
embracing Islam so it becomes possible to give, and take, endlessly with no need for 
permission or to ask why.  
§ A purely harmful act such as lending money, or taking out loans, is void even with the 
guardian's permission.  
§ An act which ranges between benefit and harm, like selling and buying, is held and 
suspended until receiving final permission from competent authorities.  
However, The Hanbali School stipulates that the acts of a sane minor are valid with the 
permission of a guardian (Wali), and null and void without this permission. Contrary to this, 
the Shafaee’s do not validate the act of a minor, even if his/her guardian allows.  
Scholars, in all four schools, agreed upon the fact that a guardian should guarantee a minor’s 
damages regardless of whether those damages concern life injuries or money89.  
 
Through jurisprudential and legal analysis relating to the validity of consent by contracted 
parties, it is worthwhile noting that the contract of insurance is different from other contracts. 
In other words, an insurance contract is not primarily profitable, but is held for safety against 
                                                
87 Alzohaily. Wahbah. Alfiqh alaislami waadelatoh.Dar alfikr for publishing, edition 33 (2011). V 5, p 415 
88 Islamic Fiqhi Academy. Conference no 18 (2007) Malaysia. Available online : 
http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/Malaysia-q18.pdf. Retrieved on 13- 08 2012  
89 See Alzohaily. Supra footnote 80.  V5. P 415 - 420. Albahooty. Kashaf Algenaa. almaktabbah al-islamiah for 
publishing, edition D.T. (1982). Beruit v3.p431. Ibn qudamah (1223AC)(620H). Almugnee. Supra footnote 51. 
V4, p457. 
49 
 
unexpected damages. No one is immune to the unexpected occurrence of risk, whether a sane 
adult, a young person or even a child in the womb.  
 
Thus, lifelong participation in an insurance contract is best considered, not only in terms of the 
nature of the contract, but also with regard to unexpected risk. Therefore, in order to ensure 
that the object of insurance conforms to Islamic Sharia provisions via the application of 
mutual insurance against risk, Billah (2007) proposed four-appropriate paths of equitable 
opportunity for all members of society, providing protection from any unexpected damage:  
a) Upon reaching the age of 15 i.e. the age of commissioning - as far as the majority of 
scholars are concerned - young people must be treated like adults in terms of their 
signature, acknowledgment of contract and obligation. 
b) A person under the age of 15 years has the right to obtain insurance and to give his/her 
name, but does not have the right to sign, although this may be possible pending the 
approval of a guardian.  
c) A young child also has the right to insurance, obtained on his/her behalf although the 
guardian who purchased the policy must have full control of the document. 
d) The foetus has the right to insurance from the time it is created and, as there are many 
risks on its life, his/her guardian purchases a policy in the interest of the foetus against 
any medical risks that might be expected.90  
The above may be seen as an overreaction regarding the rights of the foetus, who is in receipt 
of medical supervision, belongs to his/her mother and is dependent upon her for nutritional 
and health stability. Therefore, how do we separate mother and foetus within the insurance 
contract, since a foetus has no legally recognised personality to be trusted, and in Islamic law, 
regarding Zakat al-Fitr91, financial donation has been obligatory for male and female, young 
and old, master and slave. In this respect, financial cover is not prescribed for the foetus, 
although guidance is provided in view of options, rather than obligations. If she/he had been 
awarded the legal status of an independent legal character, financial contribution would have 
                                                
90 Ma’sum Billah. M (2007). Supra foot note 3. 
91 Alzohaily. Wahbah. Alfiqh alaislami waadelatoh. Ibid    
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been obligatory. In addition to compensation, in Islamic jurisprudence, a foetus’ blood money 
must be paid (10/1) tenfold a woman’s blood money92.  
 
However, El Qora Daghi (2006) has pointed out that consent is required to secure the validity 
of an insurance contract, and this must not contain any defect of consent, such as coercion, 
fraud or even a simple mistake in data presentation93.  
  
                                                
92 Albahooty. Kashaf Algenaa.Suppra footnote 67. V 3, p220. 
93 El Qora Daghi. A (2006). Supra footnote 22, p. 35.  
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2. The wording of the contract   
 
A written contract governs the relationship between parties in terms of duties, rights, 
obligations, terms and exceptions, together with implementation and reporting. It is a 
customary convention among the insurance companies that contracting must be concluded 
through an insurance policy written and signed by contracting parties94.  
Nowadays, insurance companies tend to conclude the contract through a recorded call or via 
the Internet. The insured is given the number of their insurance policy as a sort of evidence 
that insurance cover is proved from the date and time of call, provided the original document 
is sent later, by mail95.  
 
In the Gulf societies, El Qora Daghi (2006) points out that the practice among insurance 
companies has been that a contract is not concluded upon reaching a verbal agreement, but via 
the insurance policy, signed by its parties96.  
 
In Islamic law, commercial contracts are based on acceptance and offer and therefore, El Qora 
Daghi (2000) states that this type of acceptance does not mean that the insurance contract is 
not a formal one since contracts do not depend upon writing only. Instead, writing is merely a 
means to prove, rather than to conclude an agreement. In this respect, the author confirms that 
acceptance and offering are the bases behind any insurance contract97.  
 
Article 1048 of the preliminary draft of Egyptian Civil Law states that the insurance contract 
does not come into force unless both parties sign the insurance policy. At this point, the policy 
is accordingly handed over to the insured party. This process clearly indicates that the 
insurance contract is a formality which is not binding unless the insured party receives a copy 
of the document with his/her own signature. However, this article was cancelled by the Audit 
Committee98. 
                                                
94 Ibid. 
95 Aviv Insurance Company. Available online on: http://www.aviva.co.uk 
96 El Qora Daghi. A (2006). Supra footnote 22, p 40. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Alsanhoury. Alwaseet. Supra 26.v7.p1174 
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 Sharaf al-Din (1983) confirms that the contract of insurance is basically a consensual, and not 
a formal, agreement. Here, the right of each party to agree to make an official contract is held 
only after being written and signed by both parties to give rise to legal effects99.  
 
3. Contract subject matter (Mahalul-Aqad) which consists of;  
 
Insured risk 
 
Risk is the most important element in insurance as it epitomises the obligation undertaken by 
both the insurer and the insured. The insured party undertakes to pay premiums in return for 
reducing the effects of risk, and the insurer undertakes to pay an amount of insurance to secure 
the insured from the effects of risk. Risk results from the premiums and the amount of 
insurance as well as the measurement of both.  
 
However, the risk in relation to insurance can be defined as (any probable accident, which is 
unpreventable as per the will of either party, and especially the will of the insured)100.  
An insured risk should meet several conditions;  
 
Islamic legal experts stipulate certain conditions in order to make an insurance contract 
valid: 
    
1. That the risk must be potential. For instance, potential risk is demonstrated in the two 
following forms:  
a. Insurance from theft or fire is a risk that may or may not happen. 
b. An insured event may be inevitable and yet, on the other hand, it may present a 
potential risk, where time is non-specific, such as life insurance; death is inevitable, but 
time is unknown.  
 
In view of this analysis, the legal impact in cases where risk is unfeasible, thereby rendering 
the subject matter impossible to insure, means the contract will be null and void. For example, 
if a person insured his/her house against fire damage then made sure, before entering into this 
agreement, that the house had been destroyed, such an insurance contract would be void due to 
                                                
99 Sharaf El Din. A (1983), Supra footnote 48. p 120   
100 Albadrawi. A.(1963). The Insurance. Wahbah Publisher. Cairo.p61. Alsalih. M(2004)Insurance between 
permission and prohibition. Al-Obiakan publisher.Riyadh.p 65  
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the lack of a building as well as the realisation of risk (the subject matter) in favour of the 
insured. To give another example, if someone insured his/her house against fire and the house 
burned down at time of contract, the insured parties risk has already been realised and so, the 
contract is null and void. This is due to occurrence of risk and lack of probability, in favour of 
the insurer.  
 
To summarise; if risk is unfeasible, as is the case in the first example (there is no risk because 
there is no house), or lacks probability as is the case in the second, then the insurance contract 
is considered both null and void101.  
 
Risk in relation to the absolute will of both parties.  
Insurance is based on events that are likely to happen, and whether the risk is relevant to the 
will of either party. In this instance, possibility is equal to risk subject to the will of that party 
and thus an element of risk is reduced. The contract of insurance is considered null and void as 
per Article 768/2 of the Egyptian Civil Code (either loss or damage caused by the insured 
intentionally, or by fraud, the insurer shall not be responsible, even where other issues have 
been agreed upon)102.  
 
Under The National Company of Cooperative Insurance NCCI “Al Tawuniya”, article 6, the 
general conditions of insurance also cover personal accident insurance, stating that, in cases of 
“fraud, concealment and/or, intentionally giving false statements, whether in the application, 
upon which the insurance is made, or with regard to something else affecting this insurance, or 
the provision of any claim which may lead to the cancellation and annulment of such 
insurance, results in the forfeiture of all claims thereof”103.  
 
Thus, it is not permissible for any person to insure himself for his intentional action, because 
the intentional act is related to his own will, and if the insurer has insured his life and then 
terminates that life for example, his contract shall not be worth the agreed amount of insurance 
or compensation since he intentionally incurred risk, via death.  
  
                                                
101 Alsanhoury. Alwaseet.supra 26. V7.p1218 
102 Ibid. v 7. P1176 
103 Al Tawuniya Insurance Company. Saudi Arabia available online on: http://www.tawuniya.com.sa/  
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An insured risk should be legitimate   
 
In other words, insured risk should not violate public law and order. At this point, article 749 
of Egyptian law states that, provided it has been the subject of insurance, every legitimate 
economic benefit should be returned to a person as a result of the non-occurrence of risk”104. 
Therefore, insurance may not be legitimate in terms of risks resulting from drug trafficking for 
instance.  
 
As far as the Islamic Sharia is concerned, every illegal matter is uninsurable. To illustrate, the 
first article of the Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia 
declares there should be....“ no contradiction with Islamic Sharia....”105, therefore, it is not 
permissible to carry out insurance on usury-based transactions or prohibited products and trade 
in Islamic sharia such as the sale of alcohol or prostitution and so on. 
  
The Premium  
 
The premium in commercial insurance is the amount of participation in cooperative insurance 
and Islamic insurance. This premium is intended to settle the amount paid by the insured to the 
insurer, or to any cooperative society or the account of insurance, whether in the form of 
instalments or all at once. The premium is the mainstay of insurance, which is not less 
important than risk. This payment/participation represents the main obligation of the insured 
in the insurance contract. 
 Determining the amount of a premium depends on several factors such as106: 
1. Risk Factor: 
Which intervene in determining the value of the premium is as follows: 
                                                
104 Alsanhoury. Alwaseet.supra.v7.p1218 
105 SAMA. The Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies in Saudi Arabia. Article 1. Available 
online : http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/Pages/LawsandRegulations.aspx. Retrieved on 13-08-
2012  
106 Alsalih. M(2004). Supra footnote75. p 65.  El Qora Daghi.A (2006),  Supra footnote 22. Alnajar. A 
(1994).The insurance contract in Islamic Sharia. Dar alnahadah alarabia for puplishing.Cairo. p 50.  
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a. Degree of probability of risk is based on probabilities, actuarial science, tables of 
statistics for previous incidents and proportion of expenditure set against the 
proportion of shareholders.  
b. Degree/gravity of risk when it is realised within the observed time and place, in 
context of surrounding circumstances. 
c. The principles of proportionality regarding risks and premiums in kind and name.  
d. Risk data provided by the insured party.  
2. The Insured Amount 
The insured amount has a role in determining the premium, or the amount of subscription, 
especially in terms of insurance for individuals and life insurance. At this stage, if the insured 
amount has increased, the premium increases. In fact, premiums often increase in accordance 
with increases in the amount of insurance rates being calculated.  
3. The Period of Insurance  
Because time has a role in determining the premium, whilst insurance contracts have long 
been considered as time contracts, so premiums should be measured by units of time. If the 
period of contract increases for more than one year, the premium amount also increases; if it is 
agreed that the premium is to be paid monthly, this does not mean that the base unit of time to 
determine the premium is a month. Hence, although the year remains the main unit of 
measurement, this is solely as a means to pay out the premium and not to determine it. 
 
The amount of insurance or (the Compensation) 
 
Compensation refers to the obligation of the insurer to pay the amount accrued at the time of 
insured risk, where the object of this obligation is the insurance amount. Sometimes the 
obligation is conditional, based on the fact that the insured risk is potential, as in vehicle or 
fire insurance for example. Sometimes compensation is attached to a fixed date upon condition 
that the insured event is realised, although the insured party may not know properly if this 
arrangement has come to fruition, as in the case of death insurance107.  
 
Al Saleh (2004) considers that the insurance total is a debt of the insurer; this debt may be 
attached to a non-specific date, as with life insurance in the event of death; whereas, for death 
                                                
107El qora Daghi. A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. P65 
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insurance, the date is unknown. The debt may be potential as in fire or liability insurance, 
because the insured risk is uncertain, and so the amount of insurance is a potential debt due to 
the possibility of potential risk108.  
This could be the case with regard to having the effect of an insurance contract on the insured 
which is equal to the sum of the insurance. But looking at the original insurance contract, it 
seems clear this cannot be classed as a debt contract, rather it is an exchange contract where a 
premium is paid in return for safety. This indicates that if the specified period in the contract 
was terminated, and there was no risk, the insured party would not be entitled to claim a 
refund for the premium paid previously. 
 
 The Modes of Payment regarding Compensation are as follows:  
A. Compensation should be paid in cash when the object of payment is an amount of 
money.  
B. Damages may be paid in kind, as with some types of insurance where the insured 
retains for him-self the right to choose a mode of payment, albeit in cash, kind or in 
repairing damage to bring an item back to its condition prior to the accident.  
C. Payment can also be in the form of provision of personal services, as is the case in 
liability insurance, where the insurer retains the right to intervene in any lawsuit 
brought against the insured109.  
 
According to Al Saleh (2004) it differs to determine this obligation whether we are ahead to 
insure injuries or persons’ insurance110:  
 
1. The Obligation of the Insurer in terms of Personal Insurance: 
The obligation of the insurer concerning insurance for private individuals often determines the 
agreed amount in an insurance policy. Private insurance does not aim to compensate for injury 
resulting from death or accident, but instead aims to alleviate injury. So, regardless of value, 
personal insurance does not guarantee compensation for all damages resulting from accident 
                                                
108 Alsalih. M(2004)Insurance between permission and prohibition. Supra footnote 75. p77 
109 El qora Daghi. A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. Ahmed Sharaf El Din (1983), Supra footnote 
48. p 232   
110 Alsalih. M(2004). Supra footnote 75.  
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or resulting in death. The insured amount merely determines the sum of obligation on the part 
of the insurer where there is no correlation between the obligation and the injury.  
Personal insurance is aimed at taking precautions for the future, and if required, the insurer 
must pay the sum of insurance to the insured if he/she is still alive on the agreed date. 
Therefore, no harm is incurred when choosing personal insurance, as a basis for compensation.  
 
2. The Obligation of the Insurer in Insuring Damages.  
The obligation of the insurer in insuring damages is governed by the principle of 
compensation. Hence, any insurance against damages is considered a contract of exchange. 
Here, several elements are involved in determining the obligation of the insurer with regard to 
damage insurance:  
A. The Occurrence of Damage 
Damage is the main component in determining the obligation of the insurer, since there is no 
compensation without damage. An insured accident may have taken place, but unless damage 
has occurred, the insured is not entitled to compensation. In the event of damage, the insured 
should confirm/prove the degree of damage inflicted upon him, as the extent of damage 
determines the level of compensation, unless the damage is equal to less than the insured 
amount. Thus, the insured party is entitled to receive the equivalent compensation for the 
damage incurred. In other words, incurred damage is worth the least of two amounts (the 
amount of insurance or the amount of compensation).  
B. Insured Amount  
This is the amount agreed upon in the insurance policy, and is a basis for fixing premium 
payments. The insured amount is often equal to the value of the insured matter. In cases of 
liability insurance, parties determine a maximum not exceeding the responsibility of the 
insurer. 
C.  The Value of the Insured Matter 
If the insured matter is totally destroyed, to the point where the insurer is fully committed to 
the insured for compensation, insurer obligation is determined by the value of the insured 
matter at the time of the incident and within the limitations of the insured amount as follows:  
1. If the value of the insured matter is equal to the insurance amount, the insured receives 
an amount equal to the cost of all damage inflicted upon him.  
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2.  If the insured amount exceeds the value of the insured matter (this form is called the 
overcharge or over insurance111) in this case, it is not allowed to increase the amount 
of compensation for the value of the insured at the time of actual risk and pursuant to 
compensatory status.  
3.  If the insured amount is less than the value of the insured matter at the time of risk, it 
shall not exceed the amount paid to the insured for the agreed sum of compensation, no 
matter the amount of damage (this form is called under insurance112)113.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
111  For more about over insurance see Dictionary of Insurance Terms, 5th edition, by Harvey W. Rubin, Ph.D., 
CLU, CPCU, published by Barron's Educational Series, Inc. Available online at : 
http://www.answers.com/topic/overinsurance . Retrieved on 11-08-2012. 
112 For more about under insurance see Insuropedia webpage. Available online at: 
http://www.insuropedia.com/UnderinsuranceClauseBusinessInterruption . Retrieved on 11-08-2012.  
113 Alsalih. Ibid 
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2.5 An Islamic Jurisprudential analysis of the Commercial Insurance 
 
2.5.1 INSURANCE AS AN IDEA OR THEORY VIS-À-VIS INSURANCE REGULATION OF EXISTING 
CONTRACTS  
 
Insurance is theoretically acceptable to the Islamic concept, therefore, Al Sanhoury (1964), 
stresses that insurance is not only an organised co-operation between a group of people to pay 
for risks, it is also subdivided so that if someone faces risk, everyone co-operates to face it 
together. With little sacrifice exerted by all, the group can avoid the severe risks and damages 
that would have beset them without this co-operation114. 
 
Al Zarqa (1980) adds that the concept that lies in the minds of legal scholars concerning the 
insurance system is that it is a system of cooperative solidarity which leads to fragmentation of 
risks and calamities, via distributing them among groups of insured persons. Therefore, 
compensation is paid to the injured from the proceeds of premiums, instead of this damage 
being the responsibility of the injured alone. It is often said that Islam with its legislations 
concerning the organisation of social and economic life, aims to establish a society based on 
co-operation and absolute solidarity in terms of rights and duties115.  
On this basis, there is no doubt that the above idea is acceptable in Islamic law and is 
consistent with the purposes of the law. For example, to co-operate in good faith, is an Islamic 
feature underpinning most of the provisions of Sharia, as it calls for co-operation and social 
solidarity. Furthermore, Islam has enjoined Zakat116 and has formed a system for the 
deserved poor, debtors, and the wayfarer to be within the lines of expenditure thereby 
promoting financial protection. Also the system of expenditure regarding relatives, the system 
of ransoms “Alaaqlah”117, and the duty of the State combine to provide a proper life for 
                                                
114 Alsanhoury. Alwaseet.supra 26. V7.p1218 
115 Alzarqa.M (1980).The insurance system and Islamic Shari’a. Islamic Economic book. Development 
conference in Damascus.p279. Alhamid.H.The verdict of Shari’a on Insurance. Dar Alitsam. Cairo.p16 
116 Obligated chairty which is 2.5 % of person’s wealth. 
117 Alaaqlah are the male factions of a tribe whom relevant to the killer from his father’s side. Here, Arab 
traditions advocate that, in the case of murder, the Alaaqlah collect blood money (Diyah) from each of the tribe’s 
males to be paid to the victim’s family. See,Almirdawy.A(1480) Alinsaf. Ministry of Islamic affairs, Saudi 
Arabia. Volume 26, p50 
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individuals and assume the task to pay debts for individuals in cases where an individual has 
died and left nothing to creditors.  
 
However, from an Islamic law perspective, the problem with the applied aspect of insurance is 
represented in the drafting of contracts, in light of capitalist thought, which does not observe 
religious aspects, and aims to profit in any way possible. This may lead us to accept the ideas 
mentioned before, as well as to change these types of contracts to observe the principles and 
concepts of Islamic law, taking into account projects such as profitable businesses.  
 
2.5.2 JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULES OF COMMERCIAL INSURANCE  
2.5.2.1 Introduction:  
 
The idea of insurance, in terms of legitimacy and acceptability has triggered much debate 
amongst the scholars of Islamic law. However, the current draft of contracts includes certain 
elements such as usury, uncertainty, gambling which do not observe the principles of Sharia, 
and in fact, contradict them.  
 
The Islamic Sharia is based on the lawfulness of any issue, as confirmed by El Qora Daghi 
(2006) including the legality of subjects, means and objects. An issue may be legitimate in 
principle, but may still be unsuitable if in contravention of these laws. For example, a trade 
may be permissible, but if it contains usury, it is prohibited. Thus, no matter how legitimate 
and useful the idea, it cannot be validated unless it is formulated via a legitimate contract and 
does not contravene Islamic law.118 
 
On the other hand, those who indicate that insurance is permissible in Islamic Sharia law do 
not state that usury or gambling are permissible, but instead argue that such elements do not 
exist within the contract. Therefore, the dispute between scholars of Islamic law is focused on 
the presence of such elements rather than on rulings/outcomes.  
 
Al Zarqa (1980) states that in principle, there are no objections to making a profit through 
insurance, but if insurance transactions between insurance companies practice usury, then 
                                                
118 El- Qora Daghi. A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. 
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these conditions can be judged on the basis of prohibited practices and potentially, 
corruption.119 
 
2.5.2.2 Jurisprudential contradiction of rules of insurance 
 
There is contradiction amongst the contemporary scholars of Islamic Sharia in terms of 
opinion regarding the rules of traditional commercial insurance, these have been divided into 
two groups as detailed below: 
1. A group that views commercial insurance as unlawful. 
2. A group that views commercial insurance as permissible. 
 
2.5.2.2.1 The opinion that commercial insurance is unlawful 
 
The school that views commercial insurance as unlawful bases this opinion upon four 
forbidden elements, as per the Islamic Sharia, i.e.: uncertainty, gambling, interest and taking 
money unjustly. 
 
This point will be considered in detail in accordance with the judgments of Islamic 
jurisprudence schools: 
 
• Uncertainty:  
Here, opinion is based upon the accounts of the following Sunna witnesses (Hadith): 
Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported that Allah's Messenger (May peace be upon 
him) forbade a transaction determined by throwing stones, and the type which involves some 
uncertainty120. 
 
This Hadith is essential for transactions and is based in financial exchange contracts. 
                                                
119 Alzarqa.M (1980).The insurance system and Islamic Sharia. Supra footnote 88. 
120 Imam Muslim. Sahih Muslim translated by Abdul Hamid Siddiqui. The Book of Transactions (Kitab Al-
Buyu`)   available online 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/ 
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Definition of Uncertainty: 
Uncertainty is deemed as one of the most influential elements in insurance rule by Sharia 
scholars. The scholars of Islamic Sharia -divided into four schools- may not differ a lot in 
defining Uncertainty, whereas Al-Zailaa'i (1313 H121.) - A Hanafi Scholar- defined 
uncertainty as "Transactions with unknown consequences, where participants are unsure 
whether a point will, or will not be achieved"122.  
 
In respect of the Maliki School, Bin Arafa (1329 H.) has defined uncertainty as "The 
transaction that in doubt in achievement- some or most - by any of its offset"123. In regard to 
the Shafi'a school, Al-Rafa'ee (623 H.) said that “it is the transaction which result may be 
unknown to the person”124, while Algadi Abu Yalaa (380H) from the Hanbali School defined 
it as "the transaction that hesitating between two things, one of them is not apparent"125. 
 
So, by way of the aforementioned definitions, presented by the scholars of Islamic 
jurisprudence schools, the reader may discover that the meanings of uncertainty are 
convergent. 
 
In further jurisprudential analysis concerning uncertainty and the commercial insurance 
contract, Al-Qora Daghi (2006) has stated that uncertainty is influential in relation to financial 
indemnification contracts. According to the consensus of scholars, the most important forms 
of uncertainty are as follows126: 
 
a. Uncertainty in the Existence of Risk throughout the Insurance Process: 
The insurance process involves uncertainty in the existence of risk. However, it is the subject 
matter (Mahalul-Aqad) identified in the contract which is potentially at risk. Hence, this 
danger is probable and unconfirmed. Yet, jurisprudence scholars have not been in conflict 
                                                
121 H means a Hijrah calendar which represents the Islamic calendar. 
122 Al-Zailaa'I Fakhrualdeen. (1313 H.) tabeen alhagaegwasharh alkanz.Omar bakashab for Publishing. Cairo. 
123 Albodory.Y(1329H). Altaj walekleel.Dar alsaadah for Publishing.Cairo. 
124 Al-Rafa'ee. A (623 H.). Fateh-u-alziz. Sharekat-u- aluamaa for Publishing. Cairo 
125 Algadi Abu Yalaa (380H). Matalib oly alnohaa.The Islamic office edition. Damascus. V3.p25  
126 El qora Daghi. A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. 
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regarding the influence of risk upon nullification of contract. Therefore, as we can see, the 
amount of insurance previously negotiated with a company, is not guaranteed since it depends 
on the existence of the insured risk, once the risk takes place the amount shall be due. 
Conversely, if this event does not take place, nothing will be paid out. 
Indeed, legislators do not deny this fact, thus, Egyptian Civil Law categorises this insurance 
contract amongst those characterised by uncertainty127. 
 
b. Uncertainty in Obtaining Compensation 
Basically, this means that the subject of the contract is, in itself the risk. Thus, in spite of its 
existence, the possibility of indemnification remains merely probable. This is because, at the 
time of agreement, whether appropriate compensation will be paid out against premiums, 
remains unknown. Therefore, entering into an agreement is a risk when attempting to obtain 
compensation.  
 
As mentioned above, Scholars are all in accord concerning this identified uncertainty as it 
nullifies the contract of reimbursement. 
 
c. Uncertainty regarding the Amount of Compensation:  
Agreed sum is considered to be one of the basic conditions in a contract of sale and 
reimbursement. As far as Islamic Sharia scholars are concerned, the amount of compensation 
is to be known at the time of wording the contract.  
Ibn Abideen (1836), a scholar from the Hanafi School, confirms that "to know the price is 
conditional in regard with validating any sale”128. Al Rafiee, a Shafa’ee Scholar, further adds 
that “Ignorance of price or appraising, invalidates the contract”129. Ibn Rushd Alhafeed 
(595H) of the Maliki School130 as well as Ibn Kodama (620H)131, of the Hanbali School 
have made the same statement. Thus, the texts of scholars from the schools of Fiqhi are 
considered a clear indication that uncertainty in amount renders the contract null and void. 
                                                
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibn Abdideen(1836). Hashiat Ibn Abidin.Alhalabi for publishing. Cairo.v.2 p21 
129 Al Rafiee. Supura footnote 96. 
130 Ibn Rushd Alhafeed.(595H).Bidait-ul-almujtahid. Ibn hazim for publishing (1999). Cairo. v2 p172 
131 Ibn Kodama Almaqdisy (620H). Alkafy. Dra Hajar for Publishing edition (2000). Cairo. V2.p71 
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This is exactly the situation with insurance contracts where different experts in civil law assert 
that insurance involves uncertainty in relation to the amount of compensation awarded, 
particularly with life insurance, as it is based upon compensation. When negotiating a contract, 
both parties are unaware regarding extent of damage or amount of compensation until such 
time as the insured risk occurs. What is more, the insurer himself does not know how much he 
will collect from premiums at the time of the incident.  
 
On the other hand, from the perspective of someone who believes that insurance contracts are 
legitimate and that insurance companies with sophisticated means, employing the rules of 
statistics and actuarial science, can identify - with specific detail - the amount of indemnity to 
be paid to the insured party in return of an insured incident. In the same way, also determining 
the amount of compensation paid to the insured at the time of insured risk. So the answer to 
this, as El Qora Daghi (2006) concluded, is the fact that both parties should be aware of the 
contract details, even if we accept that the insurance company have the ability to assess risk 
and calculate the amount of compensation and that this knowledge is not be available to the 
second party, i.e. the insured. Furthermore, if the company is unable to ascertain the sum total 
owed by the insured person over a certain period, it cannot know how much will be paid, per 
person, in interest, so all this uncertainty remains and thereby rescinds the contract132. 
 
d. Uncertainty regarding the Time of Payment of Insurance Amount 
(compensation):  
 
The Islamic Sharia Scholars have formed a precondition for validating the reimbursement 
contracts. Here, time should be known, and contracts where time is unknown should be 
declared null and void. El Nawawi (631H) confirms that scholars agree upon this, thereby 
affirming that transactions omitting to specify time should be forbidden133. Nevertheless, 
when applying this principle to the insurance contract, we find that the duration of the contract 
is often undetermined concerning a specific period (one year for example). Although, 
                                                
132 El- Qora Daghi. A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. 
133 Imam El Nawawi(631H), Almajmoo. Dar Alfikrfor Publishing (1997).Beruit .V9.p339 
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exception is perhaps made for the payment of indemnification which cannot be determined in 
terms of involvement in the occurrence of risk. 
 
• The Second Element: Wagering and Gambling: 
 The scholars support the prohibition of commercial insurance in Islamic Sharia law because it 
a type of wagering and gambling which is also considered as sin in certain European 
countries134. For this reason, El Sanhoury (1964) has indicated that gambling is an agreement 
was each gambler undertakes to pay if he/she looses to another gambler. Payment can be in 
the form of money, or anything that has been mutually agreed upon. However, wagering is a 
pledge by which both gamblers undertake to pay if his/her chosen event is unrealised. The 
winner of this pledge will gain a sum of money135.  
 
Wagering and gambling is forbidden in Islamic law as God Says: “O ye who believe! 
Intoxicant (all kinds of alcoholic drink) and gambling, and Al-ansab, and al-zlam (arrows to 
seek luck or decision) are an abomination of Shaitan’s (Satan’s) handiwork. So avoid (strictly 
all) that (abomination) in order that you may be successful.”136 
 
Most Arab laws have prohibited gambling and wagering and have placed civil and criminal 
sanctions on those who practice such games (e.g. Article 739 of the Egyptian Civil Code, 
Article 705 of the Syrian Civil Code, and Article 739 in Libyan law amongst many others137). 
 As far as the prohibitions of commercial insurance are concerned, El Qora Daghi (2006) has 
pointed out that the definition of betting and gambling, and the characteristics of contract 
formation, it does apply to the insurance contracts and such characteristics are covered in 
insurance contracts. In other words, a commercial insurance contract is undertaken by either 
party (i.e. the insurance company) to pay to the second party (i.e. the insured) a sum money, or 
any other agreed financial consideration. This is also the case where a certain incident (insured 
risk) is protected in exchange for a promise (from the insured), to pay a further amount 
                                                
134 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, (1925),supra footnote 10. Vol. 8, p.100 
135 Alsanhoury. Alwaseet.supra 26. V7.p 958- 986 
136 The Holy Quran. King Fahad Complex for the printing of the Holy Quran. Chapter 5 (sorat al 
Maydah,)Verse90. P135. Available online 
http://www.islamway.com/SF/quran/data/The_Holy_Quran_English.pdf    
137 Alhamid.H.The verdict of Shari’a on Insurance. Supra footnote 88. P 105  
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namely, the annual premium of the said incident. Thus, the nature of the insurance contract is 
parallel to the nature of both gambling and betting contracts, but with different names, 
elements and parties: being one of the potential financial reimbursement contracts for both 
parties138.  
 
Insurance used to be disguised under the form of a legal contract. El Sanhoury (1964) stresses 
that the insurance contract consists of gambling and betting, and if viewed via the relationship 
between the insurance company and the insured, we find that insurance companies do not 
conclude contracts with a single insured party, or with a small number insured persons. 
However, if this was written into the insurance contract, then insurance would be considered 
as some sort of gambling or betting and would then represent an illegal contract.  For example, 
where a company has contracted with an insured person who’s house was burnt down, the 
house value, is paid; Alternatively, if the house was not burnt down, then the value of 
insurance, paid by the insured, represents pure profit for the company, which is arguably a real 
form of betting139.  
 
• The Third Element: Usury (Riba) or Interest:  
Usury is a major sin as far as the Sharia scholars are concerned. To illustrate, in the Holy 
Quran Allah Says:   
 "O ye who believe, be a afraid of Allah and give up what remains (due to you) from Riba 
(usury)(from now, onwards), if you are (really)a believer. And if you do not do this, then take 
a notice of war from Allah and his messenger. But if you repent, you shall have your capital 
sums. Deal not unjustly (asking for more capital sums), and you shall not be dealt with 
unjustly (by receiving less than your capital sums).”140 
 
In Islamic Sharia Fiqhi, Riba is divided into two parts:  
• The usury of credit (Riba Alfazal) which is intended to increase an indemnity in a 
unified manner for example where wheat is exchanged for wheat, with a certain 
increase. Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) stated that  
                                                
138 El Qora Daghi. A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. 
139 Alsanhoury. Alwaseet.supra 26. V7.p1086 
140 The Holy Quran. King Fahad Complex for the printing of the Holy Quran. Chapter 2 (sorat al Bagarah) 
Verse278-279.p65. Available online http://www.islamway.com/SF/quran/data/The_Holy_Quran_English.pdf  
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“exchange of gold with gold, silver with silver, wheat with wheat, barley with barley, 
dates with dates and salt with salt should be of equal quantities and spot. Anyone who 
varies the quantities or allows one side of the exchange to be deferred, indulges in riba 
for which both buyer and seller are equally responsible”141(Sahih Imam Bukhariand 
Muslim)   
Thus, based on this statement, a new kind of riba identified which is that in the case of the 
six commodities mentioned in it, if exchanged against themselves, the quantities should be 
equal and these should be exchanged simultaneously by both parties.142 
• Usury of long term credit (Riba Alnaseiaa) is a loan of Dirhams (money) taken for a 
known period of time, proportional to increases in the amount of the loan and 
accordingly, increases in debt, as well as duration143.  
Commercial insurance has two forms of usury as demonstrated via the following examples:  
1. Amounts paid by the insured party in cash, may be refunded for more or less, when an 
insured risk (long term) occurs during the course of an existing contract based upon 
exchange, such as sales. Furthermore, the company in fact sells insurance policies 
which may then be refunded in cash, paying out either more, or less, after a certain 
period of time. So, if we consider the contract as a reimbursement contract, like a 
contract of sale, then this becomes the selling of cash in return for cash via long term 
credit (Riba Alnaseiaa), or usury of credit (Riba Alfazal).  
2. The life insurance contract contains a clause undertaken by the company, where the 
lessee (the insured) is to be reimbursed if he/she is alive after a specified period, 
inclusive of premiums paid with interest. This can also be seen as usury.  
3. When insurance companies deposit funds into banks using additional investment 
practices and financial tools, and then receive interests, this may be classed as usury. 
                                                
141 Khan. Muhammed S. H.(1996). Alrawdah Alnadiah shareh Aldurrar Albaheyah. Alkawther for publishing, 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 4th Edition, 1996, volume 2, p229.    
142 Shafi. M ,Usmani.M(1997). The Issue of Interest. Darulishat, Karach, Bakistan edition 1997. P16-17.  
143 Alsalih. M(2004)Insurance between permission and prohibition. Supra footnote 75. p.p 117-122 
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Investment through buying bonds or shares with gained interest, is forbidden as usury 
in Islamic law144. 
• Fourth Element: Commercial Insurance - Taking Money Unjustly:  
The scholars of Islamic law hold that the insurance contract is essentially taking money from 
people unjustly. From this perspective, the contract is invalid, because of uncertainty levels 
namely, betting and gambling. At this point, Allah says: 
 "O ye who believe, Eat not up your property among yourselves unjustly, except it to be a 
trade amongst you, by mutual consent"145. 
El Qora Daghi (2006), reported that the Holy Quran provided permissibility to take people's 
money via two main prerequisites:  
• Through a valid legitimate contract, or a contract not violating the law of God.  
• Upon a mutual consent between two parties. Although the presence of mutual consent 
must be based upon a legitimate contract, which is not in contravention of the law of 
God. 
  
                                                
144 Alhamid.H.The verdict of Shari’a on Insurance. Supra footnote 88. P108.  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), Islamic 
Insurance. Supra footnote 22. 
145 The Holy Quran. King Fahad Complex for the printing of the Holy Quran. Chapter 4 (sorat al 
Nisaa)Verse29. p112. Available online http://www.islamway.com/SF/quran/data/The_Holy_Quran_English.pdf 
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2.5.2.2.2The view that commercial insurance is permissible: 
 
 This group of scholars asserts that commercial insurance is permissible in Islamic law and 
present certain evidences in this regard, as follows:  
A- In Islamic jurisprudential study, the basis of contracts and related conditions are 
permissible, and in light of this, the insurance contract is a new contract and a new 
system within Islam. Thus, the commercial contract does not directly relate to any of 
the prevailing contracts and so, does not fall under any contract named in the Islamic 
Sharia. Therefore, on this basis, it should be allowed as a contract as long as it is not 
contravening Sharia law. As regards considering commercial contracts as gambling or 
betting, this point is not taken for granted however, the uncertainty in the contract is 
modest and a little uncertainty is allowed in the Islamic Sharia. Also, the usury issue it 
is not necessarily a fundamental/integral part of a commercial contract. Instead this can 
be considered as one of many routine practices carried out by insurance companies and 
therefore, can be set apart from usury.146  
B- Insurance can be analogised via legitimate contracts in Islamic law, inclusive of the 
following:  
• The analogy of the insurance contract with the loyalty contract (walaa almualah):  
A loyalty contract is a contract in Islamic Sharia Fiqhi where two parties pay each other the 
due ransom or blood money in the event of committing a crime or receiving an inheritance. 
This contract prevailed before the rise of Islam and has since been confirmed by Islam.  
The logic behind this reasoning is that a loyalty contract is not a matter of consensus among 
the Sharia scholars. Thus, this analogy is inaccurate since one of the conditions of Islamic 
jurisprudence is that the foundations must be agreed upon.  
• The Analogy of Insurance as a Road of Risk:  
According to al Zarqa, the matter of ensuring the road of risk at Hanafi School is a 
jurisprudential idea which fits with the mainstay of permissible insurance risk. An example of 
                                                
146  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. Albarry.Z.(1977).Alwaseet fe Ahkaam 
altarirkat.Dar alnahdah Publishing edition (1973). Cairo. Alsalih. M(2004)Insurance between permission and 
prohibition. Supra footnote 75. Alzarqa.M(1964)The verdict of the insurance contract in Islamic sharia. Supra 
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this would be, "…if one person said to another “take the following path, it is secure, I will 
guarantee your safety if anything befalls." So in this example, the Insurer ensures the safety of 
goods sent as via an approved “line of road”.  
Some scholars have answered this, arguing that the basis of bail and guarantee are 
contributions or donation contracts whereas, insurance is a type of exchange or reimbursement 
contract. In this scenario the collected money from bail would be nullified as it is not valid for 
one person to tell another, “I will guarantee you etc…” This is not permissible in Islamic law, 
thus highlighting the difference. 147  
 
2.5.3 THE RULE OF COMMERCIAL INSURANCE IN ISLAMIC SHARIA  
 
A set of legal, and Sharia, provisions have been issued on the topic of commercial insurance 
both in the past, and at the present time. First and foremost is the statement by “Ashhab”, one 
of the Maliki scholars who lived two hundred years after Hijra, the “Messenger’s Migration”, 
stated: "The guarantee should not be for a certain price, but never believe when one man says 
to another that he will guarantee a commodity over a certain time, because, when money has 
been exchanged for a matter that cannot be sold or purchased, this constitutes uncertainty and 
gambling”148. 
 
Ahmad Ibn Yahya (1436) asserts that a “…guarantee for stolen or sunken objects is null and 
void ", and that this is applicable to marine insurance and insurance against fire149.  
 
El Qora Daghi (2006) has indicated that such fatwa’s are not equivalent to conclusive 
evidence that the issue of insurance was known at that time among the scholars of Islamic 
Sharia. El Qora Daghi (2006) also added that it is possible that marine insurance was in place 
and widespread in the West before Ahmad bin Yahya150. 
 
                                                
147 Ibid. 
148Alswailam.S (2009). Stoppages in Insurance Issue.  International Islamic Bureau for Economic and Finance. 
Available online http://www.sfhatk.com/vb/uploaded/471_21252008374.rar 
149 Ibn Yahya. A(1436). Albahar Alzaikher. Alrisalah Establishment for Publishing. Beirut. Edition2 (1984).    
150 El qora Daghi. A (2006), supra 22. 
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However, the first scholar to speak about insurance provisions in its traditional form was Ibn 
Abideen (1836) he said, “It is a tradition that if traders rent a boat from a non-Muslim, they 
paid to him his wage and paid also extra known money for another person living in his 
country. This extra money was called (SOKRAH) provided that if some of the money in the 
boat is fired, sunk or stolen, this man who lives in the country guarantees this money against 
what he takes from them…); then he said (I think that traders have no right to take a 
compensation for the damages”. 151  
 
In December 1906, the Grand Legitimate Court of Egypt deemed that a lawsuit claiming for 
an amount of life insurance is legally invalid in view of Sharia due to the containment of non-
permissible facts. This opinion has been supported by the Egyptian Higher Council of 
Endowments, with successive views from its members based on the prohibition of insurance 
and debated over several conferences featuring insurance. The first conference was in 1961, 
“The Second Fiqhi Week Conference” which took place in Damascus. Here, scientists were 
divided between those who see insurance as totally prohibited and those who believe that it is 
permissible if free of usury152.  
 
At the Second Conference of Islamic Research, under the World Islamic Association, held in 
1965, the conference examined the issue of insurance, in which Ali El Khafeef, a member of 
the Islamic Research Academy, presented research on insurance. At this point, the conference 
formed a special committee, the Committee for Jurisprudential Researches153. 
 
On 24.4.1968, the Fatwa Committee at Al-Azhar issued a ruling prohibiting all kinds of 
commercial insurance. Then, in 1972, the Secretariat of the Islamic Research Academy 
demanded that the opinion of Muslim scholars must be respected in the world. Thus, more 
than 85 countries, including Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and 
Morocco, agreed to prohibit insurance154.  
 
                                                
151 Ibn Abdideen(1836). Hashiat Ibn Abidin.Alhalabi publisher. Cairo. Supra footnote 99.V2, p21. Altwajery. A 
(2009). Altaameen almua’asir fi muzan alsharia .Supra 28. P22 
152El qora Daghi. A (2006), supra 22. 
153 Ibid 
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During the 6th-11th of May 1972, at the University of Libya Symposium, a selected host of 
Sharia and economics scholars discussed the issues surrounding insurance contracts and 
reached a decision, including the prohibition of life insurance and also the permissibility of 
insurance contracts; to be temporarily replaced by cooperative insurance155.  
 
On 4/4/1397H 24/04/1977, the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia issued a rule that 
confirms the permission of cooperative insurance and forbids commercial insurance156.  
 
Throughout this historical jurisprudential review it has been the main intention to shed light on 
the efforts exerted by scientists and scientific academics, noting how they reached a decision - 
which has not been made in haste -, but based upon study and consultation over the last 25 
years.  
 
On 10/08/1389H 22/10/1969, the Islamic Fiqhi Academy of the Muslim World League issued 
a decree for the prohibition of all forms of commercial insurance, whether for self, for 
merchandise or otherwise, and the permissibility of cooperative insurance was confirmed. The 
International Islamic Fiqhi Academy then provided Resolution 9 (9/2) stating that "a 
commercial insurance policy with fixed-premium companies that deal in commercial 
insurance with an element of uncertainty, invalidates any contract which is therefore forbidden 
in Islamic Sharia.”157  
 
Through this presentation, it is clear that Sharia scholars have concluded that commercial 
insurance is forbidden as it does not correspond with the instructions of Islam.  
 
 
 
                                                
155 Ibid. 
156 The General Presidency of Scholary and Ifta in Saudi Arabia. Decision no (5/10)Insurance subject. Edition 
(2001). V4. P 307. Available online at: 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?BookID=1&View=Page&PageNo=1&PageID=410  
157 The International Islamic Fiqhi Academy. Conference 1 (1969). Available online at: 
http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/qrarat/2-9.htm  
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2.6 Takaful Commercial Insurance  
 
Takaful is a system of Islamic insurance based on the accepted principle of Ta’awun (mutual 
assistance) and Tabarru (voluntary contribution), where risk is shared collectively by the 
group. This system is operated on the basis of shared responsibility, brotherhood, solidarity 
and mutual cooperation or assistance, providing mutual financial security and assistance to 
safeguard participants against a defined risk. Various types of Takaful, incorporating these 
principles, are detailed below: 
2.6.1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF TAKAFUL COMMERCIAL INSURANCE  
 
The basic principles of Takaful, according to Islamic values are: 
• Policyholders co-operate amongst themselves for the common good. 
• Every policyholder pays his/her subscription to help those that need assistance. 
• Losses are divided and liabilities spread according to the community pooling system. 
• Uncertainty is eliminated in respect of subscription and compensation. 
• No one member of the scheme derives advantage to the cost of others.158 
 
2.6.2 TAKAFUL TYPES   
2.6.2.1 Family Takaful   
 
According to Ali (1989), with this type of Takaful insurance the policy has a defined period of 
maturity, and the insured commonly make periodic premium contributions which are primarily 
used to meeting individual savings targets and in part, to financially assist bereaved families of 
the deceased insured. Premium amounts vary depending on the sum (face amount) that each 
insured party aims to accumulate at the end of the coverage period as well as on details such as 
age, gender and health condition of the insured party. The insurer may set a minimum face 
                                                
158 These principles are derived from the general concept of Islamic scholars in respect of insurance, and from 
the in-depth reading of books such as:  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 22. 
Albarry.Z.(1977). Alsalih. M(2004)Insurance between permission and prohibition. Supra footnote 75. 
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amount for this purpose and may also set a minimum/maximum age limit for participating in 
this type of policy. By the same token, the insurer may decide to accept standard risks only 
and may maintain separate classes of policy holder, perhaps organised by age, but with 
different years of entry to the plan159.  
Takaful life insurance is also used for other purposes, including generating a fund for 
children’s education, securing a fund in case of a mortgagor's premature death and protecting 
business interest against key employee’s deaths. Several Takaful policies now come with 
hospitalisation and disability benefits. In fact, there is virtually a counterpart Takaful life 
insurance policy for each major type of conventional life insurance policy, while difference lie 
in how premiums are allocated160.  
 
However, by using investment as a methodology, a Takaful operator (insurer) credits 
instalment premiums over two separate accounts - the individual account and the special 
account pertaining to each insured party. Takaful insurers then invest those funds in individual 
and special accounts in the form of mutual funds, primarily consisting of stocks in financial 
institutions and manufacturers, so long as their goods and services are permitted by Islamic 
Sharia. See figure below161.    
                                                
159 Ali, Kasi Mohammedd. Mortuza, 1989. "Principles and Practices of Insurance under Islamic Framework," 
Insurance Journal, (December): 29-38. 
160 See Malaysia Takaful available online http://www.takaful-
malaysia.com.my/family/products/Pages/default.aspx    
161 Ali, Kasi Mohammedd. Mortuza, 1989. Supra footnote 150. 
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Figure 2.1: The Process of Family Takaful 
 
However, if an insured party goes on to meet their target savings, determined at policy 
inception, the insured receives a refund on all premiums that he/she has paid in addition to 
his/her share of investment income from that account. In addition, his/her share of surplus will 
be assessed from the special account162.  
 
Takaful insurers also permit their insured population to surrender policies prematurely. When 
an insured party exercises this option, he/she will receive a refund of all premiums plus his/her 
share of surplus from the individual account (minus administrative expenses) until the date of 
surrender. However, no refund is awarded from the special account in cases where a policy is 
surrendered. Typically, with a Takaful insurance plan, it matters little whether or not an 
                                                
162 Ibid. 
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insured party surrenders in the manner prescribed via his/her policy, since all insured’s are, in 
principle, partners of the insurance plan163.  
 
2.6.2.2 General Takaful (Non-Life Insurance) 
 
In non-life insurance, Takaful  insurers commonly offer coverage on an annual renewal basis, 
for everything from fire insurance and allied lines, automobile insurance, liability insurance, 
marine insurance, workers’ compensation, fidelity insurance and even crop insurance. In 
Takaful life insurance, the Mudarabah mode of financing is employed in General Takaful.  
Premiums are pooled into a Takaful fund managed by each insurer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The process of General Takaful contract 
 
In this system, the insurer acts as trustee, invests funds in Islamic ways and channels the 
investment income, less investment expenses, back into the fund. The insurer then settles all 
outstanding claims, deducts its operating expenses and transfers part of the fund to relevant 
reserves. 
 
If there a balance is leftover after all necessary adjustments, the balance will be shared by the 
insurer and its insured in accordance with an agreed ratio e.g., 50 percent each. This surplus is 
normally distributed on expiry of each insured parties insurance policy. If, however, the sum 
of the premium and investment income is insufficient to meet these adjustments, those 
affected may be assessed for additional contributions. Accordingly, Takaful non-life insurance 
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works similarly, albeit not exactly, agreeing assessable, mutual insurance arrangements in a 
conventional insurance context164. 
 
2.6.2.3 Re-Takaful (Re-Insurance) 
 
In terms of risk-sharing and pricing, Maysami, Ramin (n.d.) has stated that reinsurance 
transfers are commonly classified into proportional and non-proportional arrangements. In 
Takaful reinsurance (also known as retakaful), non-proportional arrangements such as excess 
of loss, or stop-loss arrangements, may not be suitable because uncertainty exists with respect 
to the assessment of losses in those arrangements, where Islamic principles demand clearly 
defined joint responsibility throughout the coverage period. Hence, Takaful reinsurance is 
likely to be arranged on a pro-rata basis, e.g., quota share or surplus reinsurance, where the re-
insurer technically becomes a co-insurer of the original risks165.  
 
Maysami, Ramin (n.d.) added that if, however, a non-proportional reinsurance arrangement is 
selected, it could be based on a strict profit commission plan or on a reciprocal basis. In this 
case, it matters little whether the reinsurance transfer is on a facultative or treaty basis. Due to 
the fact that only a few Takaful reinsurers are currently operating, the capacity of the Takaful 
reinsurance market would not be large enough to accommodate the demands from Takaful 
insurers. As such, Takaful insurers often create and operate a pool, pursuant to Islamic 
principles in order to minimize their exposure to certain, catastrophic risks. They can also be 
allowed to enter into contractual agreements with conventional re-insurers. In fact, a number 
of conventional re-insurers have provided reinsurance protection to insurers, Takaful or not, 
throughout several Islamic countries.  
 
                                                
164 Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management; A Takaful perspective, Published by Alnoor 2007 Kensington, South 
Africa. P16 
165Maysami, Ramin (no date). An Analysis of Islamic Takaful Insurance. Available online at: 
http://www.isu.ac.ir/farsi/academics/economics/edu/dlc/2rd/09/other/analysis%20of%20Islamic%20Takaful%20I
nsurance.pdf . Retrieved on 09-08-2012.   
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However, although this may not be strictly followed by insured parties, Muslim jurists advise 
that Takaful insurers cease purchasing coverage from conventional re-insurers when a Takaful 
re-insurer becomes available166. 
 
2.6.3 THE MODEL OF TAKAFUL 
 
The terms “Family Takaful” or just “Takaful” are generally used for family solidarity in place 
of conventional life insurances. Other products, available in various countries, are General 
Takaful, Education/Medical Takaful, etc. Based on the nature of the relationship, Ali khan 
stated that there are various models including Wakalah (agency) Model, Mudarabah (share in 
profit) Model and the combination of agency and Mudarabah models or agency and waqaf. 
2.6.3.1 The Mudarabah model (share in profit) 
 
In the Mudarabah model the policyholders receive profit on their part of the funds only 
if/when a Takaful Company earns a profit. The sharing arrangement is determined in advance 
and is a function of the developmental stage and earnings of the Company. The Sharia 
committee approves the sharing ratio for each year in advance. Most of the expenses are 
charged to the shareholders167.  
2.6.3.2 The Wakalah Model 
 
In the Wakalah Model, the surplus of policyholders’ funds and investments – net the 
management fee or expenses – goes to the policyholders. The shareholders charge a Wakalah 
fee from contributions and this fee covers most of the expenses of business. The fee rate is 
fixed annually, in advance, and in consultation with the company’s Sharia committee. In order 
to give incentive for good governance, management fees are related to level of 
performance168.  
                                                
166 Ibid.  
167 Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management; A Takaful perspective. Supra footnote 155. 
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2.6.3.3 Wakalah with waqaf 
 
In Wakalah with waqaf, this Takaful model employs the following contracts to govern their 
business: 
• A pure donation contract (for Waqf motives alone), where the participant agrees to 
donate a pre-determined percentage of their contribution to the Waqf fund to provide 
assistance to fellow participants. 
• The agency (Al-Wakalah) contract where the participant (waqif) authorises a Takaful  
Company (agent) to conduct affairs relating to the Risk and Special Fund on his /her 
behalf, hence all Islamic verdicts regarding this contract are referred specifically to the 
agent (Nazer- u- alWaqf) including applications and Fiqhi books.169 
 
2.6.4 TAKAFUL INSURANCE SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES170  
 
Ali Kasi, (1989) identified some considerable similarities and differences between Takaful and 
conventional insurance.  
2.6.4.1 Similarities  
 
Takaful and conventional non-life insurance is similar in that they both adopt several key legal 
principles in terms of insurance. Most notably, both types of insurance employ the principle of 
insurable interest to minimise the problems of moral hazard, i.e., to separate insurance from 
gambling.  
Using the principle of uberrima fides171, both Takaful and conventional insurers can render 
contract void if there is material misrepresentation, concealment or breach of warranty made 
                                                
169 Liaquat, Ali Khan..HOW DOES TAKAFUL DIFFER FROM INSURANCE? . From assaif.Org. Available 
online: 
http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=HOW+DOES+TAKAFUL+DIFFER+FROM+INSURANCE%3F+&btnG
=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&as_vis=1 . Retrieved on 09-08-2012.  
170 Basically, there are a considerable number of differences between both of them, referred to in the next 
chapter, where I am going to talk about the Takaful models indepth.  
171Uberrima fides a Latin phrase meaning "utmost good faith" (or translated literally, "most abundant faith"). It 
is the name of a legal doctrine which governs insurance contracts. available online on ; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uberrima_fides  
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by the insured. Regarding innocent misrepresentation or breaches of warranty, conventional 
insurers are either unlikely to void or are forbidden to do so by statute or code of law.  
Similarly, Takaful insurers may not void such a contract. Further, those insured’s that serve 
the Sharia supervisory board may object to their insurer exercising this option, as they 
represent other insured’s contributing to the company172.  
2.6.4.2 Differences 
 
Differences, however, exist. In conventional insurance, insurers use a "valued policy" for 
certain types of properties where the insurer agrees, total loss, to indemnify the value agreed 
upon at policy inception. For partial loss, the insurer may pay more (or less) than the 
indemnity if the actual value of the property, at the time of loss, falls below (or increases 
above) the coverage limit.  
 
Cash value arrangements are not permitted in Takaful (Ali, 1989). Neither is this accepted in 
Islam i.e., depreciation of property value is not permitted. Takaful insurers are thus willing to 
extend coverage only after conducting a proper valuation of the property to be insured.  
 
Further, Takaful insurers conduct a periodic valuation of the insured property to eliminate any 
discrepancy between the existing insurance coverage and the current market value of the 
property insured, and adjust premiums accordingly. These valuation restrictions compel that 
property insurance be placed on a replacement cost basis in order to suit Islamic principles173.  
 
2.7 survey of Takaful operations 
 
During the past three decades we have seen Takaful operations opening up in many countries 
throughout the world, primarily in Islamic countries and countries with a large Muslim 
community. The world’s pioneer Takaful  insurer was established in 1979 – the Islamic 
Insurance Company of Sudan, followed by the Islamic Insurance Company of Saudi Arabia, in 
the same year.  
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In the Far East, Malaysia has been at the forefront of Takaful  development with Bank Negara 
taking the lead introducing separate Takaful  regulations thereby allowing the Takaful  
business to flourish in that country. Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei have all followed with 
the development of Takaful operations. In the Middle East, Takaful operations have developed 
in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iran, Qatar and Iran with more new operations to be opened up in 
Egypt, UAE and Kuwait in recent years. It is fair to say that the Far East and Middle East 
regions lead the way in Takaful development but other countries are also moving in this 
direction i.e. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka174. 
 
Outside these two primary regions, Takaful has also been introduced into Europe and the USA 
but, as yet, development of Takaful in the western world has not met with any major degree of 
success. There is no doubt that there is a tremendous opportunity for Takaful to develop in 
these regions, with large Muslim communities being able to avail themselves of Takaful 
products and services.  
 
Nevertheless, significant investment is required to compete with the conventional insurance 
industry and regulatory changes would also be necessary, as seen in the Malaysian market, to 
allow Takaful to compete on equal terms with conventional insurance operators. 
 
However, Takaful industry in the Middle East is under-developed compared to other markets 
such as those in Malaysia. The more successful companies in the Middle East have grown at 
10% p.a. whereas in Malaysia the rate of growth has been 60% p.a.  The total insurance 
premium income of the world is $2.4 trillion whereas in Takaful the total premium income is 
$2.1 billion175.  
 
Against conventional insurance, only five percent of the population in Muslim countries are 
taking advantage of these insurance facilities, and only where it is a legal obligation to obtain 
insurance. Therefore, 95% of the population are not buying insurance due to the concept that 
insurance is un-Islamic. By using Takaful as Islamic insurance a large population out of the 
remaining 95% could be encouraged to take out insurance in the form of Takaful. Re-Takaful 
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(Reinsurance) companies are few and far between and generally, the Takaful operators are 
using the services of normal re-insurers176.  
 
Mutual based insurance companies have been providing insurance products relating to 
personal lines in limited amounts. Thus, on the basis of mutuality, Takaful operators cannot 
insure large commercial risks involving huge amounts of capital because these risks will 
require insurance companies with large amounts of capital.  
 
Therefore, the Saudi Government has increased the limit of capital for an insurance company 
to 100 million Riyals, and 200 million for reinsurance companies177.  
 
2.7.1 TAKAFUL IN ARABIAN COUNTRIES 
 
The development of a cooperative form of insurance in this region probably dates back to the 
pre-Islamic period when each tribe tried to protect the life and property of its members. For 
example, if one member killed another, then the family of the perpetrator was expected to pay 
"blood money" to the surviving family of the deceased. It is also well known that, around 1500 
BC, Syrian rulers accumulated funds from public taxation to pay for fire, flood or draught 
losses suffered by community members. At present, there are several Islamic insurers and 
three re-insurers domiciling in the Middle East and the North Africa region178.  
 
The biggest of these re-insurers is the Jeddah-based Islamic Insurance and Reinsurance 
Company. The other two re-insurers are the Islamic Takaful & ReTakaful Company in Jeddah 
and the BEST Re in Tunisia founded in 1985. The latter company is fully owned by 
SALAMA Group (Dubai – UAE), which also comprises 7 other direct Takaful companies.179.  
However, Alpen Capital expects the Gulf Cooperating Council’s (GCC) Takaful market to 
continue to grow faster than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (non-oil). Based on both the 
                                                
176 Ibid.  
177Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. SAMA  
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/Pages/LawsandRegulations.aspx , Retrieved on 15-08-2012. 
178 Maysami, Ramin. An Analysis of Islamic Takaful Insurance. Supra footnote 156 
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current macroeconomic outlook, and a set of assumption detailed below, Alpen Capital 
expects the market to grow at an approximately nominal and real Compound Annual Growth 
Rate (CAGR) of 20.7% and 16.1% respectively (from 2009 to 2012). The performance of the 
industry in the first nine months of 2009, with double digit top-line growth in each quarter on 
an aggregate basis, supports these growth estimates180. 
 
• Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, according to Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) there are 43 
companies applying Takaful with US $1.39 b indemnities in 2008 compared with US $680.52 
million in 2005181. Here, the National Company for Co-operative Insurance (NCCI) was the 
first company to apply Islamic cooperative insurance.  
As a joint venture, established in 1986 by three government agencies, this type of insurance 
underwrites risks in the oil industry worldwide, as well as the aviation fleet risks of Arab 
nations. In fact, the NCCI recently achieved 1st position with stock market shares valued at 
US$ 200 million182. However, in order to enhance the insurance market, SAMA stipulates 
SAR 100 million for insurance companies and SAR 200 million for reinsurance. 
 
• Kuwait  
In Kuwait, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry granted a license for the first Takaful 
insurance company as recently as February 1998. This new company, capitalised at US$98 
million, has eight major shareholders including Kuwait Finance House, the International 
Investor and International Murabaha (the main Islamic financial institution in the country). 
This company is expected to offer a full range of Takaful products in the near future. There are 
now more than 9 Takaful and Re-Takaful companies in Kuwait183. 
 
                                                
180 Alpen Capital. (2010). GCC Takaful Industry.P6 
181 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) report 2008 available online; 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/Insurance/InssuranceLib/4600_R_InsuaMarketSurvey2008_Ar_1430_05_21_V1.pdf . 
Retrieved on 09-08-2012.   
182 Tawuniy. Performance available online at; 
http://www.tawuniya.com.sa/Home/AboutUs/AboutTawuniya/Performance/tabid/379/Default.aspx . Retrieved on 
13-08-2012 
183 Alpen Capital. (2010).supra footnote 131. 
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• The UAE 
In the UAE, Insurance regulation is presently minimal and undergoing revision. Indeed, a new 
insurance law came into force in August 2007 thereby establishing the Insurance commission, 
a new regulatory body for locally incorporated companies. However, requirements for Takaful 
companies have not yet been decided. On the contrary, the Dubai International Financial 
Services Centre (DIFC), an offshore financial centre, requires Takaful firms operating within 
the DIFC to operate outside the Prudential Insurance Rule book (followed by conventional 
insurers) and to fulfil the requirements of the Islamic Financial Services Rulebook (IFS). 
There are now more than 16 Takaful and Re-Takaful companies in the UAE184. 
 
However, the insurance market in many other countries in the region has recently shown a 
considerable growth rate, although the insurance penetration ratio and the insurance density in 
those countries are relatively lower than those in more economically mature countries.  
 
For example, the Lebanese insurance market enjoys a high level of awareness among the 
general public, who tend to be well educated. Its non-life insurance accounts for nearly 80 
percent of total premiums but, unfortunately, there is no Takaful operation in existence here. 
Alternatively, in Egypt, legislation was passed in the early 1990s to allow the eventual 
establishment of a free market system, but the first Takaful operation came latterly in form of 
the National Takaful Insurance Co (2008)185.    
 
2.7.2 TAKAFUL IN EAST ASIA 
 
• Malaysia  
As stated by Maysami Ramin, Malaysia, introduced the Takaful Act in the early 1980s in 
order to legitimise Takaful operations and is probably the only country in the world with such 
a law. After passing the act, Bank Negara (the central bank of Malaysia) was appointed to 
                                                
184 Ibid. P28 
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regulate Takaful operations and to monitor the compliance of Takaful insurers within the 
Sharia. Syarikat Takaful Malaysia, a subsidiary of Bank Islam Malaysia, was the first to obtain 
a Takaful operation license under the act. This was incorporated in 1984 and commenced 
operations in 1985 both in life, and non-life lines. In 1993, Malaysia’s National Insurance 
MNI Takaful was licensed and has since been operating in Malaysia. This latter insurer 
currently focuses on enhancing customer services technology and on developing new 
marketing channels, e.g., policyholders' services through post offices. Malaysia’s National 
Insurance Company, the largest local insurance company, currently owns about 80 percent of 
the shares in MNI Takaful186.   
 
• Singapore  
In Singapore, Takaful, together with Islamic banking, has been viewed as a tool to promote the 
economic development of the Islamic community and comprises approx. 15 percent of the 
population. Currently, two Takaful insurers are in operation, both created in 1995. The 
Ampro-Income Takaful  Company is a joint venture between Ampro Holdings of Singapore 
(mainly in manufacturing business) and NTUC-Income Insurance Co-operative (a local 
mutual insurance company dominating personal lines of insurance and with a relatively large 
number of Muslim insurance agents).  The other Takaful insurer is Syarikat Takaful Singapura 
(STS), a joint venture business between Keppel Insurance Company and Singapore Malay 
Teachers' Multi-purpose Co-operative Society187. 
 
• Pakistan 
In Pakistan, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) is the regulatory 
authority of the insurance industry operating in accordance with the Insurance Ordinance 
2000. Here, thus far, the Takaful business has not been introduced. However, the Insurance 
Ordinance, 2000 has made provisions for Takaful business. Islamic banking institutions 
require the support of Takaful businesses. As such, the SECP has constituted a four-member 
task force, which will frame rules and regulations for Takaful businesses in Pakistan. 
Furthermore, Pak Kuwait Investment Corporation has been allowed to establish a Takaful 
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company in Pakistan under the name of “First Takaful Insurance Company Ltd.” with an 
authorised capital of Rs.100 million188.  
 
2.7.3 THE WEST 
 
• The USA 
Interestingly, Takaful is observed in the non-Islamic world too. The USA hosts the largest 
insurance industry in the world, accounting for 30% of total worldwide premium income, 
compared with 11% in Japan189. The US has many Takaful operators, for example, USA 
Takaful Management Services; LLC (Wayne, NJ) is just one of several Takaful insurers in 
operation.  Established in 1996, this company provides Takaful life and non-life insurance 
coverage’s in both personal and commercial lines. Other US Takaful insurers, or financial 
institutions operating under Sharia principles, include: Failaka Investments (Chicago, IL), 
Samad Group (Dayton, OH), North American Islamic Trust (Indianapolis, IN), Baitul Mai., 
Inc. (Secaucus, NJ), Abar Investments, Inc. (Stamford, CT) and MSI Finance Corporation 
(Houston, TX)190.  
 
• The UK  
The UK insurance industry is the largest in Europe and the third largest in the world after the 
USA and Japan, accounting for 11% of total worldwide premium income. The UK's annual 
per capita insurance spend is approximately £2,500 (US$4,600), which is the second highest in 
the world after Switzerland (as of 2005). Most people in the UK purchase some form of 
insurance and over 60% of households in the UK subscribe to home-related insurance, while 
more than 70% are covered for motor insurance191.  
 
                                                
188 Liaquat, Ali Khan. Supra footnote 125. 
189 The UK insurance – key facts (2009). Associations of British insurers. Available online; 
http://www.abi.org.uk/Facts_and_Figures/46809.pdf. Retrieved on 09-08-2012.  
190 Maysami, Ramin. An Analysis of Islamic Takaful Insurance. Supra footnote 124. 
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A UK survey conducted by British Islamic Insurance Holdings (BIIH), revealed that the first 
Takaful Company in the UK (founded in May 2008), decided to launch with capital of £80 
million. The survey actually indicated a strong preference for Sharia compliant insurance 
solutions amongst UK Muslims with 50% responding that they were “extremely likely” or 
“very likely” to buy Motor Takaful, as long as all aspects of the policy, including cost and 
level of cover, are comparable with their existing conventional insurance policy. A further 
26% said that they would be “fairly likely” to buy Motor Takaful. The corresponding figures 
for Household Takaful were 46% and 28% respectively192.  
 
However, Takaful insurance is also found in Switzerland, Belgium and Australia. 
 
2.8 The Regulation of Takaful    
 
Regulation is still in its infancy with many jurisdictions, there are different models of Takaful 
in use and different regulatory approaches. In regulating Takaful companies, the regulators 
may, in general, seek assistance from the administrative principles of conventional insurance 
companies. The regulators may use the conventional principles and actuarial rules for Takaful 
companies. This is an administrative procedure that would not be objected to by Sharia. 
 In the UK or Dubai, for example, in authorising a Takaful operator, the Financial Services 
Authority FSA or Dubai Financial Services Authority DFSA will in general consider: 
 
• Risk assessment 
• Conduct of business 
 
Takaful  operators must comply with the Insurance Conduct of Business (ICOB) rules which 
seek to carry out the obligations set out in the (FSA)’s Principles for Businesses, for example: 
Observe proper standards of market conduct, Observe high standards of integrity and treat 
customers fairly. 
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• Capital adequacy  
Takaful operators must have sufficient financial resources to meet claims as they fall due, also 
the capacity of Solvency and margins Admissibility of assets, finally address capital adequacy 
under the Wakalah / Mudarabah models. 
 
• Management, Systems and Controls 
Takaful operators must employ adequate human resources, competent and prudent 
management, persons occupying “controlled functions”, IT systems and Sharia compliance. 
 
• Disclosure 
This involves the submission of a business plan, regular reports and co-operative and open 
dealings with the FSA or DFSA193. 
 
Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), regulator of the Saudi Arabian 
insurance market, mandates all insurance companies to be established in a cooperative 
manner. SAMA also directs the cooperative insurance companies to distribute 10% of the net 
surplus of insurance surplus to policyholders directly or in the form of a reduction in 
premiums for the following year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus is transferred to the 
shareholders. SAMA also mandated all insurance companies (existing and new) to obtain a 
license by March 2008 to underwrite business or exit the market. Notably, to obtain a license, 
a company must be established as a joint stock company, invest at least 20% of policyholder 
funds in government bonds and 20% in bonds issued by Saudi-authorized banks194.  
 
As a result, as of August 2009, out of the 43 companies operating in Saudi Arabia in 2008, 25 
insurance and reinsurance companies were fully licensed to operate in the Kingdom and 6 
                                                
193 FSA, The Full Handbook available online http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/. The DFSA 
Rulebook. The Actuarial Profession presentation available online http://www.actuaries.org.uk/?a=127387. 
Retrieved on 10-08-2012.     
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companies have been approved to be established by the Council of Ministers195. Nowadays, 
there are 33 insurance companies listed in Saudi market196. 
 
Accordingly, administrative procedures would not be objected to by Sharia, as administrative 
procedures are actions that do not involve any contractual undertakings which may go against 
the principles of Takaful operations.  
The Sharia allows participants to benefit from the positive features of conventional insurance 
management and regulation methodology on the basis of the principle of valid public interest 
(masalaha mu’tabara) or principle of Legitimacy Policy (alsiyasah al-shari’yyah). These 
principals are employed to allow the formation of rules and regulations - since no explicit 
rules of insurance are featured in the Qur’an and Sunnah - provided their use will not violate 
the basic principles of Islamic law. 
 
However, the foundation of the mechanism for monitoring segregated funds regulations is 
different.  So, it is suggested that the relationship between Takaful firms and participants 
necessitates the segregation of funds. From a Sharia perspective, this parting of funds is 
carried out in order to ensure that expenses and other risks, related to each fund, are allocated 
accordingly. Therefore, regulators are required to develop a mechanism to monitor the 
movement of different funds in relation to Takaful practices.  
 
The importance of this regulation mechanism is obvious. Monitoring will help regulators 
scrutinize investment risks and expenses and reveal how Takaful companies allocate these in 
view of shareholders and policyholders rights and obligations. The expense risk, relating to the 
shareholders fund, should remain with the Takaful operator. The allocation of expenses and 
risks with respect to the Takaful fund, will depend on the model used by the Takaful company 
whether Mudarabah or Wakalah. 
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2.9 SUMMARY 
 
The main objective of Chapter 2 was to present an abridgment on the Legal and jurisprudential 
concept of Islamic Mutual Cooperative Insurance [Takaful] and its potential application in the 
world.  
 
The following points were outlined in my personal reflection; motives for my choice of thesis; 
a brief overview of the meaning of Takaful; a synopsis of the global development and features 
of commercial insurance under the perspectives of Islamic experts; the three pillars of an 
insurance contract; A brief survey of Takaful global development, to date; an analysis and 
evaluation, indicating the strengths and weakness, and the problems and challenges facing 
Takaful under Islamic Sharia Law. 
Chapter 3 will examine the distinctiveness of the Models of Takaful (Mudarabah, Wakalah 
(agency), and Wakalah with Waqf) and Family Takaful, exploring different opinions between 
the four schools of Islamic Sharia law.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE MODELS OF TAKAFUL (MUDARABAH, WAKALAH 
(AGENCY), WAKALAH WITH WAQF) AND FAMILY TAKAFUL; 
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF OPINIONS AMONG ISLAMIC 
SHARIA LAW SCHOOLS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Enthusiasm for the Islamisation of banking and insurance is currently at its peak. In fact, it is 
clear that both private individuals, and financial institutions, are making every effort to 
Islamise banking and insurance sectors. The concept of insurance has existed for many 
centuries. Indeed, 19th Century Muslim traders came to regard insurance as a necessity, 
transporting their cargo via shipping goods across the seas to distant countries. These traders 
would mutually arrange for safeguards, covering their cargo and vessels against the risk of 
sinking. Over the last two decades, a new form of Islamic insurance, known as Takaful, has 
emerged. Takaful has been growing in popularity throughout the world, Islamic, and Non-
Islamic, countries alike. 
 
Consulting the primary sources of Islamic Sharia law1, this chapter will identify Takaful as an 
Islamic provision. Hence, discussion will focus upon the jurisprudential (Fiqhi) issues 
associated with Takaful verdicts, as based on sound principles, synonymous with Islamic 
scripture. Further, the chapter will illustrate the nature of the Takaful contract, as a new feature 
within today’s insurance industry. This will be followed by a Fiqhi analysis of Takaful, 
exploring various applications.   
 
Based on Waqf, Wakalah – a company’s method of operation/agency - incorporates numerous 
features and mechanisms. This study will highlight the application of these features in line 
with majority opinion, voiced by Islamic experts and economists, with reference to its relative 
advantages. 
  
                                                
1 Quran, Sunnah, Consensus (Ijmaa), Analogy (Qias).  
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As a product, family Takaful is an Islamic alternative to life insurance, offering a range of 
models and options. Therefore, this chapter illustrates these models while also describing the 
contractual relationship between relevant parties.  
 
Correspondingly, there is considerable divergence with Takaful application; here, the concept 
of surplus represents a defining feature, distinguishing Takaful from conventional insurance. 
Therefore, at the end of this chapter, specific regulatory and supervisory considerations will be 
illustrated based on the Takaful system.   
 
3.2 Definition of Islamic Mutual Cooperative Insurance (Takaful) 
 
Takaful is an Arabic term meaning joint guarantee pertaining to a debt, and/or commitment to 
conservation and care. In respect of this, the Prophet Mohammed, Peace Be Upon Him 
(PBUH), stated; “I, as the carer of the orphans in Heaven, will be like this”, and indicated to 
his fingers, and divided them2 (Holding the index and middle fingers close).  
 
The Takaful contribution is basically the amount participants actually pay, or promise to pay, 
to a Takaful pool or operator. This payment is either wholly (Wakala concept), or partially 
(Mudarabah concept), donated form an insurance portfolio; for which an indemnity is paid 
when the insured risk occurs, as per the terms and conditions of the Takaful certificate. Thus, 
initially, a Takaful contribution is paid as a donation, adding to the insurance portfolio of all 
participants. Although portfolios are often managed by incorporated companies, these 
companies do not own participant contributions. Instead, contributions are handled on the 
basis of agency, or agency cum Mudarabah, and possibly Mudarabah combining Musharaka, 
as explained in the proceeding sections. 
 
In other words, the basic objective of Takaful is to cover a defined loss via a defined fund. 
Thus, each member of the pool makes provisions to support the needy, thereby promoting 
mutual help among group participants. Abo Guddah (2008) held that the definition of Takaful 
is the participation of a group, bound together in a financial system, allowing members to 
                                                
2 Imam Muslim (H 261). Sahih Muslim, Dar Alam Al kotb 1996. Volume 4 page 2287 Hadeath no 2983.  
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cooperate in shouldering injury by paying appropriate compensation to the injured through 
donor’s premiums3. 
 
Furthermore, Takaful insurance, as described by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation of 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), is “a symbiotic relationship between people who may 
be exposed to similar dangers”. This association is formed in order to avoid/reduce damage 
caused by those dangers members pay contributions against. Based on a commitment to 
donate, Takaful consists of an insurance fund incorporating a separate financial fund, so as to 
pay compensation for damages incurred by participants as a result of damages from the 
insured. This Financial Fund is administered either, by a select committee chosen from policy 
holders, or by an independent company. However, independents charge an administration fee 
for managing an insurance business, taking a share of the profits in return for their investment 
funds, hence, functioning as an agent or speculator”4. 
 
Ma’sum Billah has added that “Takaful (Islamic Insurance) is a financial transaction of mutual 
co-operation created between two parties, providing financial security against unexpected 
material risk”. In a Takaful transaction, the first party, referred to as the participant (insured), 
pays a particular amount of money, known as a contribution (premium), to the second party, 
known as the Takaful operator (insurer). At this point, it is mutually agreed that the operator is 
under legal responsibility to provide the participant with financial security against unexpected 
loss or damage incurred by the subject matter of the policy, if occurring within policy 
timelines. 
 
However, in cases of Takaful life policies - where loss has not occurred within a specified 
period - the insured party is entitled to re-coup the sum of their paid-contributions held via the 
Participant’s Account (PA). The insured party is also entitled to a share of the profits made as 
a result of their paid-contributions, based on principles characterised by the al-Mudarabah5 
                                                
3Abo Guddah. A. The Cooperative Insurance through Waqf system. Paper published by International Islamic 
University in Malaysia 2008 available online on; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_6.pdf 
4 Islamic Sharia Standards. Published by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions. Bahrain 2007, Islamic Standard   No. 26 Page 436. 
5 A1-Mudarabahh is a financial technique applicable to the Islamic partnership between two or more parties. In 
this scenario, one party provides capital while the other offers service or skill in a particular business, both 
sharing profits accordingly. Today, Islamic banks and insurance companies operate on the principle of 
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financing model. In this transaction, both the Takaful operator and the participant are mutually 
cooperating for financial protection6. 
 
3.3 Takaful Operations adopt the same rules as those applied in General 
Contracts 
 
Jurists are experienced at verifying certain properties or qualities necessary for the validity of 
contracts. Based on a number of perspectives, it is conceded that Takaful operations constitute 
a type of contract. Thus, the rules and principles adhered to within the Takaful contract fall 
under those applied to general contracts vis-à-vis subject matter, terms and conditions and 
investment requirements. When one explores the fiqh literature in respect of legal contracts, it 
becomes clear that a valid contractual relationship must include the following: 
 
a) Exchange of Offer and Acceptance 
A contract is valid when the exchange of an offer is accepted via two or more contracting 
parties. In this instance, it is necessary to identify the contracting parties participating in 
Takaful operations7. These parties - one offering and the other accepting - may be viewed 
from two perspectives. As far as Takaful membership is concerned, the act of offer and 
acceptance represents an exchange between those holding the Takaful portfolio, and potential 
participants. The Takaful operator uses an insurance license to create a Takaful portfolio 
matched to his/her/its juristic personality. The operator then acts on behalf of this juristic 
personality to exchange offers, pending acceptance, with potential participants. Having signed 
the contract of contribution, participants are then awarded membership status within the 
Takaful portfolio and are subject to the operator’s article of association with regard to rights 
and obligations8. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Mudarabahh, an alternative to interest based-transactions. In brief, Mudarabahh is an interest free, profit and loss 
sharing transaction. 
6 Ma’sum Billah. M. Developing Applications for Islamic Insurance Takaful. Published by ICMIF available 
online on: http://www.panoramassicurativo.ania.it/get_file.php?id=14523 Retrieved on 14-08-2012 
7 Ibin Alqaeem (H751). Eelam Almuaqeen. Dar Alkotob Alilmiyah Lebanon 1996, Volume 3, Page 129.   
8 Ma’sum Billah. M (2007). Applied Takaful and Modern Insurance Law and Practice. Sweet & Maxwell Asia 
2007. Page 238. 
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After establishing a Takaful portfolio, an implied exchange (offer/acceptance) between the 
operator and the members of the Takaful portfolio (participants) occurs regarding management 
of the Takaful portfolio. This agreement permits the operator to arrange contracts and 
determine contributions and indemnities on behalf of participants. The exchange also grants 
the operator the right to invest contributions in accordance with models adopted by the 
operator. Thus, the creation of a Takaful membership portfolio is necessary to ensure Takaful 
validity. Conversely, without juristic personality, represented by the operator, Takaful 
processes would be invalid9. At this juncture, it is noted that the procedures of offer and 
acceptance are conducted via standard forms, completed by prospective participants. Besides 
serving the interests of contracting parties, this practice is also acceptable within Sharia, being 
compatible with Sharia rules and principles. 
 
b)  Legal Competence and the Concluding of Contracts 
It is essential that contracting parties, who exchange offer and acceptance, possess the legal 
capacity to enter into an agreement. In Takaful, operators gain the legal capacity to conclude 
contracts by virtue of their license of operation. Whereas, the participants’ fund derives legal 
capacity from the assumed status of the operator, who represents and manages the Takaful 
fund10. 
 
c)  Determination of the Subject-matter 
The formalities of a valid contract require that the subject matter be defined clearly. The 
subject-matter can take the form of tangible goods, services and/or usufructs. In Takaful, 
relationships differ according to subject-matter. As far as fellow participants are concerned, 
the subject matter of Takaful is essentially cooperation between a group of people vulnerable 
to similar/common risk, aiming to minimise the effect of that risk via Takaful contributions. 
In this context, the subject matter may be explained as follows11: 
 
                                                
9 Husain Hamid. H “al-Ta’min Ala al-Hayat”, Hawliah Albaraka, December 2000, pp. 38-69. Mohammed 
Burhan Arbouna.	
  Regulation of Takaful Business: A Shari’a Overview of Contractual Aspects of Takaful Models. 
Unpublished Article. p13.   
10 Khoder. M (1994) Saudi Commercial Law.Aldar Alwatania Aljadeeda for publishment. Alkhobar, Saudi 
Arabia. P 147 
11 Albadrawi. A. (1963). The Insurance. Wahbah for publishment. Cairo. p61. Alsalih. M (2004) Insurance 
between Permission and Prohibition. Al-Obiakan for publishment. Riyadh. p65. 
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(i) The amount of contribution paid by participants constituting mutual cooperation between 
members. This premium may be paid in a lump sum or as set instalments during the period of 
Takaful. As the participant contributes to the fund this qualifies him/her to become a member. 
Membership is on the understanding that participants accept certain procedures relating to 
their donation and to other members, if/when the insured risk occurs. By making this 
contribution, members establish a Takaful portfolio/fund, distinct from the capital of the 
Takaful operator. Therefore, in order to become a member, the participant is entering into a 
contract with the operator who represents the Takaful fund. 
 
(ii) The indemnity amount paid by the operator, on behalf of the participants, to a member 
incurring the insured risks. As far as the operator and the underwriter are concerned, the 
subject matter involves providing services along with the payment of fees, if any. In terms of 
investment, the subject matter represents either, the payment of fees and provision of services 
or, work and a percentage of profit. However, this depends on the model of investment used 
by the Takaful operator in view of the Takaful fund. Thus, the validity of the Takaful system 
hinges on a clear understanding of the subject matter. Hence, Takaful agreements, and 
participation, must reflect various subject matter in order to be valid and free from ambiguity. 
 
d) The Takaful Operation must be Beneficial to all Contracting Parties 
The Sharia requires that contracts are concluded on the understanding that they benefit all 
parties. This is because a contract portrays an exchange of interest and it is not practical to 
agree on something that gives no immediate benefit to the contracting parties. In Islamic law, 
contracts must serve the interest of two parties equally. Each party must feel that he or she has 
benefited from the contract. However, if a contract benefits only one party at the expense of 
the other, the contract becomes void12. 
 
e) The Takaful Operation must not Contradict an Explicit Text 
To preserve the validity of Takaful operations, it is important that the general features of a 
Takaful model are not fashioned in a way that conflicts with sources explicit to the Qur’an and 
                                                
12 Ibin Alqaeem (H751). Supra footnote 8 Volume 4 page 201. Albahooty. M (H1051). Kashaf Alqinaa. Kitab- 
u-Alshirkah, Dar Alaam Alkutub 1997 Lebanon, Volume 3 page 180.   
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Sunnah. If a source does impact in such a way that certain structures are not possible, then the 
product that depends on this structure becomes unacceptable in Sharia13. 
 
f) Observation of Impermissible Transactions 
A Takaful product must not be intended to circumvent impermissible transactions, such as riba 
and gharar. If the structure appears to involve riba or gharar in a roundabout way, it then 
becomes unacceptable14. One of the basic differences between Takaful and conventional 
insurance is the way the investment of funds is managed. In Takaful, agreement and 
investment mechanisms must comply with Islamic principles. Further, no investment should 
be made in non-halal products. Moreover, the Takaful fund and operators capital should not be 
invested in interest-based transactions. 
 
3.4 Features of Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
 
It should be noted that the Takaful concept aims to provide policyholders with the same 
services offered by conventional commercial companies. The theme of Takaful is to protect 
participants against the inability to overcome unwanted future events and difficulties. 
Nevertheless, this objective is achieved via a completely different set of features. The most 
important features of Islamic insurance can be summarized as follows15:  
 
a) Islamic insurance companies strictly observe Sharia rules and principles. This relationship 
is built on the avoidance of riba-based transactions, especially when investing collected 
contributions. Again, contracts and policy certificates must comply with the requirements of 
Sharia in respect of agreement. Basically, it is not a requirement that a particular Takaful 
contract, activity or relationship should comply with a Sharia nominated contract, or that a 
Takaful contract must exist in the Qur’an and Sunnah. All that is required is that the contract 
                                                
13 Ma’sum Billah. M(2007). Supra footnote 9. P238. Dr. Biltaji. M. The Insurance Contract in Perspective of 
Islamic Jurisprudence. Published by the Scientific Encyclopedia of Banks. 2004 Volume 5 p137. 
14 The High Committee for Iftaa in Saudi Arabia Resolution no.(18332) on 25/11/1426H available online at: 
http://www.alfalaq.com/sam/sam121.htm 
15  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), Islamic Insurance, El Bashaer Islamic Press. p134. Sharaf al-Din. Ahmed (1983). 
The Verdicts of Insurance in Legal and Judiciary Terms. Kuwait University Edition. p 125 
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must not violate Sharia principles. In fact, as a general principle, all contracts concluded by 
men are considered valid unless explicitly prohibited by Sharia. This feature of Takaful 
necessitates the appointment of Sharia Boards and internal Sharia Advisors in order to guide 
how insurance processes should be carried out in light of Sharia requirements. 
 
b) The formation of two separate accounts at the signing of the insurance policy. One account 
manages the movement of funds governed by shareholders. The other, manages the movement 
of funds belonging to individual participants. Here, it should be noted that this segregation 
also creates a partnership/relationship between participants and operators as illustrated below. 
 
c) In principle, the relationship between the operator and the participant is either an “agency-
agency” relationship or an “agency cum Mudarabah” or an “agency cum Waqf” 
relationship16. In other words, the insurance company is authorised by participants to manage 
operations and insurance services including, among other things, the preparation of 
documents, the collection of contributions and the payment of indemnities. Participants also 
authorise the company to invest their mobilised contributions, either on the basis of investment 
agency and/or Mudarabah, in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon by all 
parties.  
 
d) An Islamic insurance company endeavours to meet the objectives of cooperation and 
solidarity among policyholders. This is achieved through payment, where participants offer a 
premium or contribution on the understanding that this amount is donated, in whole or in part, 
to remedy damage or catastrophe befalling any registered member within the insurance 
portfolio. Therefore, the donated sum belongs to all participants and does not belong to 
shareholders, as in the case of conventional insurance companies. 
 
e) Islamic insurance involves uncertainty pertaining to compensation and its value. This 
affects the exchange contract, but not the donation-based contract, which is the basic 
philosophy of Takaful. In Islamic insurance, uncertainty or gharar occurs between participants 
who constitute one entity to meet mutual benefit. Alternatively, in conventional insurance, the 
                                                
16 Ma’sum Billah. M(2007). Supra footnote 9. Pp.18-29. 
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gharar is between the insured person(s) and the insurance company17. These are two separate 
parties whose interests conflict. In conventional insurance, the gharar lies with the fact that a 
person is paying a premium for an indemnity regarding an insured risk, which may or may not 
happen. 
 
f) Islamic insurance companies distribute the accumulated surplus to participants according to 
their contribution. The surplus is calculated as contribution minus compensation, expenses and 
reserves18. 
 
g) In the ideal situation, Takaful participants contribute additional money to protect against 
deficit when meeting the insured risk19. 
 
h) Policyholders are entitled to participate in the administration and supervision of all Takaful 
operator activities. This participation may be achieved by the creation of an Association of 
Participants (AP). The AP can appoint a representative to attend management meetings or 
board meetings on behalf of participants. This participation can help to overcome the 
problems associated with the mutual exchange of loans between Takaful operators and 
participants, should the operator choose to operate on this basis20. 
 
3.5 The Jurisprudential (Fiqhi) Analyses of Takaful Verdicts 
 
There is considerable interest among insurance industry specialists concerning Takaful as an 
appropriate solution. In recent times modern Islamic experts have considered Takaful, as an 
alternative to conventional insurance products because it is free from unlawful elements such 
as gambling, riba (usury) and other uncertainties. All the same, a considerable number of 
                                                
17  Algari.M  2009. Al fai’id Altaaminy. An Arabic paper presented at the cooperative insurance conference in 
Riyadh. P16 available online at: http://iifef.com/files/taameen/03.pdf 
18 Haidar.H (2009) Al fai’id Altaaminy. An Arabic paper presented at the cooperative insurance conference in 
Riyadh available online at: http://iifef.com/files/taameen/08.pdf   
19 Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management; A Takaful Perspective, Published by Alnoor 2007 Kensington, South 
Africa.   
20 Awards and Recommendations of Nadwat al-Baraka al-Iqtisad al- Islami, 2001, p.156. 
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experts believe that certain Takaful models, advocating contemporary formulations, include 
elements which deem them none-compliant with Islamic Sharia teachings. 
 
Contra to the above-mentioned, there are also a number of Islamic experts who assert that 
Takaful complies with Sharia law and is in line with the Quranic doctrine of co-operation. 
Furthermore, these experts believe that Takaful follows the Holy verse where Allah 
commanded to all believers: “Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not 
in sin and rancor: fear Allah: for Allah is strict in punishment”21. This verse is considered a 
general rule by jurisprudential scholars; thus, under Islamic teachings, the commandment to 
practice mutual co-operation is not an absolute. On the contrary, there is a limitation to it, as 
Allah has further prohibited mankind from mutually cooperating in any manner involving 
sinful element. Furthermore, in proof originating from the Sunnah doctrine; Jabir bin 
'Abdullah narrated that:  
 
“Allah's Apostle sent an army towards the east coast and appointed Abu 'Ubaida bin Al-
Jarrah as their chief, and the army consisted of three-hundred men including myself. We 
marched on until we reached a place where our food was about to finish. Abu 'Ubaida 
ordered us to collect food for the journey, and it was collected. My (our) food consisted of 
dates. Abu 'Ubaida gave us our daily ration in small amounts until the store was exhausted. 
Our share had amounted to one date for each of us. I said, "How can one date be of benefit to 
you?" Jabir replied, "We came to know the value of this when even that finished." Jabir added, 
"When we reached the sea-shore, we saw a huge fish which was like a small mountain. The 
army ate from it for eighteen days. Then Abu 'Ubaida ordered that two of its ribs be fixed, and 
they were fixed in the ground. Then he ordered that a she-camel be ridden to pass under the 
two ribs (forming an arch) without touching them”.22 
 
Another witness from Sunna narrated by Abu Musa Alash’ari suggested that the Prophet 
(Peace Be Upon Him) stated:  
 
                                                
21 Ali. Y. Translation of the Holy Quran. Almaeda chapter 5. verse 2 Available online at; 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/005.qmt.html  
22 Imam Bukhari(810) Sahih Bukhari, Volume 3, Book 44, Number 663 available online at: 
http://www.jannah.com/cgi-bin/library/hadeeth.pl?coll=1&book=44 
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“When the people of the Ash’ari tribe ran short of food during the holy battles, or the food of 
their families in Medina ran short, they would collect all remaining food in one sheet and 
distribute it among themselves equally by measuring it with a bowl. So, these people are from 
me, and I am from them.”23 
 
Objections: 
 
Many modern day experts consider the above Sunna witness accounts as direct inspiration for 
the concept of Takaful. On the other hand, critical differences exist between the above 
recorded events (stories) and Takaful. These are as follows:  
1. According to previous scholarly opinion; the above Ash’ari event is considered an 
extraordinary case relating to times of poverty or extreme need, to food in travel or to 
holy battles. Ibin Hajar24 has remarked that the quotation “ran short of food”, suggests 
that these actions were carried out as a donation in the spirit of console and tolerance 
and in preference of doing good to others. Hence, this is different from Takaful since 
mutual application applies in different circumstances. The above event also applied to 
all persons in need, and was not restricted to participants only. 
 
In terms of modern expert opinion; current enthusiasm for the Islamisation of banking 
and insurance is at its peak. Both private individuals and financial institutions are 
making every effort to Islamise banking and insurance sectors. Thus, the present 
situation is perhaps not so far removed from the analogy of an extreme need for food 
as mentioned above. Nowadays, Islamic finance can arguably grant people a safe 
financial life in an arena where people’s social lives are complicated, and ignorance 
and poverty are evident. Potentially, Takaful is a commercially viable institution 
appropriate for future money markets. 
 
2. Previous scholarly opinion: Upon considering the two conditions mentioned above, the 
difference between what a person is paying and what he/she is taking is usually 
tolerated when conducted in a prescribed manner. Hence, Albahooty justified 
                                                
23 Imam Bukhari(810)Sahih Bukhari, Volume 3, Book 44, Number 666 available online at: 
http://www.jannah.com/cgi-bin/library/hadeeth.pl?coll=1&book=44  
24 Ibin Hajar. A (H 852). Fath-u-Albari, Kitab- u- Alshihah, Egypt Dar 2001, Volume 5 page 181. 
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Almunahadah25 as lawful in Islamic Sharia because it is based on forgiving. 
Albahooty, stated: “in travel, Almunahadah is completed by the righteous. Indeed, Al-
Hassan did this when he traveled with his companion”26. Nevertheless, this concept 
differs from the model of Takaful, where the difference between persons paying and 
gaining may reach highly significant monitory proportions. Hence, from this 
perspective, Takaful it will not be tolerated and does not comply with events described 
in Sharia. 
 
Modern expert opinion: Dr M. Biltaji27 (2004) held that while the primary purpose of 
a group of people participating in their own shares is based purely on cooperation and 
solidarity, as well as necessity, so it may then be acceptable to participate in 
equal/unequal shares, as in Almunahadah. If this is available under circumstances of 
famine or travel, as it is in Ash’ari and Abu Ubaida. Thus, in all cases the settlement 
allowed for them is what they are permitted to receive. 
 
3. Previous scholarly opinion: From the above Ash’ari story, the prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) described how the hungry “…distributed food among themselves equally”. As 
a result, S. Allhiani 28 (2006) held that even when one individual did not have 
anything to contribute, the division, according to the above text, must be equal. This 
means that each person receives an average award, differing from Takaful where 
compensation is awarded to a policyholder and is related to a potential risk, which may 
or may not occur. In short, these features make Takaful different from Ash’ari. To 
explain, the payment of money is a pure donation in Ash’ari, but this is not the case in 
Takaful since the Takaful contract appears to be a contract of exchange (Muawadah). 
Therefore, in cases where a claim is made, if the company fails to provide the 
participant with suitable compensation, the participant will not hesitate to sue the 
company, and hence the concept of donation is lost. 
 
                                                
25Almunahadah is a type of company when a companionships place all of their food in one sheet and then 
distribute it among themselves equally.  
26 Albahooty. M (H1051). Supra footnote 13. Volume 3 page 189. 
27 Biltaji. M. supra footnote 15, Volume 5 p137.  
28Allhiani. S: Ash’ari story is proof of why we should allow insurance. Paper published by King Abdul Aziz 
University. 2006 available online at; http://islamiccenter.kau.edu.sa/arabic/Hewar_Arbeaa/ABS/209.htm  
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4.  The modern expert opinion of Y. Shubaily 29 (2008) confirms that the Takaful 
contract is a cooperative contract, as opposed to a contract founded purely on donation 
or exchange (Muawadah). Having said this, there are numerous similarities amongst 
certain procedures which create confusion. Differences between each of the contracts 
are described further on. 
 
In addition to the above, M. Ma’sum Billah30 (2007) likens the base of Takaful to “The 
acceptance of the old Arab’s practices of ‘Aqila for Dyat’”. In addition, the Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) himself has accepted the concept of Aqila’s practiced 
by the old Arab tribes. However, in Islamic Jurisprudence, use of the term Aqila is limited 
to the males of the tribe, and in the case of blood money (dyat)31 men must pay, thereby 
sparing the females from doing so. However, the Takaful model is based on exchange 
between both genders. The general concept of mutual exchange is found in many other 
examples in Islam Sharia i.e. Zakat etc. To support this,  A. Abo Guddah32 (2008) added 
that Takaful is based on considered legitimacy and rules, which include the following: 
 
•  Bringing benefit and pushing away harm; 
•  The damage is pushed back as much as possible; 
•  There is evidence to support social cooperation. 
 
In addition many other provisions of Sharia attain solidarity, such as zakat, expenditures, 
‘Aqillaa for Dyat’ and so on. After these Fiqhi analyses, the question arises as to whether 
Takaful complies with Islamic teachings. In order to learn via reaching a conclusion, one must 
analyse the nature of Takaful contracts.  
 
 
                                                
29Shubaily.Y. A comparison between the Waqf and Takaful system. Paper published by International Islamic 
University in Malaysia 2008 available online at; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_4.pdf 
30 Ma’sum Billah. M. Developing Applications of Islamic Insurance Takaful. Supra footnote 7.    
31Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy (1223AC) (620H). Almugnee, Dar Alkutub for publishing, edition 3, 1997, Beirut. 
Volume 15 page 39.  
32Abo Guddah. Cooperative Insurance through the Waqf System. Supra footnote 4. 
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3.6 The Nature of Takaful Contracts 
 
There is considerable discussion among modern experts concerning Takaful, and to what 
extent this system is applicable to:  
1. A pure donation contract or  
2. A cooperative mutual contract or 
3. A contract of exchange as a form of conventional insurance.  
In order to obtain a clear answer, it is important that each type of contract be described. 
 
3.6.1 IS TAKAFUL PURELY A CONTRACT OF DONATION OR IS IT A QUALIFIED CONTRACT OF 
DONATION? 
 
The application of Takaful confirms that this model is not purely a contract of donation 
because, essentially, the nature of donation is based on a contract of payment. Here, the 
participant pays without expectation of reward or compensation. Alsharief. M (2008) asserted 
that the donation must be devoid of compensation and profit. So, in the majority of Fiqhi 
schools, a gift (Hibba) or donation accompanied by conditions of compensation is considered 
a sale thus, all provisions of sale will apply to it. For example, the defect option (kheyar 
al’aaib) and the option of description (kheyar alwasf)33 are applicable. Likewise the High 
Committee for Fatwa in Saudi Arabia confirms that only commercial insurance policy holders 
receive profit from trade. However, this is not applicable to mutual cooperative insurance 
hence marking it distinction from the former34. The Takaful model confirms that the 
participant pays money in order to impose their right to receive compensation.  
 
Represented by Alhattab, the Maliki School have also put forward a point of view regarding 
qualified donations and their application in the Takaful contract. As a new concept and form, 
the payment contribution is based on the principle of “unilateral binding undertaking to 
donate”. Endorsed by the Maliki School, this perspective is expressly illustrated in the 
following sections.  
                                                
33Alsharief. M (2008) The Islamic Alternative to Insurance. Paper published by International Islamic University 
in Malaysia 2008 available online at; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_5.pdf 
34 The High Committee for Iftaa in Saudi Arabia Resolution no.(18332) on 25/11/1426H available online at: 
http://www.alfalaq.com/sam/sam121.htm  
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3.6.1.1 Issues associated with the Donation Relationship 
 
It has already been established that Takaful processes operate largely by virtue of the contract 
of donation. In this case, following their withdrawal, participants should not be entitled to a 
return or a share in surplus and profit. This is because a donor is discouraged by Prophet 
Mohammed’s statement (Hadeith) to call off a donation, as it is considered to be a gift 
(Hibbah) once paid. To this effect, Ibn 'Abbas has quoted the Prophet stating that, “…one who 
takes back his gift (which he has already given) is like a dog that swallows its vomit.”35  
In order to discourage such action, calling off a donation is viewed as being similar to a person 
who feeds on their vomiting; such a comparison suggests that calling off a donation is a filthy 
act. This principle calls for an evaluation of the concept of donation in Takaful. Here, the latter 
should be carried out in respect of principles evoked in order to justify the entitlement of 
participants to receive surplus, reserves and/or any other mode of compensation36. 
3.6.1.2 Rulings of Conditional or Qualified Donation 
 
The execution of an Islamic insurance contract, on the basis of donation, is often evident when 
the insured waive all, or part of, their instalments for the benefit of other participants. This 
issue has prompted commentators of Islamic insurance to suggest that the surplus should be 
distributed to participants serving as a remainder of their Takaful donations. This, in turn, 
raises legal questions as to whether members are entitled to donate, and later receive part of 
their donation, for example, when there is a surplus or when the operator cancels the policy, 
for whatever reason. 
 
At this juncture, an investigation of Takaful principles may result in awarding donors the right 
to receive part of their donation back. In other words, is it permissible for a donor to qualify 
their donation whereby the donation is only effective when the qualification is realised? In 
addition, is it possible for a donor to state this amount as a donation if the entire amount is 
disbursed to the beneficiaries. However, if only part of their donation is disbursed should the 
remaining sum be reimbursed? 
                                                
35 Imam Albukhari (810) Sahih Albokhari. Gifts Book. Volume 3, Book 47, Number 762. Available online at 
:http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/047.sbt.html  
36 Alsalih. M (2004) Insurance between Permission and Prohibition. supra footnote 12. p77.  El Qora Daghi.A 
(2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 17. P65 
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Answers to the above questions require us to recall the basis of Takaful operations. It is noted 
that the Takaful model is based on organised donation distinct from any Sharia nominated 
contract of donation. The Takaful contract combines elements of generosity (tabaruu al-
mukarama) and reimbursement (mu’awadah). In Islamic law, this form of donation may be 
circumscribed with a qualified condition. Therefore, the contribution of participants is 
implicitly qualified to extent of use. This implies that, at the date of contribution, members are 
not entitled to part of their contribution in situations where contributions are used to indemnify 
beyond any surplus amount. However, where surplus exists, it must be distributed to 
participants. Thus, by default, the Takaful contract holds the sum total contribution as a 
donation throughout the extent of the claim. If claimants are paid and there is still surplus, 
such surplus should not be considered a donation, but rather a right that should be returned to 
participants. This is a form of qualified donation37. 
 
In principle, this qualification does not affect the contracts of donation. This is because Sharia 
allows that donations be restricted by conditions, allocated for a specific purpose or to be a 
contingent in certain events. In brief, the characterisation of Takaful contributions as donations 
does not contradict the idea of reimbursement of the remaining surplus. Contributions may be 
partly reimbursed in cases where the certificate is cancelled by the operator for justifiable 
reason and/or under the availability of surplus. 
 
The conditional donation has a precedent in Islamic law under the concept of the umri 
contract. Here, a gift for compensation or hibah althawab was endorsed by many schools of 
Islamic law such as Abo hanifa, Malik and other scholars38. At this stage, it should be noted 
that the term ‘gift’ in Islamic law is classified into two forms, namely absolute gift or hibah 
mutlaqa and compensatory gift, i.e. a gift with the aim to be compensated later. This is known 
in fiqh literature as hibah al-thawab. By definition, a qualified gift is also a contract of 
donation39. Again, the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) is reported to have sent a gift to Najashi, 
the king of Abyssinia, on condition that the gift belong to Najashi so long as he is alive. The 
                                                
37Algari. M 2009. Al fai’id Altaaminy. Supra footnote 19. 
38 Ibn Rushd Alhafeed.(595H).Bidait-ul-Almujtahid. Ibn hazim for publishing (1999). Cairo. v2. p269. 
39 For more on qualified, charity-based contracts, see Qahf. Munzir, al-Waqf al-Islami, (Beirut: Dar al- Fikr, 
2000), pp. 137-142. 
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Messenger found that Najashi was dead and the gift was returned to the Prophet (Peace Be 
Upon Him); he received it and distributed it among his wives.40 
3.6.1.3 The Obligatory Nature of the Takaful Donation 
 
It has been established that Takaful is based on a contract of donation. However, there are a 
number of donation contracts in Islamic law, e.g. ordinary alms giving, agency, loan, 
unqualified gift, and will or wasiyyah41. In broader terms, the phrase tabarru or donation 
constitutes the disbursement of wealth, rendering services and work without monetary 
consideration but with hope for reward in the hereafter. In other words, the immediate benefit 
of the donation goes to the beneficiary and the donor does not expect ab initio/ any financial 
compensation. The question thus is whether the takaful operation falls within this definition of 
donation. This necessitates explanation of the nature of donation throughout Takaful business, 
including whether it is comparable to other contracts based on payment and donation. Most of 
the rules and the relationships pertaining to Takaful depend, one way or the other, on the 
nature of the donation involved. As mentioned, there is no doubt that Takaful is based on the 
concept of donation. However, the Takaful donation is a unique form of donation. As al-Darir 
puts it, “the parties to this contract (Takaful contract) do not aim for profit in isolation. Their 
intention is to cooperate with the purpose of overcoming misfortunes in life. This is a special 
donation/contract which has no parallel to Sharia-nominated donations and contracts”42. 
The uniqueness of the Takaful donation lies in the fact that the payment of contribution is 
based on the principle of “unilateral binding undertaking to donate”, espoused by the Maliki 
school. In principle, a donation is offered on a courtesy basis and does not signify a binding 
task. However, the nature of a participant’s contribution to the Takaful fund represents a 
special undertaking which is close to a binding obligation. This is due to the fact that each 
individual expects to participate and to rely on the undertakings of the other participants. 
Perhaps this is why the Maliki School entitles beneficiaries, of this form of unilateral 
undertaking, to bring a legal case against a donor (who promises to donate) for cancellation of 
their donations. Al-Hattab argued that: 
                                                
40 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, supra footnote 26, vol. 5, p. 222; al-Shawkani, Nayl al-Awtar, vol. 6, p. 100. 
41 For more on donation contracts see Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy (1223AC) (620H). Almugnee, supra footnote 33, 
Volumes 15, 16, 17. 
42Al-Darir, Muhammad al-Ameen (1990). Alghara Waatharoh fi Alokood fi Alfiqh Alislami, Salih Kamil, a 
series for academic theses, Jeddah, edition 2(1995), p. 643. 
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“The Maliki jurists differ in opinion in relation to contracts in which a person undertakes to 
pay, if the creditor’s expected right is not paid on time, an amount of money in favour of either 
a third party or a charity for underprivileged persons. It is generally considered that this 
undertaking cannot be enforced by the courts. Alternatively, Ibn Dinar has asserted that ‘this 
undertaking may be enforced by the courts”43. 
 
Discussions of al-Hattab concerning voluntary, or charitable, undertakings indicate that some 
Maliki jurists, notably Ibn Nafi, share similar views as Ibn Dinar. Ibn Dinar observed that 
numerous documents of sale/contracts have been formulated on the basis of this type of 
undertaking; although the prevalent view goes against their enforceability in court44. 
Views adopted by these Maliki scholars have led to the acceptance of a binding donation 
which can be enforced by any court of law. This is the stance adopted by the Sharia Board 
working within the Jordan Islamic Insurance Company45. In contrast, the majority of Hanafy 
Shafiee and Hanbaly scholars do not accept these explanations since, as mentioned before, in 
principle, donations are offered on a voluntary basis and are not a binding undertaking. As 
such, how can the Maliki School audaciously force donors to pay when his/her involvement is 
only a matter of courtesy as opposed to an obligation?46  
 
Furthermore, this suggests that the operator is also responsible for ensuring that the 
participant, who promises to pay a donation, has actually paid the donation and that this is 
procedurally reasonable. Nevertheless in instances where the participants did not pay, then the 
operator is responsible for bringing the case to court and for payment. So, in order to affect 
this policy, contracts must clearly state this fact to participants. 
 
  
                                                
43 al- Hattab, Tahrir al-Kalam fi Masa’il al-Iltizam, Islamic West House for publications, Lebanon edition 
1(1984) p176. See also  Algari.M  2009. Al fai’id Altaaminy. Supra footnote 19. Alsalih. M (2004) Insurance 
between Permission and Prohibition. Supra, footnote 12.p77.  
44 Ibid. p. 171 
45  Unpublished Fatwas on Insurance Practices by Jordan Islamic Insurance Company. 
46  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), Islamic Insurance. Supra footnote 17. P65.  Biltaji. M. supra footnote 15. Volume 5 
p132. 
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3.6.2 IS TAKAFUL A MUTUAL COOPERATIVE CONTRACT, OR IS IT A CONTRACT OF 
REIMBURSEMENT? 
 
Before answering this question, it is essential the reader understands the features of a contract 
of Reimbursement. 
3.6.2.1 The Features of Contract of Reimbursement (Muawadah) 
 
The contract of Reimbursement has been mentioned several times nevertheless, greater 
understanding of its features is perhaps vital to the reader because of its critical affect upon 
insurance and the Takaful contract. One clearly defined perspective on the contract of 
reimbursement (Muawadah) in Takaful focuses on the mutual relationship. In its application, 
one party pays in order to insure anticipated compensation when he/she needs it. Therefore, 
we should apply the follow conditions to make all transactions Islamically lawful: 
 
• The contract must be free of Riba (interest). Riba appears when a transaction in a 
Takaful operation involves monetary exchange. In fact, Zohaily. W47 has provided us 
with a good example. In this scenario, the participant pays money, called a premium, 
and in return, the Takaful company pay out money referred to as compensation. Cases 
where one party receives more money than was paid, tend to be considered Riba Fazil 
and Riba Naseeea. However, if compensation equals what was paid, then it is 
considered to be Riba Naseeea.     
• The contract of reimbursement must be free of Gharar (uncertainty) which leads to 
disputes. The Prophet Muhammed (Peace Be Upon Him) forbade Gharar.48 Takaful 
can be analogous to Aqilah or the Ash’ari tribe applications described earlier, because  
1. These models perform their contributions in the form of a donation contract 
rather than a contract of reimbursement (Muawadah). 
2.  In Aqilah, the duty of compensation falls on the tribe when an individual 
compensator has no financial capacity to pay, this is considered a donation 
also. 
                                                
47 Zohaily. W. Insurance and Re-insurance. Dar alfiker Lebanon 2003 Page 550. 
48 Imam Muslim (H 261). Sahih Muslim, Dar Alam Al kotb 1996. Volume 3 page 1153 Hadeath no 1513. 
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• The contract of reimbursement must be free from ambiguity, and the subject matter 
(mahalual aqad) must be definite. Zarqa. M 49 (1998) held that throughout the 
contract of exchange, if ambiguity leads to dispute, then the contract will be rendered 
invalid. This detail is not quite clear in terms of the application of Takaful – typically, 
the participant does not know how much he/she will pay (he/she will probably pay for 
one, two or three years longer than initially expected). An individual may also be 
ignorant as to what extent he/she will be covered – with compensation values 
remaining exceptionally high. Therefore, scholars remedy this by establishing the 
Takaful contract based on a donation which it is not affected by ambiguity.  
 
Thus, if we apply the above-mentioned conditions to the cooperative insurance contract, we 
will clearly find that this type of agreement does not contain all of these conditions. Islamic 
cooperative insurance/Takaful was established, based on contracts of donation which the 
above conditions do not affect. 
3.6.2.2 Analysis regarding the Nature of Takaful Contracts 
 
The opinion of Shubaily.Y (2008), confirms that the cooperative insurance contract represents 
a contractual relationship between two or more parties involved in loss and profit. The 
contract takes three forms; an agreement for the sake of profit, as in company contracts, an 
agreement to reduce the expenses as found in Almunahadah including the travellers scenario, 
and finally, an agreement to reduce damage and harm, as in Takaful. In contrast, Shubaily. Y 
(2008), stated that the contract of reimbursement is based on a quarrel between parties, where 
inevitably, one loses and another wins. Much like conventional insurance, where a relationship 
between the company and the policyholders is classed as an exchange relationship. Here, 
compensation reduces as surplus increases thereby the company wins and vice versa50. 
However, Alsharief. M (2008) voiced that there is no difference between conventional 
insurance and cooperative mutual insurance/Takaful because all clearly include the element of 
exchange (Muawadah). Alsharief. M (2008) explains that the policy holder applies to the 
insurance company in order to receive compensation from the fund. Yet, if he/she has doubt 
about the receipt of compensation, that individual need not apply. Further, he/she essentially 
                                                
49 Zarqa. M (1998) The General Fiqhi Entrance. Dar Alqalam. Damascus. 1998 volume1 page 742.    
50 Shubaily. Y. A comparison between the Waqf and Takaful system. Paper published by International Islamic 
University in Malaysia 2008 available online at; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_4.pdf 
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applies because compensation is restricted among policy holders51. The most prominent 
perspective highlights, not the relationship between the company and policy holders, but the 
relationship between policyholders themselves. In relation to this, Sheikh A. Ibn Munee 
argues that there is no difference in cases of compensation/obligation between commercial 
insurance companies towards policyholders and/or the obligation between policy holders 
themselves. With mutual cooperative insurance in order to pay compensations, both contracts 
have the reimbursement formula52. 
 
On the other hand, in any insurance transaction, be it Islamic or conventional, premium 
mobilisation forms an integral part of operations. This is because premiums are core to the 
insurance business and Takaful. Al-Darir (1995) explains that in conventional insurance, the 
contract is based on the principles of exchange of interest. The relationship is designed in such 
a way that the insured buys protection via payment of premiums and the insurer provides 
protection against the insured risk. In this way, the contract becomes a form of sale centred 
around an uncertain event for which it is not compatible with Islamic principles of exchange. 
Instead, this form of premium contribution involves great uncertainty that invalidates contracts 
and financial transactions. In other words, the relationship between the insurer and the insured 
party is similar to that of a buyer and seller. 
 
From an Islamic law perspective, Insurance transactions cannot be concluded on this basis. 
This situation demands exploration of another relationship, allowing us to achieve the 
objectives of the insurance business without contravening Islamic principles as applied to 
contracts and trade. This confirms that participants pay contributions by mutual agreement in 
order to indemnify the insured against peril when it occurs. A concept is based on the 
principles of donation which tolerate elements of gharar and ambiguity. All the same, these 
invalidating elements do not affect contracts of charity, including the ideas behind Takaful.53 
 
Thus, the validity of Takaful operations requires the mutual assistance of participants, clearly 
translated into practice via stating explicitly that participants contribute premiums to the 
                                                
51Alsharief. M (2008) The Islamic Alternative for Insurance. Paper published by International Islamic University 
in Malaysia 2008 available online on; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_5.pdf 
52 Ibn Munee. A. Insurance between Allowance and Prohibition. Arabic lecture available online at: 
http://tdwl.net/vb/showthread.php?t=5111    
53 Al-Darir, Muhammad al-Ameen. Supra footnote 44, p. 643. 
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insurance company, as donations, in order to indemnify the insured risks. The philosophy of 
donation altered relations between participants and operators. These dynamics developed from 
premium payment in exchange for indemnity to management and investment relationships, as 
explained throughout the next few paragraphs. This cooperation relationship also created other 
relevant relations among participants. Therefore, we can distinguish Takaful from 
conventional insurance. 
 
It is clear that: 
1) Takaful cooperative insurance represents a qualified contract of donation (which has 
no exchange) because the element of uncertainty affects the contract of reimbursement 
(Muawadah). 
2) There are recognised differences in procedure between Takaful cooperative insurance 
and commercial insurance. 
3) Both employ an insurance operator (insurer, insured, risk, and premium). 
4) The principles of donation tolerate elements of gharar and ambiguity. This feature 
renders the Takaful system different from conventional insurance with principles based 
on exchange54. 
5) Contracts have a bearing on actual commercial actions and are not produced solely for 
the sake of wording policies. Ibn Alqaeem stated that contractual considerations refer 
to purpose before words. Thus, the act of donation is an affective factor throughout 
these transactions55. 
6) In the author’s opinion, the only application of Takaful which completely complies 
with Sharia, and receives no objections among Islamic experts, is the Takaful with 
Waqf model, clarified later via the illustration of Waqf model56. 
3.6.2.3 The Legal Relationship of Compensation between Parties 
 
We often hear or read that Takaful operation is a contract undertaking to pay compensation to 
the insured. For this reason, some scholars argue that the obligation to indemnify, or al-iltizam 
                                                
54 To gain more knowledge read Alsharief. M (2008) The Islamic Alternative to Insurance. Paper published by 
International Islamic University in Malaysia 2008 available online at; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_5.pdf 
55 Ibn Alqaeem (H 751). Eelam Almuaqeen. Supra 8, V 3 page 129.  
56 See page 38- 41. 
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bi alta‘weed, makes Takaful similar to conventional insurance. Also, it should be emphasised 
that there is little doubt concerning the endeavour to indemnify exists within Takaful 
operations. Nevertheless, we must ascertain whether this undertaking is between the Takaful 
operator and participants or whether it is confined to participants only. A number of writings 
confuse the relationships involved in Takaful. For example, in Takaful, participants are 
simultaneously both the insured and the insurer. Moreover, participants jointly cooperate to 
compensate risks incurred by one participant from their paid or accrued contributions. In this 
case, the participants implicitly take it upon themselves to increase their contributions to meet 
deficits. Hence, if members do not increase their contributions, there will be no fund and so, 
no indemnity since indemnity is formed in accordance with the Takaful fund. Also, the 
operator was not obliged to indemnify participants, and if indemnification occurred, then 
Takaful becomes conventional insurance which has been prohibited by resolution of the 
International Fiqh Academy, as per the principles of Sharia in respect of contracts of 
reimbursement57. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 The High Committee for Iftaa in Saudi Arabia Resolution no.(18332) on 25/11/1426H available online at: 
http://www.alfalaq.com/sam/sam121.htm 
114 
 
3.7 The Nature of the Legal Partnership/Relationship between Parties 
 
Not only does the insurance industry provide administration of insurance pools. The money 
collected, is channeled into various lucrative investment vehicles. From this perspective, and 
in the case of Takaful, the organised form of donation consists of a partnership element 
between participants in respect of investment. With Takaful, each are entitled to a share of the 
profits. Investing money either on the basis of agency or Mudarabah is based on the concept 
of profit sharing. This is evident in view of the fact that surplus or profit is shared in 
proportion to individual contribution; a Takaful relationship often omitted by commentators 
writing about Islamic insurance. Therefore, one may humbly conclude that the relationship of 
participants between peers involves a combination of donation and partnership (musharaka). 
Donations are relevant to the mobilisation of funds, whereas Musharaka is relevant in terms of 
deserving a share of the surplus, again, in proportion to contributions. 
 
3.7.1 THE IMPLIED WAIVER (TAKHARUJ AND MUBARA’AH58) RELATIONSHIP 
 
One inter-participant relationship traditionally receiving little attention from those writing 
about Takaful, is the Takharuj and Mubara’ah relationship. This relationship suggests an 
implied contract where participants waive their rights and obligations. Closely associated with 
Takaful operations, this contract concerns surplus distribution, liquidation of the Takaful 
system and/or reserve distribution. Thus, the Takaful operators and supervisory authorities 
should be clear on the principles of implied waiver regarding claims between departing 
policyholders prior to the occurrence of any events stated in the policy. Thus, policy 
documents must clearly outline the principles of Mubara’ah. 
 
Also, the Takaful surplus, and any remaining reserves related to it, may be treated after 
liquidation in two ways. Firstly, the policy may state that, at the point of liquidation, the 
surplus, meaning any remaining reserves and amounts, shall be donated to a charity fund. 
Indeed, a charity account is the official avenue for any money which is not able to be returned 
                                                
58 Takharuj and Mubarahah are Arabic terms (linguistically) meaning get out, release or disappear, and in 
technical terms refer to legal procedures set out for participants in the case of cancellation of an insurance policy 
either by the company or by the participant.  
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to the original owner. Thus, it is preferable to state in the insurance policy or by-law that the 
surplus shall be donated to charity along with any remaining reserves59. 
 
This approach creates a Waqf fund or charity asset60 from surplus. Secondly, it is also 
permissible to distribute the surplus among existing policyholders on the date of liquidation. 
However, the problem with the second alternative is that, by the time liquidation has 
materialised, a large number of participants may have withdrawn from the pool leaving their 
rights to the surplus and reserves behind. In order to deal with this situation, application of the 
principle of “waiver of claims and obligations” or Mubara’ah becomes necessary. Mubara’ah 
guarantees that sums generated by departing participants become permissible to remaining 
participants on the date of liquidation. When the Takaful surplus is distributed according to 
contribution size, there may be some remaining money for departing/withdrawing members. 
As previously mentioned, this money should be distributed among remaining participants 
according to the proportions of their contributions. In applying the principals of mubar’ah, this 
money belongs to individual members. The operator is not entitled to take such an amount61 
however. 
 
3.7.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS AND THE OPERATOR 
 
The element of cooperation in Takaful is shared between the participants themselves. 
Relations between the company and participants are governed by the ethos of business and 
trade and/or contracts of exchange. In other words, the Takaful operator does not operate on 
the basis of cooperation since participants do not contribute to help the operator and vice 
versa62. Hence, a contract of donation is not relevant as far as the relationship between the 
participants and the operator is concerned. In short, when one person asserts that Islamic 
insurance is based on donation rather than profit making, it this does not mean that the 
                                                
59 Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management, supra footnote 21. P16  
60Mughal, Zubair (2008). Takaful can help Reduce Poverty. Economic Review (05318955); Feb/Mar2008, Vol. 
39 Issue 2/3, p21-22, 2p available online at: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=33871110&site=ehost-live  
61 Mohammed Burhan Arbouna. Supra footnote 10, p 23-24.  
62  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), Islamic Insurance, supra footnote 17 Sharaf al-Din.Ahmed (1983). The verdicts of 
Insurance via the Legal and Judiciary system. Kuwait University Edition. 
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operator is not aiming to make a profit. The Takaful operator manages underwriting and 
investment activities purely via business and trade. This means that the Takaful model is not 
intended to make profit by merely providing guarantee against risks. However, management 
aspects are carried out on the basis of exchange, much like any other transactions. In this 
respect, relationships between the Takaful operator and participants take various forms. Form 
depends on whether the Takaful operator is operating on an agency-agency basis or an agency-
Mudarabah basis; explained below. 
3.7.2.1 The Agency-Agency (Wakalah) Basis 
 
With this type of business relationship, existing participants authorise the Takaful operator to 
manage insurance operations on their behalf. Under this contract, the Takaful company is duly 
responsible to prudently manage insurance activities according to standard of industry. 
Omission of this contract will disqualify the Takaful operator from accepting contributions 
from the participants. In addition, absence of this contract will also disqualify the Takaful 
company from processing application forms according to certain standards. This procedure 
entertains any claim made by participants, and what is more, awards indemnity to any 
participant who experiences the insured risks63. On the basis of Wakalah operation, the 
Takaful operator is entitled to a services fee from the Takaful fund. 
 
In addition to managing the insurance files, Islamic cooperative insurance also invests money, 
received from participants, through special investment structures. In this case, the company is 
entitled to a specified commission (a fixed sum of money) or a certain percentage of the total 
contributions. This sum is collected in respect of placement and investment of insurance 
monies on the basis of Wakalah or agency. In this relationship, the operator earns commission, 
be it a fixed amount or a percentage of the contributions, regardless of the performance of the 
investment. In this model, the Mudarabah concept is irrelevant, as there is no Mudarabah 
relationship between the operator and participants. From the outset, the fund is presented to 
the Takaful operator on an agency basis. In this scenario, both Takaful operations and 
investments are carried out on an agency basis in mind of remuneration. The entire profit, 
derived from investment transactions, belong to the policyholders. The Mudarabah 
                                                
63 Susan Dingwall (2006) The United Kingdom: Regulatory approach to Takaful. Takaful Articles. ICMIF 
Takaful. Available online at: http://www.takaful.coop/  retrieved on 14-08-2012. 
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relationship is relevant only when the operator is passing an amount to another company in 
order to invest. Here, the relationship between two companies is referred to as Mudarabah64. 
 
In this model, cooperative risk sharing occurs among participants with a Takaful operator 
whereby a fee is agreed to be paid to the operator for services presented. The operator shall not 
take part in underwriting results. An example of this model is the Takaful IKHLAS Malaysia.  
 
Takaful IKHLAS65 typically employs the following contracts to govern business: 
•  A donation contract where participants agree to donate a pre-determined 
percentage of their contribution to funds intended to provide assistance to 
fellow participants. 
•  An agency (Al-Wakalah) contract, where participants authorise Takaful 
IKHLAS to conduct the affairs of the Risk and Special Fund on their behalf. 
See diagram below:  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Wakhalah model (Fee based Agency) 
                                                
64 Prof. Wan Axis. Y. Takaful - An Option to Conventional Insurance: A Malaysian Model available online at ; 
http://site.securities.com/doc_pdf?pc=IG&sv=IFIS&doc_id=102186456. Retrieved on 14-08-2012. 
65 Takaful Ikhlas Malaysia. available online at; http://www.Takaful-
ikhlas.com.my/corporateProfile/TakafulModel.asp Retrieved on 14-08-2012. 
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3.7.2.2 The Mudarabah Relationship  
 
This refers to co-operative risk sharing where participants and operators share in the 
distribution profit. An example of this model is the Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad 
(STMB). It is held that, by this principle, the entrepreneur or al-Mudharib (Takaful operator) 
will accept payment of Takaful installments or Takaful contributions (premiums). These 
payments are termed Ra's-ul-Mal via the investors or providers of capital or funds (Takaful 
participants) acting as Rabui-ul-Mal. Contracts specify how profits (and surplus) from Takaful 
operations is managed by the Takaful operator, to be shared amongst policyholders, in 
accordance with the principle of Mudarabah. Thus, profits and surplus are shared among 
participants as the providers of capital. Here, the Takaful operator assumes the role of the 
entrepreneur. The sharing of such profit (surplus) may be in a ratio of 5:5, 6:4, 7:3, etc. as 
mutually agreed between contracting parties66. However, the first two licenses issued by Bank 
Negara were under the Mudarabah model yet these Banks have now switched to the combined 
model, applied to all new business in Malaysia67.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Mudarabah Model 
 
                                                
66Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad (STMB) available online at; http://www.Takaful-
malaysia.com/V5/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23&Itemid=36    
67 The World Takaful Report (2010). Managing Performance and Recovery. April 2010. ERNST & YOUNG. 
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3.7.2.3 The Mixed Agency-Mudarabah Relationship 
 
In brief, Mudarabah is an investment instrument in which members recruits experienced and 
skilled persons to invest the fund. In other words, it suggests that one party owns money 
without the financial skill and/or time to invest. Whereas another party may involve an 
experienced and skilled person without money. Hence, the fund’s owner will present funds to 
the skilled entrepreneur so as to create a Mudarabah mechanism of investment and profit 
share, if appropriate68. With this form of investment, there are a number of issues to consider, 
including the various capacities of the skilled entrepreneur (mudarib) and what he or she is 
entitled to do. Our concern here is how this instrument penetrates the Islamic insurance 
industry and becomes a model of operation in many parts of the Muslim world. 
 
It must be noted that there is no doubt that the Mudarabah is not the basis for the mobilisation 
via Takaful contribution. Furthermore, the Mudarabah is not applicable to operations 
concerning indemnity, document preparation and other related administrative issues. 
Nevertheless, Mudarabah appears to encompass elements of agency, with regard to buying 
and selling and litigation, on behalf of the capital provider. If this is indeed the case, the 
application of Mudarabah in the Takaful industry requires further investigation. 
 
The Mudarabah concept has become relevant to Takaful as an industry because, in the past, 
operators had perceived participants as one entity. By the same token, members have given 
their entire donation fund to Takaful operators for indemnity purposes, on one hand, and for 
investment purposes, on the other. As such, the rules of Mudarabah appropriately govern the 
investment relationship between participants, as capital providers, and Takaful operators, as 
entrepreneurs69. 
 
However, operators acting on a Mudarabah basis often find it difficult to separate these 
important aspects of Takaful, constituting the co-operation of parties regarding payment. This 
also means that throughout Takaful processes, there is counterpart risk associated with 
Mudarabah contracts, concerning compensation for an insured risk, known as the “Fund 
                                                
68 Islamic Sharia Standards. Sharia Standards on Mudarabah Contract, Published by the Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). , Bahrain, Page 236. 2004. 
69 Mohd. Daud Bakar “Distribution and Compensation Issues of Takaful Products”, Paper presented at the 
International Conference on Takaful/Islamic Insurance 2-3 June 1999, Hilton Kuala Lumpur, p. 6. 
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Mobilisation Relationship (FMR)”. In the beginning, the initial aim of participants is not 
Mudarabah, as such. Mudarabah is a secondary objective, since it would be unprofessional to 
maintain a mobilised fund without investment. Therefore, “Mudarabah model” operators find 
it necessary to reflect the principles of solidarity and indemnity. With this in mind, the 
operator would divide received contributions into two sets, namely Participants’ Special 
Accounts (PSA) and Participants Accounts (PA). The participants’ special account PSA is 
basically employed as the Takaful operation account whereas PA’s are administered on a 
Mudarabah basis. See diagram below.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Family Takaful Mixed Model  
 
As a result of the above, a scholars current role involves investigating how best to characterise 
these divisions within donation amounts whilst considering investment on a Mudarabah basis. 
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In fact, the function of Takaful, on the basis of the Mudarabah, may be characterised as 
follows70: 
 
1. In relation to Participants’ Special Accounts (PSA’s), i.e. the account from which an 
indemnity is made, it is suggested that PSA’s should be administered on an agency basis. It 
has also been suggested that this should be done for a fee, since the process involves a number 
of duties including: management of underwriting activities, printing, processing application 
forms, actuarial considerations, performing the duty of disclosure under the principle of 
utmost good faith, investigating and processing claims, paying compensation and other related 
activities. The maintenance of this agency is the underlying factor assigning the Takaful 
operator the authority to accept contributions in the first place. Without this contract the 
concept of Mudarabah in Takaful would fail; it is not the contract that justifies the 
permissibility of Takaful operations. 
 
This agreement implies that, by default, a Takaful contract has taken place between 
participants. In which case, participants are simply authorising the operator who has been 
granted license to conduct insurance activities and hence is entitled to administer the Takaful 
fund along with other related issues. The Takaful operator is then entitled to introduce certain 
changes or conditions in order to deem the agency contract acceptable. At this stage, the 
Takaful operator is entitled to accept offers and to manage the Takaful insurance on condition 
that the amount to be received will be evenly divided between Takaful operations and Takaful 
investments. 
 
On occasion, the Takaful operator may realise that the investment agency relationship is not 
profitable for operations. This is because, in an agency, commission is normally determined in 
advance, as a lump sum, or according to a percentage based on collected contributions. In 
cases where external companies are brought in to manage the Takaful fund, this commission 
may not be sufficient to cover operator expenses,. Hence, the operator may shift towards a 
viable alternative. At this point, it would be unreasonable to demand that the Takaful operator 
                                                
70Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management; A Takaful Perspective. Supra footnote 21.  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), 
Islamic Insurance. Supra, footnote 17.P65. Biltaji. M. The Insurance Contract from the Perspective of Islamic 
Jurisprudence. Supra footnote 15. Ma’sum Billah. M(2007). Applied Takaful and Modern Insurance Law and 
Practice. Supra footnote 9. 
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stick to the agency relationship when the operator considers a Mudarabah relationship to be 
more profitable for both parties. In a Mudarabah relationship, the Takaful operator may also 
manage Takaful operations free of charge in exchange for a higher percentage of profits. 
 
2. The Participants’ Account (PA), should be based on a Mudarabah contract between 
participants and the operator. In this instance, the Takaful company invests the Mudarabah 
portion of contributions via a profit sharing basis within the parameters of the Mudarabah 
contract. This is done in respect of issues relating to the determination of a profit ratio, the 
marketing in Mudarabah, and the party who bears the expenses of Mudarabah71.  
 
In addition to his/her/its profit share, the Takaful operator may also earn an agency fee for 
managing Takaful activities. However, questions may arise as to whether the Takaful operator 
may forgo his/her/its profit share as mudarib, or his/her/its agency fee as manager, and instead 
agreed to an entitlement of the surplus, if any exists. This issue requires further investigation. 
Nevertheless, the primary view would be that the principles of Sharia require advance 
determination of the amount/fee involved in agency, otherwise uncertainty impacts upon the 
reimbursement contracts. The agency contract, involves an exchange of interest between the 
operator and participants, as the operator does not act in the spirit of donation. 
 
Hence, leaving the remuneration undefined renders an agency contract null and void72. Again, 
as the potential to accumulate surplus remains unknown, any agency contract, based on the 
concept of sharing surplus as a fee for agency will be deemed invalid. 
 
This apart, questions may arise regarding Sharia Law and the classification of the mobilised 
funds including the Takaful fund and the Mudarabah fund. In answer to this, upon the signing 
of contracts between participants and operators, there is an implied assumption that 
participants have qualified their donations. In other words, the Mudarabah model suggests that 
participants only consent to part with their contributions in order to make donations and invest 
on the basis of Mudarabah. This action falls under the issue of qualified donation, discussed 
                                                
71 Arbouna, Mohammed Burhan, “The Operation of Re-takaful (Islamic Reinsurance) Protection”, Arab Law 
Quarterly, [2000], pp. 335-362. Available online at:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3382184 . Retrieved on 14-08-
2012. 
72  Algari.M  2009. Al fai’id Altaaminy. Supra footnote 19. P16. 
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earlier73. The rationale for characterising both Mudarabah and Takaful models in the manner 
explained above can be explained in terms of the Sharia legal maxim. The Sharia states that 
acts by Muslims, and/or persons of senses (uqala’a) must be corrected or deemed acceptable 
as far as possible, even when acts are based on in-famous or unfavourable juristic views74. 
 
From this, one may argue that the practice known as Mudarabah, is in fact, the agency-
Mudarabah model, since there is a element of agency within a Mudarabah contract. With this 
structure, the Takaful operator’s relationship with participants could be that of mudarib and 
rabb-ull-mal on one hand, and agent on the other; perhaps mudarib, with respect to investment 
of the contributions. In this case, the operator earns a profit ratio if profits are to be realised by 
way of monies invested via the Mudarabah model, namely between the company and its 
participants: the investors. Here, the benefits realised by shareholders are not restricted to 
surplus, as is the case with conventional, commercial insurance. Furthermore, the operator also 
benefits by being paid commission, in functioning as a management agent, in one role, and 
sharing the profit of investment, in another. This is permitted since there is no rule against 
receiving profit and remuneration from one entity when acting in different capacities. 
 
Jurisprudential (Fiqhi) Analyses of the Malaysian Takaful Wakalah and Mudarabah 
Models 
 
The models of Takaful are founded on two types of relationships: 
 
1. The relationship between the company and policyholders 
Essentially, this sort of relationship is governed by two important contracts: 
 
• The administration of insurance transactions contract, applied through a 
rental (Ijarah) contract, which is considered a contract of exchange. 
Therefore, the charge, and the contractual benefits and obligations of this 
agreement, must all be identified.  
• The investment contract to the Takaful Fund. This can be classed under 
either Mudarabah or Wakalah contracts. However, the ratio or wages of 
                                                
73 Ibid. Also see  El Qora Daghi.A (2006), supra footnote 17.  
74 Al-Sarakhsi. Shams ul- deen, al-Mabsut, Dar alma’rifah. Beruit (1989). vol. 6, p. 26; vol. 19, p. 1784; 
Albahooty. Kashaf Algenaa. Almaktabbah Alislamiah for publishing edition D.T. (1982). Beirut. vol. 4, p.366 
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Mudarib and/or an agent, must be identified at the beginning of the 
contract.  
 
In fact this relationship is in line with Islamic Sharia law because Ijarah, Mudarabah and 
Wakalah contracts are permitted in Islamic law when meeting a considerable number of 
conditions addressed in Islamic Fiqh books.  
 
2. The relationship between Policyholders Themselves 
This relationship is simultaneously a partnership and a guarantee, thus both parties can be seen 
as partners and guarantors. Furthermore, he/she/they are partners regarding: 
 
• The investment in the Takaful fund. 
• The rights to compensation when he/she/they require it.  
 
The individual is also a guarantor in: 
 
• The compensation paid to policy holders.  
• Any deficit in Takaful funds making it difficult to fulfill Takaful 
obligations. 
 
According to the relationship detailed above, and through researching many Takaful papers 
and websites, the author has identified the following issues associated with Fiqhi: 
 
A. The contract between policy holders is considered a qualified contract of donation. 
Although some writers continue to advocate the sincere intentions of donation, others 
insist on a contract of exchange.  
B. Both parties have an obligation to pay and also benefit from the right to receive, which 
clearly suggests a contract of reimbursement (Muawadah) and yet, this Muawadah 
does not affect the contract of donation, as mentioned above75 . 
C. The relationship between policy holders complies with the application of a Mufawadah 
contract76 which is unlawful in the majority of Islamic Fiqhi schools; with the 
                                                
75 See page 23-24. 
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exception of the Hanafi School77. This is because the Mufawadah model includes an 
element of Gharar, uncertainty. Furthermore, uncertainty is obvious throughout this 
potential contract as policyholders may pay in and yet, might not receive 
compensation, akin to conventional insurance application.  
 
To sum up, for experts to agree that the Takaful model is compliant with Wakalah and 
Mudarabah is merely conjecture, as Takaful clearly shows that the element of uncertainty is 
not removed via compensational returns. In fact, the only insurance model to meet Islamic 
Sharia law is arguably the combination of Wakhalah with Waqf, discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
 
3.7.2.4The Wakhalah with Waqf Relationship   
 
Waqf (endowment) is an Arabic verb which literally means to detain (al-habs). As for the 
exact technical definition of Waqf, Muslim scholars differ in their classifications depending on 
their position concerning specific elements and conditions recognised as features of Waqf78. 
However, scholars do agreed on the basic concept of Waqf, which is the permanent dedication 
of a portion of one’s wealth for the pleasure of Allah. This means that a portion of a person’s 
property is alienated from him/her and “transferred” to Allah. In other words, ownership 
“passes” from the person making the Waqf to Allah. Therefore, property cannot be inherited, 
gifted or mortgaged, etc. Essential to this scheme, the body of the property remains intact 
while income is derived there from, and/or the property itself is used for certain philanthropic 
activities on behalf of Allah. This is regarded as a recurring, continuous or on-going act of 
charity (sadaqah jariyah). 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
76 It is a transaction in Islamic law where each party in the contract deputises the other in all matters of money 
and management. So it is prohibited by the Hnbali, Maliki and Shafee schools; this is because it includes agency 
contract on the side of the guarantee contract and both contracts include an element of ignorance (Jahalah). Thus, 
in Islamic law, an individual cannot say “I will guarantee this to you and/or make you an agent in everything”, so 
the subject matter must be concrete via both contracts. This is absent in the contract of Mufawadah. See more 
about this contract in Alsarkhasi (1989). Almabsut. Kitab alsharikah. Supra footnote 76.      
77Ibin Alhumam. K (H861) Fathu al Gadeer. Kitab-u – Alshirkah . Dar Alkutub Alealmia, Lebanon, edition 1 
(2003). Volume 6 page 157. 
78 Al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, v12.p27.supra footnot 76. al- Hattab, Tahrir al-Kalam fi Masa’il al-Iltizam. Supra 
footnote 45. V6, p18. Ibn Qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee,V 6. p206.supra footnote 33. 
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Hashim illustrates that the concept of the Takaful Waqf signifies a plan designed to enable any 
individual to save regularly with the objective of accumulating a fund which may be left as a 
donation under the Waqf system. Through this plan, the participant (or contributor) will amass 
a considerable sum of money, through the accumulation of Takaful instalments, paid regularly 
over a certain period of time. This would then be sufficient enough to serve as an endowment 
for Waqf. Under this system, benefits are payable either upon the untimely death of the 
participant or upon the plan reaching maturity. Payments are remitted by Takaful Malaysia to 
any institution named as the Waqf recipient79. 
However, Jakhura. B80 (2008) studied the application of Takaful based on Waqf in South 
Africa (SA). He held that Waqf is created by the participant as a supposed donation, made up 
of capital held in perpetuity. The Waqf then, is commonly managed by company trustees who 
can charge an administration fee for presented services. Trustees are governed by rules 
prescribed by participants in deeds and policies.  
Jakhura. B (2008) added that, in lieu of these administrative services, Takaful SA would be 
entitled to receive a management fee equivalent to 10% of the gross premiums received by the 
Waqf fund. So, with regard to these practices, administration fees will be collected from gross 
premiums i.e. (the Waqf assets and profits). Hence, this application renders the model 
incompatible with Islamic Sharia law. Fiqhi schools confirm that this is because the agent’s 
fee (nazer-u-alWaqf ), must be collected from surplus, as opposed to the Waqf fund, unless a 
participant knows, in advance, that an administration fee will be collected from the premium. 
The intention of the donor, in this situation, will be different, triggering a suitable treatment 
which complies with Sharia. This is because the objective behind payments is that they will be 
split into two parts; one for the Waqf and the other, towards administration fees.  
Jakhura. B (2008), further added that the rules of Waqf regulate the membership of Waqf, 
along with payments, contributions, benefits, surpluses and all other relevant matters. All 
                                                
79 Ashraf. Hashim (2008). The Collection of Waqf through Insurance Companies: A Critical Analysis of the 
Malaysian Experience. International Conference On Co-operative Insurance in the Framework of Waqf. 4 – 6 
March 2008 / 26 – 28 Safar 1429. International Islamic University Malaysia.  
80 Jakhura. B (2008). The Application of Takaful Based on the Waqf Model in South Africa. Paper published by 
International Islamic University in Malaysia 2008, available online at; http://www.islamfeqh.com/15_4.pdf .  
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contributions paid to the Waqf (as a separate legal entity) pass into the ownership of the Waqf 
to be regulated by terms stated in the Waqf policy81.  
 
This Takaful model employs the following contracts to govern businesses: 
• A pure contract of donation for Waqf purposes alone, where the participant 
agrees to donate a pre-determined percentage of their contribution to the Waqf 
fund so as to provide assistance to fellow participants. 
• The agency (Al-Wakhalah) contract, is where participants (waqif) authorise the 
Takaful company (agent) to conduct affairs of Risk, operating Special Funds on 
his/her behalf. Thus, all Islamic verdicts regarding this contract refer 
specifically to the agent (Nazer-u-alWaqf) the application of which has been 
described in Fiqhi books.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Whakalah with Waqf Model 
 
 
                                                
81Ibid.  
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3.7.2.4.1 The Hybrid Wakalah with Waqf for South Africa 
 
The hybrid model is primarily regulated by the Wakalah relationship where the Takaful 
operator acts on behalf of participants. The Takaful operator receives contributions from 
participants and places them in a fund. From that fund, contributions are split into three 
portions by the Takaful operator - as an insurance agent. The first portion goes towards 
management fees, the second, is contributed / donated to a Waqf fund. This is in fact the 
Takaful fund or risk management fund, and so, from this fund re-takaful claims and other 
related costs are paid. The third portion can be placed in an investment scheme. However, the 
investment fund can equally be managed on the basis of Shirkah al-anan82 i.e. a partnership 
whereby the Takaful operator can also invest money. This is a separate contract. Alternatively, 
the investment fund can be dealt with on the basis of Mudarabah, where the Takaful operator 
does not invest any capital but simply offers expertise83. This model has been applied in 
Alnoor Takaful in South Africa; as shown in the following diagram.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Alnoor Takaful in South Africa84 
                                                
82 Islamic Fiqhi is a partnership whereby both partners invest a definite sum of money and benefit from a 
definite profit share. See more Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee,V 6. p206.supra footnote 33. 
. Ibn Rushd Alhafeed.(595H).Bidait-ul-almujtahid. v2. p269.  
83 Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management. Supra footnote 21.  Pp.23-25 
84 Ma’sum Billah. M(2007). Applied Takaful in Modern Insurance Law and Practice. Supra footnote 7. p28. 
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3.7.2.4.2 Advantages of Takaful with Waqf 
 
Aware of the expansion of the Takaful industry, many people have found that there are 
advantages which will benefit them. F. Manjoo 85 (2007) has cited some of these, as provided 
below:  
1. Profit Motivated  
Through conventional insurance the client is treated as a policyholder only, whereas in the 
Takaful industry participants are treated as investors-cum-policyholders. Thus, 
participants in a Takaful scheme hit two bottles with one ball. While their risks are 
covered and indemnified, they also share in the profits generated from the investment 
fund portfolios. 
2.  Enhancement of the Spending (Infaq) Sector 
In Islam, voluntary sectors are highly encouraged and have proven to be efficient in the 
past via the mechanisms of Waqf, Zakah, Zakat-u- al-Fitr and the Will (Wasiyah). The 
Prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) stated: “Whoever removes a worldly grief 
from a believer, Allah will take away from him one of the griefs of the Hereafter. Whoever 
alleviates a hardship (from) a needy person, Allah will alleviate a hardship from him in 
both this world and the Hereafter…”86  
Takaful, represents an expanding avenue, and arguably has the means to reactivate this 
sector on an  
national or even global level. In fact, experts are saying that Takaful is the second most 
important social institution aspiring to counteract poverty and deprivation. A living 
example of this is the International Co-operative and Mutual Insurance Federation which 
represents 127 members from 67 countries, all striving to alleviate poverty. Here, 
Muslims have developed Takaful projects to encourage micro financing in countries like 
Ghana.  
 
                                                
85 Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management, Supra footnote 21.    
86 Imam An-Nawawi's. An-Nawawi's Forty Hadiths. Hadith no 36. Available online at; 
http://www.40hadith.com/40hadith_en.htm. Retrieved on 14-08-2012. 
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3. Ethical Contracts 
When substituting the insurance contract for a Mudarabah, Wakalah or Waqf model, the 
elements of Riba, Gharar and Maisir are eliminated (at least to a greater extent if no re-
Takaful exists, and in this case the regulators do not dictate the channel of funds). Further, 
investment portfolios are be in line with Sharia, thus the return also supports Halal 
(legally allowable by Sharia). 
4. A savings Pattern is Created 
Technically, people participate in different Takaful funds are investors in that fund. 
Whereas, in the case of conventional insurance, the underwriting of many policies means 
they become non-refundable such in the event of fire and theft. Moreover, if the insured 
event/contingency does not take place, paid premiums are lost.  
The Takaful market rate is still low because Muslims have not yet grasped the importance 
of saving patterns in moulding the financial market. Once this is achieved, Takaful may 
prompt a global upheaval in the financial markets, as Muslims make up 17% of the world 
population, and therefore, have access to many natural resources.  
5. Capital Mobilisation to help the Needy  
Muslims mobilise at least 2.5% of their wealth, helping the needy in the form of Zakah, 
with a proper Takaful plan. Thus, it seems right that part of the generated profits should go 
into the voluntary sector. With this system, investment portfolios add more value to 
people’s wealth, thus leading to more Zakah being payable. 
6. Social Institutions and Support 
Currently, Islamic relief foundations lack money whilst in the peak of need. With the 
Takaful system, and particularly the Waqf model, these relief foundations can access an 
institutionally organised income from surplus money generated by Takaful companies. An 
option made possible due to the terms of the deeds, whilst also supporting Halal. 
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3.7.2.5 The Model of Mixed Wakalah – Musharakah Relationship 
 
This is another important relationship within Takaful operations; where a company invests its 
money together with the Takaful fund. This combination necessitates partnership in 
investment. These partners therefore share profits in accordance with the principles of a 
partnership. In this case, the profit is divided pro-rata. A percentage of profit is intended for 
the Takaful company representing its part of the investment money as a partner. The 
remaining percentage will be distributed between parties (normally the company and its 
participants) on a Mudarabah, or investment agency, basis. 
 
This process is deemed acceptable by jurists who ask whether it is permissible for a party to 
act as both mudarib, and investor, simultaneously? According to researcher opinion, the 
answer is yes87. In short, the first and third portion the company enjoyed status as partner so, 
in this example, the company has earned its share of the profits. On the same note, two thirds 
of the company was submerged in the Mudarabah or agency relationship with participants, 
and so deserves its agreed share of profits; see the following diagram.  
 
 
  
Figure 3.6: Mixed Wakalah – Musharakah Model. 
  
                                                
87 Ibn Qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee,V 6. p206. supra footnote 33. 
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3.7.2.6 Family Takaful Models 
 
As Ali (1989) has stated, with this type of Takaful insurance, the policy features a defined 
period of maturity, where the insured make periodic premiums used primarily to meet 
individual savings targets. Premiums are also used, in part, to financially assisting the 
bereaved families of the deceased insured. Premium amounts vary from person to person 
primarily depending on the sum (face amount) that each insured participant is targeting to 
accumulate at the end of their period of coverage. Age, gender and health also factor into this 
equation. 
 
The insurer may set a minimum face amount for this purpose. They may also set minimum 
and maximum age limits in terms of participating in this type of policy. Additionally, insurers 
can decide to accept standard risks only and to maintain separate classes of insured people, 
perhaps of the same age but with different years of entry to the plan88 for example.  
 
Takaful life insurance is also used for other purposes, including generating a fund for 
children’s education, securing a fund in case of a mortgagor’s premature death and protecting 
business interests against a key employee’s death. Several Takaful policies now come with 
riders regarding hospitalisation and disability benefit. In fact, there is virtually a counterpart 
Takaful life insurance policy for each major type of conventional insurance policy, while 
differences lie in how premiums are allocated89.  
 
However, by using investment as a method, a Takaful operator (insurer) can credit installment 
premiums to two separate accounts - the individual account and the special account, of each 
insured member - . Takaful insurers invest funds in both individual, and special accounts, in 
the form of mutual funds, consisting primarily of stocks from financial institutions and 
manufacturers producing goods and services permitted by Islamic Sharia; see figures 
illustrating Family Takaful, presented below.   
 
                                                
88 Ali, Kasi Mohammed. Mortuza, 1989. "Principles and Practices of Insurance under an Islamic Framework," 
Insurance Journal, (December): 29-38. 
89 See Malaysia Takaful available online at:  
http://www.takaful-malaysia.com.my/family/products/Pages/default.aspx    
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If an insured person lives long enough to meet their target savings amount, determined at 
policy inception, the insured party receives a full refund of all premiums he/she has paid into 
his/her individual account. He/she will also receive his or her shares of investment income 
from that account. In addition, his or her shares of surplus will be assessed from the special 
account.  
 
Takaful insurers also permit their insureds to surrender policies prematurely. When an insured 
exercises this option, he or she will receive a refund of all premiums plus his or her share of 
surplus from their individual account (minus administrative expenses) until the date of 
surrender. However, no refund is usually given from the special account when a policy is 
surrendered. In a typical Takaful insurance plan, little consequence is awarded to whether or 
not an insured member surrenders in a manner prescribed by his or her policy since all 
participants are, in principle, partners of the same insurance plan.  
 
The process of family Takaful models: 
 
1. Mudarabah Model 
In this model the operator deals with investment on the basis of a shared percentage. 
 
Figure 3.7: Family Takaful Mudharabah Model 
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2. Wakalah Model 
In this model, the agent deals with investment on the basis of a pre-determined fee 
rather than a percentage, as in the Mudarabah model (detailed above). If this 
occurred then the contract would be void because of the existence of 
ignorance/uncertainty regarding fees. 
 
Figure 3.8 Family Takaful Wakalah Model 
 
3. Mixed Mudarabah and Wakalah Model 
In this model the operator receives benefit from a pre-determined fee for management 
costs under the Wakalah contract and a shared percentage from investment profits under 
the Mudarabah contract.  
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Figure 3.9 Family Takaful Mixed Model 
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3.8 Issues and Ruling of Surplus 
 
In modern writings based on Takaful, it is very common to come across the terms profit and 
surplus. Throughout the Takaful industry, widespread use of these terms can sometimes be 
confusing. For example, one observes that the term profit is given to surplus and vice versa. 
This perhaps calls for an explanation, as far as use within the Takaful industry is concerned. 
 
3.8.1 SURPLUS, CONTRARY TO PROFIT 
 
By definition, “insurance, or underwriting surplus, denotes an excess of the total premium 
contributions paid by policyholders. An event that occurs during the current financial period 
and includes the total amount of indemnities paid in respect of claims incurred during that 
period, along with net re-insurance and deductions for expenses and changes to technical 
provisions”90. This definition indicates that any surplus left after the payment of indemnities 
and expenses, and the transfer of reserves, is distributed amongst policyholders. This is simply 
because these amounts form part of their contributions. In this context, surplus cannot be 
described as profit. Profit refers to returns gained upon recovery of invested capital, or to a 
monetary value over and above the capital after investment. According to the juristic 
terminology, profit constitutes capital, or the income and revenue accumulated over and above 
capital. In short, profit means adding additional financial value to capital91. Thus, in 
underwriting activities, there is no profit but rather surplus. 
 
3.8.2 SHARIA RULINGS PERTAINING TO SURPLUS 
 
As the term indicates, surplus is the remainder of a contribution after the payment of 
indemnities and expenses and after the transfer of reserves. Thus, surplus should be distributed 
among policyholders, simply because these amounts form part of their contributions92. The 
Sharia ruling on surplus is derived from the origin of that surplus, i.e. via premium 
                                                
90 AAOIFI, Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions 2002, p. 400. 
91 Ibn Qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee, vol. 5, p. 33.supra footnote 33 
92  Algari.M  2009. Al fai’id Altaaminy. Supra footnote 19.  
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contributions. In this case, surplus is the sole right of participants, unless participants 
contractually agree that the operator is to share in this surplus 93as discussed below. 
 
3.8.3 METHODS OF TAKAFUL SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION 
 
There are a number of methods, used by Islamic insurance companies, to distribute surplus. 
These methods are approved via standards issued by the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). This is because, these methods do 
not violate the principles of Sharia, but rather they compliment actions that form part of 
insurance by-laws. 
 
Among these methods are the following: 
1. The allocation of surplus to all policyholders, occurs regardless of whether or not they have 
made claims on the policy during an agreed financial period. 
2. Allocation of surplus among policyholders only, specifically those who have not made any 
claims during the current financial period. 
3. Allocation of surplus among those who have not made claims as well as those who have 
made claims of amounts less than their insurance contributions. This is provided that the latter 
category of policyholders receive only the difference between their insurance contributions 
and their claims, during the present financial period94. 
 
3.8.4 APPLICATION OF SURPLUS AND RESERVES FOR INNOVATION 
 
Whether or not the operator shares the surplus with participants, another product could be 
invented using the reserves and surplus. For example, the Takaful operator may design a 
product that would allow him/her/it to guarantee participants a secure credit facility against 
their entitlement to surplus. For example, the surplus may be held without distribution, in aim 
that participants may secure credit facilities from Islamic banks, against the surplus amount95. 
                                                
93 Ibid. p6. Also see Haytham Haidar. (2009) Al fai’id Altaaminy. Supra footnote 20.   
94 AAOIFI, Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions 2002. 
95 Mohammed Burhan Arbouna.	
  Regulation of Takaful Business: A Shari’a Overview of Contractual Aspects of 
Takaful Models. Supra footnote 10.  p30 
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This suggestion is perhaps possible as the Takaful operator is not party to the Takaful system. 
In other words, its personality is separate from the participants’ legal personality. Therefore, in 
this context, the Takaful operator may guarantee any participants secure credit from other 
sources. Furthermore, the Takaful operator will recover the debt should there be any default by 
any of the participants in regards to the surplus or any money remaining in the insurance 
policy. However, the acceptability of this suggestion and the mechanism of its implementation 
are subject to thorough research under the general principles of Sharia and of Takaful 
practices. 
 
3.8.5 SHARING SURPLUS AS AN INCENTIVE TO GOOD PERFORMANCE 
 
The sharing of surpluses by participants, operators and shareholders is a critical issue within 
the Islamic insurance industry. In explanation, surplus is the absolute right of participants 
because it is fadl or fai’id (remaining) of participants’ contributions that have not been put into 
use. On the other hand, it is noted that some Takaful operators consider surplus as profit to be 
shared with participants. This raises questions of legality and leads us to ask whether it is an 
absolute principle that, regardless of model, surplus can never be shared between participants 
and operators. This is not an absolute rule, because the sharing of surplus by the operator may 
be characterised under some Sharia principles. Perhaps this is why some Sharia Boards permit 
shareholders to share in the underwriting of surplus with policyholders96. If this fatwa exists, 
then the fatwa may be interpreted as stating that the operator is entitled to share in the surplus 
with participants, on basis of the following conditions: 
 
1) The operator manages insurance activities and investments founded on agency, without 
consideration, and is entitled to share in the surplus as an incentive or reward for good 
performance97. 
2) The operator manages the insurance operations on the basis of agency without 
consideration and manages participants’ fund on the basis of Mudarabah. In this case, 
the operator is entitled to share in the surplus as an incentive or gift for good 
                                                
96The author did not witness fatwa although this is recorded in Fatawa Hai’ah al-Raqabah al-Shari’yya of Bank 
Faisal Faisal al-Islami al-Sudani, vol. 1, p. 22 . 
97  Algari.M  2009.  Al fai’id Altaaminy. Supra footnote 19. 
139 
 
performance. The operator is entitled to share the surplus as an incentive or reward for 
good performance providing the following conditions are observed98: 
1. Policy certificates signed by customers, must clearly state that insurance 
operations are carried out on the basis of agency and are free of charge. 
2. The policy must state that the operator is entitled to an incentive gift for good 
performance if there is surplus. 
3. The term of profit must be avoided where the operator shares the surplus with 
participants because profit is a result of investment and surplus is not related to 
investment. Put differently, surplus is not money that was generated due to 
investment. The use of the term “Mudarabah profit” in relation to surplus, 
suggests that surplus, is a result of an investment and this assumption is not 
correct, neither in theory nor in practice. 
 
                                                
98 See report prepared by the committee appointed by AAOIFI to discuss various aspects of Islamic Insurance 
Activities. 
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3.9The Reinsurance Arrangement and Investment 
 
According to the practice of Islamic insurance, the relationship of re-insurance companies 
and Takaful operators is set out as follows: 
a. The Re-insurance Company will mobilise premiums/policies from insurance 
companies. 
b. The Re-insurance Company assumes responsibility to invest this fund on a Mudarabah 
basis alongside other Takaful operators. 
c. The proceeds will be evenly distributed between the Reinsurance Company and 
Takaful operators on the basis of a defined percentage in respect of participating 
certificates given to participating companies. This percentage, say 10% of the 
proceeds, belong to shareholders of the Re-insurance Company. The remaining, 90%, 
is to be added to the retakaful fund. 
d. In the event of danger, reinsurance will indemnify the defined risks and settle the 
expenses via Takaful taken from the overall premiums, reserves and proceeds of 
investment. 
e. In the event of surplus, this must be returned to the Takaful fund in accordance with 
the contribution of each and every Takaful operator. 
f. In the event that the Reinsurance Company cannot indemnify the defined risks, it may 
borrow from the retakaful fund under the terms of a loan. 
g. It is evident from this process that the Reinsurance Company does not have any 
financial interest other than its share in the proceeds of Mudarabah, if any99.  
See following diagram: 
  
                                                
99 For more details on reinsurance from an Islamic perspective, see Arbouna, “The Operation of Retakaful 
(Islamic Reinsurance) Protection”, supra footnote 73. pp. 335-362. 
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Figure 3.10 The Reinsurance Agreement and Investment 
 
3.10 Arranging a Loan Facility to cover an Insurance Deficit 
 
Earlier on, it was noted that Takaful contributions are paid on the basis of a special form of 
qualified donation. The role of the operator is the management of the insurance pool and the 
investment of the insurance fund. The operator is not obliged to indemnify from its funds. The 
indemnities are paid from the insurance pool, created following the mobilisation of 
contributions from participants. 
 
This is because Takaful is not divided between two separate parties; rather, participants 
represent the insured and insurer simultaneously as they act to insured each other. Therefore, if 
the Takaful fund falls short of meeting the indemnity, the operator may manage this situation 
in line with AAOIFI Accounting and Auditing Standards on disclosure of bases for 
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determining and allocating surplus or deficit in an Islamic insurance company. These 
standards advocate that this situation may be fixed by taking following actions: 
 
a. To settle the deficit from the reserves of the policyholders, if any. 
b. To borrow from shareholders’ funds, and/or from other sources, the sum of the deficit, 
to be paid back in order to encourage the accumulation of future surpluses. 
c. To ask the policyholders to meet the deficit pro-rata. 
d. To increase future premium contributions on a pro-rata basis. 
 
Generally, if point (a) or (c) are followed then few problems will occur for participants and 
operators. Nevertheless, point (d) appears to be out of the question. Arguably, this action will 
not solve immediate difficulties, since money must come from somewhere in order to recover 
the deficit. Clearly, over the long term, participants will pay via increased contributions. In the 
author’s view, solution (d) is not practical, except in extending debt for the policyholders. 
Point (b) is also problematic. The problem with this arrangement (b), is that it offers no 
incentive to encourage the operator or third party, to tender a loan facility. This is because, 
within the financial world, institutions tend not to offer benevolent loans. Therefore, it would 
be very difficult for the Takaful operator to secure a loan facility from a third party without 
incentive. The same can be said of shareholders. It follows that shareholders would need to see 
the benefit of providing a loan to the fund without interest. Thus, it seems a form of incentive 
must be devised to encourage a loan provision facility. This incentive lies in the concept of the 
“mutual exchange of loans” or tabadul al-qurud, approved by AAOIFI Sharia100 along with a 
number of Sharia Boards of Islamic banks and insurance companies101 , in order to avoid 
interest payments, and at the same time, secures a loan. 
 
The Sharia Board of Jordan Islamic Insurance argued that, “there is no objection for the 
operator and the participants to exchange loans when one of the parties is in need of a loan 
without interest”102. According to the al-Barakah Forum on Islamic economics “it is 
                                                
100 AAOIFI, Shari’a Standard No. 1: Trading in Currencies clause 2/4 (a). 
101 See for example The Shari’a Board of Kuwait Finance House, al- Fatawa al-Shar’iyyah fi al-Masa’il al-
Iqtisadiyyah, vol. 4, fatwa numbers 697 and 698 p. 146. Available online at 
http://www.kfh.com/KFH_Fatawa/Fatawa_Index.aspx. Retrieved on 14-08-2012. 
102 Unpublished Fatwa of Sharia Board of Jordan Islamic Insurance Company. 
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permissible not to pay, or receive, interest where two banks agree to exchange deposits of the 
same/or different currencies in the form of a loan, when each party is in need. This 
permissibility is circumscribed under the condition that the obligation of one party, to provide 
the loan is not dependent on the obligation of the other. However, the fatwa of some Sharia 
Boards see no legal problem with the conditional exchange of deposits and loans”103. Thus, 
the exchange of deposits and/or loans, tabadul al-qurud, is an innovative product that could be 
introduced into the realm of Islamic insurance to encourage the securing of loans in a fast and 
effective manner. Further, there are no practical issues when a loan is taken from the Takaful 
operator and awarded to the Takaful fund. Nevertheless, the question remaining unanswered is 
which party approves the loan if the loan is to be released to the Takaful operator by 
participants104. 
 
3.11 Some Regulatory and Supervisory Considerations 
3.11.1 MECHANISM OF MONITORING SEGREGATED FUNDS 
 
It is accepted that the relationship of Takaful insurers and their participants necessitates the 
segregation of funds. From a Sharia perspective, this is to ensure that expenses and other risks 
related to each fund are allocated accordingly. Therefore, regulators need to develop a 
mechanism to monitor the movement of different funds involved in Takaful practices. The 
importance of this is obvious. Such a system will help regulators to monitor investment risks 
and expenses and to witness how Takaful companies allocate these, as far as shareholders’ and 
policyholders’ rights and obligations are concerned. The expense and risk relating to the 
shareholders’ fund should remain with the Takaful operator. Whereas, the allocation of 
investment risks and expenses will depend on the model used by the Takaful company105. 
 
                                                
103 Fatawa Hai’ah al-Raqabah al-Shari’iyyah Bank Faisal al-Islami al-Sudani, vol. 1, p. 52-53. 
104 Jummah Mohammed. A (2010). Maosooaa Fatawa almoamalat almaliah lil almasarif wlamoassasat 
almaliah. Dar alssalam. Cairo Volume 13. P50- 110, also see Bisher Lotfy. (2009). Altadawel alaliktroony lil 
alomlat. Dar alnafaais. Amman. P54-60.    
105 Mohammed Burhan Arbouna.	
  Regulation of Takaful Business: A Shari’a Overview of Contractual Aspects of 
Takaful Models. p35. 
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3.11.2 RISK OF MISLEADING THE PUBLIC BY TAKAFUL OPERATORS 
 
It is submitted that Islamic insurance connotes agency and operation on behalf of participants. 
This means that it is participants who establish the Takaful fund, and not the Takaful operator. 
As a legal entity, the operator is there to promote business relationships between participants 
and to encourage more individuals to participate. We call this “selling the Takaful fund”, 
which is an important aspect of the operation. In this scenario, the operator may intentionally, 
or unwittingly, mislead the public in terms of packages or Sharia compliance106. Therefore, 
there is a strong argument that there is a need for regulators to monitor this situation107. It 
seems, the best way to do this is to appoint an in-house Sharia Advisors. The aim of this is to 
monitor products and daily transactions. A Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) would also 
complement the requirements of the AAOIFI standards on Takaful. Nevertheless, as an SSB, if 
it existed, would not always be available to direct, review and supervise the daily activities of 
a Takaful company, then there is also a need for regulators to look into the issue of in-house 
Sharia advisors108. 
3.11.3 CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS FOR TAKAFUL COMPANIES 
 
A central issue is whether or not, the capital adequacy requirement of Takaful companies 
enable loan provision or the means to indemnify. The answer to this is very important in view 
of the fact that Takaful companies are considered as agents acting on behalf of their members. 
As Arbouna confirms, in Takaful, the people who indemnify are the participants themselves. 
This role cannot be adopted by the company, otherwise the Takaful would become a contract 
of reimbursement109. In other words, the indemnity in Takaful may take place, in whole, in 
part or not at all, when there is no fund to cover the insured risk. This is the cornerstone 
principle for the permissibility of a Takaful operation. The indemnity in Takaful is firmly 
                                                
106 As an example, investment limits laid down by Saudi insurance regulators permits a maximum of 45% in 
Stocks and Bonds and 30% in equities. Some of these products are prohibited in Sharia and have been applied by 
many cooperative insurance companies for example, Tawuniya NCCI. See Ajmal Bhatty (2007) Investment 
Strategy and Solvency for Takaful companies. Tokio Marine Middle East. P6. 
107 There is a serious appeal from many scholars in Saudi Arabia identifying critical need to appoint this 
observational body. 
108 Mohammed Burhan Arbouna.	
  Regulation of Takaful Business: A Shari’a Overview of Contractual Aspects of 
Takaful Models. Supra footnote 10.p 23-24. 
109 Ibid, p25. 
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placed within the realms of possibility and not in the sphere of uncertainty, as with 
conventional insurance. So the answer, as explained earlier, is the latter.  
3.11.4 RISKS OF TAKAFUL MODELS 
 
The Takaful models, explained earlier, encompass particular risks. As far as Mudarabah is 
concerned, there is a counterpart risk for each benefit. These risks generally come under the 
banner of negligence and misconduct. For example, as already discussed, the provision of a 
guarantee of the investment in Takaful, is not allowed, and thus only occurs in cases of 
negligence and misconduct110. There are also risks linked to the allocation of expenses and 
investment risks, as discussed earlier. All these may be termed as a “conflict of interests”. In 
Wakalah, the Takaful operator may either knowingly or unwittingly consider underwriting and 
investment policies that would maximise its fees without giving attention to whether such 
policies protect the right of the participants, especially the need of the participants to see a 
surplus to be distributed amongst them. On the other hand, since the agent/ wakeel will receive 
fees irrespective of what happens to the Takaful fund, the agent may not manage the Takaful 
prudently or in a professional manner required from any risk manager. In order to limit these 
risks, regulators may make it mandatory for the Takaful operator to provide interest free loans 
to the fund, should there be any difficulties. This should also prevent the Takaful operator 
from requiring participants to pay additional funds111. 
3.11.5 APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONAL METHODS OF REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
In monitoring Takaful companies, regulators may, generally speaking, seek assistance from 
the administrative principles of conventional insurance companies. Here, regulators may use 
conventional principles and actuarial rules and apply them to Takaful companies. This is an 
administrative procedure that would not be objected to by Sharia. Administrative procedures 
consist of actions that do not involve any contractual undertakings which may go against the 
principles of Takaful operations. Sharia allows us to benefit from the positive features of 
conventional insurance, management and regulation via the principles of valid public interest 
(masalaha mu’tabara’). Further to this, the principles of al-siyasah al-shari’yyah, are 
                                                
110 Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee, supra footnote 33. 
111 Mohammed Burhan Arbouna.	
  Regulation of Takaful Business: A Shari’a Overview of Contractual Aspects of 
Takaful Models. supra footnote 10, p 23-24, also Manjoo. F. (2007) Risk Management. Supra footnote 21.  
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employed to facilitate rules and regulations that would otherwise have no explicit position 
within the Qur’an and Sunnah, provided their use will not violate the basic principles of 
Islamic law112.  
 
3.12 Conclusion  
In recent times, Takaful has been recognised by some modern Islamic experts as an alternative 
product to conventional insurance. This is because the Takaful model is free from unlawful 
elements like gambling, Riba (usury) and uncertainty. However, there are significant 
discussions among modern experts concerning Takaful. These discussions generally debate to 
what extent this system can be considered purely as a contract of donation, a co-operative 
mutual contract or a contract of reimbursement, in relation to conventional insurance. Further 
analysis of the models and their approaches, revealed that the model of Mudarabah and the 
model of Wakalah are contracts of reimbursement (Muawadah). There is actually no 
difference between conventional insurance and mutual insurance because both clearly include 
the element of reimbursement (Muawadah). Hence, policyholders apply to a company to 
obtain compensation from a fund. However, an element of doubt remains concerning the 
receipt of compensation. The only real reason the policy holder applies to this fund is because 
the fund is restricted among policyholders only.  
The only model the author found which complies with Islamic Sharia law is Wakalah with 
Waqf.  
The South African Takaful introduces a 10% administration fee – to be collected from the 
gross premiums (this means Waqf assets and its profits). This application makes the model 
incompatible with Islamic Sharia law because the fee of the agent (nazer-u-alWaqf, as 
confirmed in all Fiqhi schools) must be collected from the surplus and not from the Waqf 
Fund. Unless the participant knows in advanced that an administration fee will be collected 
from the premium, so then the intention of the donor in this situation will be different and will 
comply with Sharia, because the payments’ intention will be split into two parts; one for the 
                                                
112 Imam Shawkany(1760). Irshad alfuhool Fee Ealm Alosool.Dar Alsalam (1998). Vol 2. P264available online 
at: http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?ID=1&idfrom=1&idto=310&bk_no=100 retrieved on 
14-08-2012.  
147 
 
Waqf and the other for an administration fee.  
Nowadays, Takaful has become a system rather than a financial product. This lends itself to 
greater preference over conventional insurance. Policy holders can collect profit and create a 
savings pattern through investments. Further, Takaful can be considered a new income channel 
on the grounds of support through social institutions and thereby enhances the spending 
(Infaq) sector. 
Finally, following the critical analysis of Takaful as an applied form (described above), the 
next chapter will outline the legal form of Takaful and its application in Saudi Arabia, as the 
main subject matter in this study. 
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CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SAUDI INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
While establishing the legislative structure of insurance, the Saudi legislator has issued a 
number of systems and decisions dictating and organising insurance. In 1999 the Regulations 
of the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance were issued in accordance with Royal Decree 
No. (R/10) dated on 13/08/1999 for the sake of organising cooperative health insurance. In 
June 2002, the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance issued the Implementing Regulations 
for the Compulsory Cooperative Health Insurance System. This insurance has been imposed 
on all companies employing more than 500 workers comprised of expatriates providing them 
with proper health coverage. The second phase has included all companies which employ 
between 100-500 workers from amongst the expatriate population. The third and final phase 
has included all companies which employ expatriates. The application of this system was 
announced in the year 2005. However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is determined to be the 
first country in the world to apply the Compulsory Cooperative Health Insurance System for 
both citizens and residents; and to raise awareness regarding this matter through mass media 
as well as other channels. )1(   
 
With regards to insurance on vehicles, there was a decision regarding Compulsory Driving 
License Insurance that was applied as per the Cabinet (The Council of Ministers) Resolution 
No. 222 dated October 30, 2001. Subsequently the Cabinet issued a decision of Compulsory 
Liability towards Third Parties for vehicles instead of license insurance. In 2003, the 
Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law was issued by virtue of Royal Decree No. 
(R/32) as of 2/6/1424. The Implementing Regulations of this system were issued following 
Ministerial Decree No. 1/596 dated on 01/03/1425 H, which allowed the establishment of 
companies with local business or licensed branches of foreign companies so as to practice 
cooperative insurance in the Kingdom. 
                                                
1A report from Al-Suhail, T Minister of Health: "We shall be the first country to apply cooperative health 
insurance to all residents", Middle East Newspaper on the 13 Feb. 2007. 
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From the Sharia aspect, many opinions (fatwa) were provided regarding the subject of 
insurance and the Sharia legality of the practical framework to be applied.  
 
Whereas the conventional insurance currently organised in subjective thought as well as in 
business applications is deemed contradictory to Islamic Sharia in that its contracts may be full 
of deceit (Gharar), usury and gambling.2 Whereas, the insurance contract is associated with 
an investment contract which is an indispensable and inseparable contract, as the model of 
insurance and the collected capital of investment are funds accumulated with the insurer.3 
Therefore the Saudi legislature has sought to issue an insurance system to be drafted in line 
with the law in Saudi Arabia based on Islamic Sharia. 
 
In this chapter I will undertake the critical study of Saudi insurance law and its consistency 
with the Saudi regime and Islamic Sharia as a constitution for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.2 The Insurance system and its consistency with the ruling regime in the 
Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia. 
 
In Article (1) of the General Principles of the Statute of Governance Law in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia it indicates that the Kingdom has taken as the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) as its constitution4 insofar as Article (7) of the Statute of 
Governance Law which provides that “Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its 
authority from the Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of His Messenger, both of which 
govern this law and all the laws of the State.”5  
 
In view of the preceding two articles, it becomes apparent that Islamic Sharia is the governor 
for the Saudi Arabian regime; and with regards to the Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies, we reveal that Art. 1 stipulates that "Insurance in the Kingdom shall be 
undertaken through registered insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner as is 
                                                
2 See Chapter 1 from pp.48 -51. 
3 See Chapter from pp.27 - 46. 
4 The Basic Law of Governance. (2003) Part one, General Principles, Art.1, Translation of Saudi law, Series 2, 
pp.17. 
5 Ibid, (2003) Part two, System of Governance, Art.7. , Translation of Saudi law , Series 2, pp.18. 
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provided within the article establishment of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance 
promulgated by Royal Decree M/5 dated 17/5/1405 H, and in accordance with the principles 
of Islamic Shari’a.”6 We clearly find that such an article has undertaken two issues:  
• It has been confined to dealing with the cooperative insurance style and such has been 
constrained by the Statute of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance. Thus a 
general statue of a state cannot be enacted in accordance with any commercial 
company which is made as the original basis; especially as applications of this 
company and its statue can be criticised by many experts in Sharia and Islamic finance.  
• However, the wording of the system should have been built on certain grounds 
consistent with the ruling regime to which all insurance companies are subject. 
 
• The article has however, added that: “and in accordance with the principles of Islamic 
Shari’a.” Thus such an addition is definitely in line with the regime in the country 
based upon the fact that the legislature when drafting such a system has been aware 
that system of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance can be criticised as far 
as the Sharia scholars in the Kingdom are concerned.7 However it would be better to 
word such an article in the following manner in order for it to be drafted and read:  
 "Insurance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be conducted through registered 
companies working in conformity with a cooperative insurance style consistent with 
Islamic Sharia provisions." 
 
Hence, it has become apparent that there has been a significant error in the constitutional 
drafting for such a regime for which many people who are interested in insurance have 
undergone a state of contradiction. With regards to the statute of any company, agreed upon 
by many researchers, this relates to the insurance business which is forbidden in some 
applications and is provided by the system as an example which should be traced; thus a new 
                                                
6 SAMA. Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (2003) Art.1, (Online), Available: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/InssuranceLib/4600_C_InsuraLaw_En_2005_08_17_V1.pdf  
7 Many Sharia scholars consider the applications of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance to be a 
conventional insurance and not a cooperative insurance, and therefore not comply with the cooperative insurance 
model that been mentioned in Islamic Fiqhi Academy of the Muslim World League (1969) decisions. For more 
information refer to Fatwa, Online (Available): 
http://www.alifta.net/fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?BookID=3&View=Page&PageNo=5&PageID=5664  17-08-
2012 
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addition is included in Islamic Sharia as stated in regards to provisions that raise a significant 
number of legal questions: 
 
The questions are now as follows:  
• Is adding or incorporating Islamic Sharia in such a regime intended to be the governor 
for all articles in the regime, or only as a literary text insertion, which is not 
contradictory with the provision of the Basic Law of Governance, i.e. Articles 1 and 
7?  
• Does the role of Sharia scholars in the evaluation of texts prior to their issuance make 
no longer diverge with Islamic Sharia?   
• What is the role of legislative bodies in administering the formulation of such a 
system to ensure that it has been published with many legal violations? 
I have not revealed follow-up procedures for the issuance of the system, or any effective or 
active role for Sharia scholars; but there is a dependence of the legislator upon the legal 
opinion of senior scholars in Saudi Arabia with regards to cooperative insurance,8 this varies 
in content from technical applications of the present system.  
 
I attempted to explore the information, and wrote to legislative bodies such as the Shura 
Council and the Panel of Experts of the Cabinet9 which are the concerned authorities in the 
State to issue and adopt such laws. Therefore I posed questions to the authorities above, and 
others, and they responded by telephone but had no answer for such questions. It was deemed 
sufficient for me to personally ask these questions with reservation with regards to the answers 
which were given. From a personal perspective this was not convincing.  
 
4.3 Characteristics of the Insurance policy in the Saudi regime:  
 
The cooperative insurance contract in view of the provision of Article.1 of the Implementing 
Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies consists of (The 
                                                
8 To find more about the legal opinion of senior scholars in cooperative insurance see  El Qora Daghi.A (2006). 
Islamic Insurance. Dar Albashaer Alislamiah. Burit, Lebanon. pp. 135. 
9 A copy of the letter presented to the Panel of Experts of the Cabinet has been attached in the appendix. This has 
been written in Arabic. 
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insurer which is an insurance company that accepts directly from the insured, and the insured 
which is a natural person or legal entity who has signed an insurance policy with the 
insurer.10)  Thus the insurance contract is formed upon the basis of two main relationships as 
outlined:  
A. The relationship of a certain insured person with others who are insured 
collectively and represented by an insurance company; and a relationship of an 
insurer with an insured person. This is stated in Article 1 of the Implementing 
Regulations of the law on supervision of cooperative insurance companies; whilst 
defining the insurance policy as: (Legal document/contract issued to the insured by 
the insurer setting out the terms of the contract to indemnify the insured for loss 
and damages covered by the policy against a premium paid by the insured).11 In 
the definition of insurance it is: a (Mechanism of contractually shifting burdens of 
pure risks by pooling them).12 This is the most important relationship, because the 
characteristics of such a relationship are the origins for the provision of 
promulgation or nullification of such contracts.  
 
B. The relationship of the insurance company with the insured in particular. This 
regards the administration and management of insurance operations, such as the 
collection of contributions towards payment of compensation, and investment of 
contributions. That is the existing relationship between the company and the 
remainder of insured persons. The relationship upon which many researchers are 
focusing is on the expense of the first relationship. Therefore, I am firstly going to 
identify the legislative characteristics of the first relationship; and subsequently I 
will discuss the Sharia qualification of the second relationship.  
 
 
 
                                                
10 SAMA, The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, 2004, 
(Online), Available: http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/Pages/LawsandRegulations.aspx  
11 Ibid article 1.17. 
12 Ibid article 1.12. 
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4.3.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SPECIFIC INSURED 
PERSON, AND THE REMAINING POLICY HOLDERS  
 
Insurance companies in Saudi Arabia adopt the cooperative or mutual insurance system as a 
basis for its work. Therefore, its contracts may be believed to be some form of voluntary 
contribution, based on existing general opinions which include cooperative or mutual 
contributions under the title of contributions. From a personal perspective providing for a 
particular principle in particular does not mean that every application for such a principle will 
be characterised as such and hence, the study of these existing contracts is the best way to 
judge them as some sort of financial reimbursement, or donation, and for judging the existing 
deceit (Gharar). 
 
Gharar can be related to obscenity which is forbidden; or to deceit (Gharar) which can be 
overcome from the viewpoint of Islamic jurisprudence.  
 
As has been noted in the preceding chapter, the basic principles of a commercial insurance 
policy consist of it being a civil contract which includes financial reimbursement and 
provision for compliance and obligation for both parties. In addition to being viewed as a 
temporary contract, along with other important principles, it has however been the subject of 
attention for Sharia scholars through analysis and criticism, and has been a direct reason for 
prohibition of insurance for the fact that some such principles can lead to deceit (Gharar), 
usury and gambling.13 Therefore, can insurance systems in Saudi Arabia be giving Islamic 
solutions consistent with the principles of Islamic Sharia?  
 
Insurance company policies in Saudi Arabia provide for the existence of a cooperative 
insurance relationship between the total number of insurance policyholders. This means that 
the company is not the original party for the contract, but is the agent for a group of 
policyholders in the management and organisation of insurance operations. Therefore, they 
impersonate the insured status in order to be acting for them, and thus each retains the 
character or capacity purely for the insured.14 Therefore the characteristics associated with the 
contracts of these companies regards the characteristics of the existing relationship between a 
                                                
13 See Chapter 1, from pp. 39 -49. 
14 See Takaful, A. (2011) Insurance policy for comprehensive car insurance Published by Alrajhi Takaful 
Company, article 1 (1l2). 
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certain policyholder and the remaining policyholders represented in the insurance company. 
Therefore does this mean that the policy holder should pay the premium amount due for the 
remaining policyholders represented in the company for financial reimbursement? Therefore 
would they deserve the amount of insurance according to the financial reimbursement, or 
would they pay the premium of contribution to provide help to whoever needed this from the 
total policyholders? Subsequently they would deserve the amount of insurance contribution 
due to their proper capacity as a beneficiary thereof. This could be identified through various 
conditions upon which contracting takes place, as described by the so-called insurance 
policy. In some insurance policies conditions do include explicit provision based on the fact 
that a premium is a contribution to help whoever requires it from the policyholders and some 
who do not.15  
 
Some opinions have stipulated that a contract is a form of voluntary contribution. But, perhaps 
the remainder of the conditions may be doing so without such a condition. However, there is 
clear evidence to signify that there is an intention to donate or cooperate among those total 
insured persons to bear the risks which may afflict them. There may also be certain evidence 
and provisions regarding the will of financial reimbursement, and therefore such a provision is 
an insufficient indication that a premium is a donation. By reviewing the provisions of such 
policies, it may be possible to clarify the characteristics of such policies as follows: 
4.3.1.1 Financial reimbursement contract (Muawadah)  
 
Imam Malik views financial reimbursement contracts as “Acts and practices resulting in the 
development of funds, and what it is meant by collecting the same.”16 They are actions 
through which money is exchanged with other money; and those financial reimbursement 
contracts can be defined as such contracts whereby both contractors take an amount 
corresponding to what has been given, wherein each party is designed to get what the other 
has for acquisition purposes.17 Both parties of financial reimbursement are policyholders and 
the insurance company on behalf of the remainder of the policyholders; whereas the two 
opposite payments of financial reimbursement take part in the premium and the compensation. 
                                                
15 Ibid. The introduction. 
16 The second conference for Alazhar research Academy (1970), V. 2, from pp.152-164.    
17  Aljorf, A S. (2009) ‘The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems’. An Arabic paper presented in cooperative 
insurance conference in Riyadh, (Online) Available: http://iifef.com/files/taameen/17.pdf pp. 55. 
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Therefore we have four pillars for the financial reimbursement operation: an insurer (the 
company); a policyholder (the insured); a premium and compensation. Therefore we can 
devise this character from insurance systems in Saudi Arabia in view of the following:  
• The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies in Article 1 (paragraph 17) thereof, has defined the insurance policy as: (A 
legal document/contract issued to the insured by the insurer setting out the terms of the 
contract to indemnify the insured for loss and damages covered by the policy against a 
premium paid by the insured).18 This is an express provision of financial 
reimbursement, as both parties take a corresponding share of what they have been 
given.  
• Article 1 of the Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Health Insurance has defined a premium as: An amount to be settled to the company 
by the policyholder in return for insurance coverage provided by the policy during the 
period of insurance.19 This is also an express provision of financial 
reimbursement; whereas the article states that the premium is paid in return for the 
amount of insurance.  
• Article 1 of the Implementing Regulations for the control system of cooperative 
insurance companies has defined premium as:  An amount offered by the insured to the 
insurer in exchange for the insurer’s acceptance to indemnify the insured for 
loss/damages resulting directly from a covered risk.20 This is an express provision of 
financial reimbursement; whereas the article states that the premium is paid in return 
for the amount of insurance. 
• The comprehensive vehicle insurance policy of the Tawnia insurance company in the 
terms of Section II has stated: The company is committed in the event of an accident 
within the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which has resulted or is resulting 
from the use of the vehicle of the insured to compensate the insured within the limits of 
responsibility set out in the schedule of policy for all amounts accrued to the insured, 
                                                
18 SAMA .The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, 
(2004), supra footnote 10.  
19 SAMA .The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Health Insurance. (Online),  
Available: http://www.cchi.gov.sa/en/Rules/Documents/Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf retrieved on 15-08-
2012. 
20 SAMA.The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, supra 
footnote 10. 
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or the driver is legally authorised to be paid as compensation for ...).21  This 
compensation to the insured is considered as a financial reimbursement in return for 
the contributions paid by them.  
• As stated in the same policy, in section III in extensions: It could be for an additional 
amount to be paid to the premium, extending the coverage of the policy to include the 
following: 
A.  Extending the personal accidents.  
B.  Extending the geographic area.  
C.  Extending the age group.  
D.  Extending the non-application of consumption conditions in the case of 
compensation for total loss).22  
 The preceding paragraphs confirm the financial reimbursement. Therefore extending the 
insurance coverage is an amount to be paid by the insured in return for an additional 
premium. Therefore, the above paragraphs are explicit provisions of financial reimbursement.  
 
Aljorf (2009) has stated that the contract is being subjected to the principle of compensation. 
This means that the intent of the contract is: Returning the insured to the economic situation 
prior to the occurrence of the risk. Thus the insured pays the premium which they are to obtain 
from the company which returns them to the economic situation that existed before the 
occurrence of the risk.23  
This is in addition to the fact that insurance policies are void of any express provision, or 
presumption, which would indicate donation.  
4.3.1.2 Binding contract for both parties: 
 
The contracts of cooperative insurance companies are binding for both parties. The two offset 
obligations lie in the commitment of the policy holder to pay the required premium, and 
commitment of the company in return, to compensate the beneficiary when danger has 
occurred. Thus such obligations offset each other. Both are caused by the presence of the 
                                                
21 Tawniya, Al-Shamel Commercial Policy Wording, (Online), Available: 
http://www.tawuniya.com.sa/GetFile.aspx?id= 781 , retrieved on 15-08-2012. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Aljorf, AS. (2009) The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems, Supra footnote 16, pp. 58.  
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other, and the consequential impact at the same time; and this is clearly indicated by the 
phrases contained in the preceding paragraph which signifies that a contract enters under the 
heading of reimbursements.24  
4.3.1.3 Contract of submission:  
 
The insurance company in this system is the stronger party, and the insured do not have the 
authority to waiver the conditions of the company, i.e. pre-printed conditions by the company 
and by compensating everyone, and therefore the insured persons are only required to sign a 
printed document, without discussion of its terms. They are not provided freedom with the 
exception of choosing between insurance or not. Whoever is willing to insure should sign via 
the company terms, and there is no difference in this respect between such a type and 
traditional commercial insurance.25  
4.3.1.4 Insurance is a probable contract or a contract of deceit (Gharar): 
 
The probable contract or deceit (Gharar) contract is defined according to Islamic 
jurisprudence literature, with many definitions, which include:  
• “A doubtful obtaining one of its financial reimbursement, or the often purpose 
intended thereof.”26  
• “A contract when a contractor does not know what he possessed, yielding what he has 
given.”27 
•  “What cannot be entrusted obtaining a financial reimbursement.”28 
•  “Deciding upon two matters, one for a purpose and the other for the opposite.”29 
•  “What is apparently desirable, and in fact detestable”30  
                                                
24 Ibid. Also see Chapter 1, pp. 25. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Alhattab.  Mawahib aljaleel fi sharhh mukhtaser alkhaleel, Dar alfikr edition 3 Beirut (1992), vol. 4, pp. 362.  
Available (online): 
http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?ID=1&bk_no=19&idfrom=1&idto=4804 retrieved on 
15-08-2012. 
27 Abdulkareem Alrafiyee, A. (1226) .Fattih Alaziz sharhh alwajeez. , Dar Alkutub Alilmiah, Beirut (1997). Vol 
8, pp.127. 
28 Algailooby (no date) Hashiat Algailooby ala sharhh almuhalla lil alminhaj, Dar alfikr for puplishment, Cairo, 
vol. 2, pp. 162. Available (online): http://bib-alex.com/23_7.php,  retrieved on 15-08-2012. 
29 Alhattab , vol.  4, pp. 368  pp. 368,  Supra footnote 26.  
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The upshot of the above definitions and reviewing the contracts of deceit (Gharar) or probable 
contracts in Islamic jurisprudence is that they are clearly financial reimbursement contracts. 
Thus they are infested and dominated with deceit (Gharar) until they are described as such, 
because if something ranges between two attributions, it cannot be described by one of them 
regardless of the other unless it is specifically and mostly significant part of it,31 Even If 
financial reimbursement is not carried out in whole or in part favour of a party to a contract. 
Contracts of deceit (Gharar) in Islamic jurisprudence are described under the heading of 
financial reimbursement, despite the lack of implementation of one the two opposing 
commitments, in part or in whole. Thus what counts is the introduction of the contract under 
financial reimbursement or donation; but under the intention and desire of the contractor and 
at the time as the contract. Therefore, deceit (Gharar) in insurance contracts is deemed to be 
an obscene deceit (Gharar) for the following reasons:  
A. Introducing insurance contracts under the definitions of deceit (Gharar), as insured, in 
cases of contracting may suspect receiving the amount of insurance, as this depends on 
the incident likelihood of occurrence in the future, which may or not occur. Thus the 
insured may or may not obtain entirely or partially the amount of insurance; or 
experience the possibility of obtaining the amount of insurance, whether or not it is 
equal, either likely or not for each other, which is not known until after the danger 
occurs, as there is no other result than obtaining an insurance amount or not.32  
 
B. The availability of certain controls of obscene deceit (Gharar) in the insurance 
contract:  
 Aljorf (2009) has stated that it is often discussed among the Maliki scholars that deceit 
(Gharar) which invalidates financial reimbursement contracts may be divided into 
seven areas, such as: deceit (Gharar) in existence, incidence and in terms of the 
amount. As well as deceit (Gharar) with regards to time and price. Therefore when 
applying such controls within an insurance contract it shows the following:  
                                                                                                                                                    
30 Mohammed Aldosoogy, M. (1230H). Hashiat Aldosoogy ala alsharhh alkabeer.Dar alfikr for puplishment, 
Beirut, vol. 3, pp. 55. Available (online): http://www.almeshkat.net/books/open.php?cat=39&book=1229 , 
retrieved on 15-08-2012.   
31 Ibn Rushd Alhafeed.(595H).Bidait-ul-almujtahid. Ibn hazim for publishing (1999). Cairo.vol. 2, pp. 547. 
32 Alhamid.H.The verdict of Shari’a on Insurance, Dar Alitsam, Cairo, pp. 45- 46. 
159 
 
• Deceit (Gharar) in existence: Availability exists in the insurance contract, because the 
amount of insurance is a debt to be paid by the insured that is not certain. This is 
because its existence depends on the existence of the insured risk, if any it would be 
found, and if not it would be null.  
• Deceit (Gharar) in obtaining: The insurance contract contains deceit (Gharar) in 
obtaining, because the contractor does not know whether they will obtain the amount 
of insurance or not, and the premiums they have paid. This is because this obtaining 
depends on the potential or not of an incident.  
• Deceit (Gharar) in the amount of compensation: This contains an amount of 
compensation, because the insurance company may obtain a single premium and then a 
disaster may occur. Therefore it will be obliged to pay the amount of insurance in 
whole or in part; whilst a large number of premiums will have been paid to the insured 
before the accident had occurred. Thus there is a significant difference between both 
cases of up to thousands of riyals. With regards to the insured, they are paid a fixed 
premium in exchange for a pledge by the company to pay a certain amount through 
which the premium will be determined. However the company may pay such an 
amount in full, or potentially half of this amount, etc depending on the gravity of 
damage which has occurred.  
• Deceit (Gharar) in term: Insurance contracts contain deceit (Gharar) in order to obtain 
compensation. "The amount of insurance is a commitment to be honored by the 
insured that may be added for a non-determined term, and this is clearly shown in 
some forms of life insurance, so that the insurance company is committed in this type 
of insurance to pay an insurance amount upon the death of the insured, which is for an 
unfixed date.33  
C.  The lack of controls of easy deceit (Gharar) in the insurance contract: Such controls 
were stated in view of some Maliki scholars whereby: "An easy deceit (Gharar) is 
forgiven for need, i.e. necessity, or if it is not meant, or non-intentional." Examples of 
easy deceit (Gharar) can be related to the foundations of a house which may have been 
bought without an understanding of its depth, width or durability; and its lease over a 
period of months with a possible decrease in months. Thus the scholars devised certain 
conditions for an easy deceit (Gharar) as outlined:  
                                                
33 Aljorf, AS. (2009) The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems, Supra footnote 16, pp. 60 -61. 
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a.  Easy deceit (Gharar): When the increased or decreased of the amount of 
compensation is little, as set by the two contractual parties as compared to the 
total value of the compensation,  
b.  When the commission of deceit (Gharar) is necessary to prevent the same 
situation which could cause great embarrassment or excessive harm to people. 
In applying such conditions to the insurance contract, we find that these controls do not apply. 
 
4.4 Legislative qualification of the Insurance company in collecting and 
investing contributions as well as payment of compensations 
 
Evaluation of the legislative qualification of the insurance company in collecting and investing 
contributions as well as payment of compensations, according to Aljorf (2009) will clearly 
find that the control system for insurance companies and its Implementing Regulations, or the 
System of Cooperative Health Insurance Council and its Implementing Regulations, or the 
Corporate System of the company itself, or Articles of Association, do not provide for the 
qualification of this relationship. It is not otherwise provided by applicable insurance 
policies.34 However I do think that this relationship could be qualified by reviewing functions 
performed by the company and the returns obtained in return for this, which may be 
determined as follows:  
A.  Article 1 of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies has stated 
that “Insurance in the Kingdom shall be undertaken through registered insurance 
companies operating in a cooperative manner as is provided within the article 
establishment of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance promulgated by 
Royal Decree M/5 dated 17/5/1405 H; and in accordance with the principles of Islamic 
Sharia.”35 
B.  Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies: The main object of the company shall be to engage in any of the insurance 
and reinsurance activities, and not to undertake any other activities unless they are 
complementary or necessary. Insurance companies may not directly own brokerage 
companies or establishments. Re-insurance companies may not also own re-insurance 
                                                
34 Ibid. pp. 62. 
35 The Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, SAMA, supra footnote 6.  
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brokerage companies or establishments. However, insurance companies may, subject 
to obtaining the Agency’s approval, own companies or establishments engaged in re-
insurance brokerage activities.36 
C.  According to Article 6 of the Statute of Insurance Company’s form established by the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) “The company invests the accumulated 
funds of its insured and shareholders in the company in accordance with established 
rules by the Board of Directors.”37  
D.   However, the Tawuniya Insurance Company stated in their annual report of 2010: in 
paragraph (b) Principles of presentation: The company maintains separate accounting 
books for each of the accounts of insurance operations as well as accounts of 
shareholders. So, all required revenues and expenses for each type of business shall be 
recorded in the relevant accounting records. Also, all expenses related for common 
operations performed by the management and members of the Company's Board-of-
Directors shall be distributed accordingly.38  
E.  Surplus and its distribution: Article 1/36 of the Implementing Regulations of the Law 
on Cooperative of Insurance Companies has defined the formula of surplus distribution 
as: “A method by which profit of insurance and reinsurance companies is distributed 
among shareholders and policyholders.”39 Furthermore, under Article 70/1 of the 
same regulation it has stated that “The Company’s financial statements, at a minimum, 
shall consist of; statements of financial position for insurance operations and 
shareholders accounts, profit and loss statements for insurance operations, 
shareholders’ income statements, statement of shareholders’ equity, statements of cash 
flows for insurance operations and shareholders’ cash flow statement.”40 In addition, 
the article has defined certain matters which should be taken into account when 
preparing the list of insurance operations, namely:  
a) “Determine earned premiums, and income generated from reinsurance commissions, 
and other insurance operations revenues.  
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 SAMA. The Statute of Insurance Company’s Form (2007), (Online) Available: 
www.sama.gov.sa/InsuranceLib/Forms/Allltims.aspx  
38 The	
  National	
  Company	
  of	
  cooperative	
  Insurance	
  (NCCI)	
  Tawuniya.	
  The	
  annual	
  report	
  of	
  	
  (2010).	
  Notes	
  to	
  The	
  
Financial	
  Statements,	
  Principles	
  of	
  Preparation,	
  p69.  
39 The Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, SAMA, supra footnote 6. 
40 Ibid 
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b) Determine the incurred indemnification. 
c)  At the end of each year, the total surplus representing the difference between (a) and 
(b) less any marketing, administrative expenses, the necessary technical provisions, 
and other general expenses related to the operation of insurance shall be specified. 
d) Company’s net surplus shall be determined by adding or subtracting the investment 
return of the policyholder’s invested funds, and subtracting the general expenses 
related to the policyholder’s portion of the investment activities.”41  
A. Net surplus is distributed according to Article 70/2.e of the Implementing Regulations 
of the Law on Cooperative of Insurance Companies whereby “10% of the net surplus 
shall be distributed to the policyholders directly, or in the form of reduction in 
premiums for the next year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus shall be transferred 
to the shareholders’ income statement”42. 
4.4.1 THE COLLECTED RETURNS BY THE COMPANY: 
 
The preceding paragraphs indicate the existence of two types of revenue charged by the 
company: 
1. Return for its management and organising insurance operations, this includes 
collection of contributions and investing them together with the paying out of 
compensation, etc., such as actual expenditures, which are always payable. 
2.  A return of 90% of the net earned surplus.  
However, the regulation has not clearly indicated the work carried out by this company as 
opposed to the surplus.43 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Ibid. article 70/2 
42 Ibid. Article 7/2.e 
43 Aljorf, AS. (2009) The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems, Supra footnote 16, pp. 64. 
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4.4.2 THE ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENTIAL (FIQHI) ANALYSIS OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
ACCORDING TO THE INSURANCE SYSTEM IN SAUDI ARABIA: 
 
After reviewing works undertaken by the company for the benefit of policyholders, checking 
the returns collected by the company, in return for performing such works, it can be said that 
the contracts of this company consist of two main inseparable pillars, namely: 
4.4.2.1 Agency contract with fixed payment  
 
The company in this contract undertakes a significant amount of responsibilities such as 
management, organisation of operations of insurance, collection of contributions and payment 
of compensations; as well as other matters related thereto. However, it is well known within 
mutual or cooperative insurance, that the policyholders are the insurers and are insured at the 
same time; and that the company is engaged in the collection of contributions and payment of 
compensation to beneficiaries on their behalf. This is because it takes the capacity of the 
insurer, and each party only keeps the capacity of the insured, so that it may arise between the 
company and the policyholder an agency contract in view of this matter.  
 
The Agency in Islamic Sharia is “an empowerment proxy to act in what is related to rights of 
Allah44 as well as the rights of humans.”45 That which is held by the company is appointed as 
a proxy of the rights of humans, or rather a contract of agency, for a temporary known 
duration, which is often one year, based upon a future condition with respect to the payment of 
the compensation. However, paying compensation is pending upon the occurrence of danger, 
whereas it is only paid after the incident which is deemed religiously permissible.46 
 
An agency has many applications which are pending, so it comes pending with a condition 
such as; “If the winter comes get a health insurance to my mother”. Also pending with time 
such as “I will assign you my agent for one month.”47  The policyholders at the time of 
signing the contracts should entrust the company in terms of the collection of contributions 
                                                
44 This applies in pilgrimage (Hajj for example) Therefore in the case of illness when one would be unable to 
perform or complete Hajj they could ask another to perform or complete it on their behalf.  
45 Albahooty. Kashaf Algenaa. almaktabbah alislamiah for publishing edition D.T. (1982).Beruit. vol. 3, pp. 48. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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and the payment of compensations to beneficiaries under the terms of policy. This is required 
as part of the process of calculating contributions and reinsurance, during a certain period, 
which is often one year, and this matter even not expressly provided for in the contract, but the 
concept of cooperative insurance practiced by the company stipulates that the insurance 
custom is required as there is a rule in Islamic law which states that “what is known as a 
custom is applied as a condition”, as if it was provided for explicitly in the contract.48  
 
Therefore, contracts are valid in all parts of their meaning according to custom, whether 
saying, acting or otherwise. Thus, what the company has taken as a return for facilitating such 
work will be determined at the end of the year based on actual expenditures of the company. 
Therefore the contract shall be held as an agency contract, and the agency with wages or 
compensation will be legally valid, whether paid or unpaid.49  
 
However, if the payment is not predetermined at the end of year it will become indefinite, and 
the paid agency is only valid if the payment has been known and has been determined at the 
time of signing the contract; because in this case it is a kind of financial reimbursement. Thus 
because of ignorance regarding the amount of compensation, an obscene deceit (Gharar) will 
arise and this will invalidate contracts of financial reimbursement.50 However, where it is 
possible to determine that the actual expenditures of a company are similar, and actual 
expenses of the company for the past years should determine that pay in advance, or select 
ceilings for the lowest and the highest such expenses in the basic system, to enable the 
policyholder to read or to be placed in the form of a supplement to the policies. Determining 
the return in advance would deny the deceit (Gharar) of the contract, and subsequently it 
would not be subjected to annulment, nor would it allow the company to significantly exceed 
its expenditure as a lack of determination of return in advance. However, it could list all the 
subscriptions and revenues, under actual expenditures, and so could cause policyholders to 
experience losses.51 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. V 3 p 489.  
50  Aljorf. AS (2009) .The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems.  Supra footnote 16. P 66 
51 This matter really happened. Therefore refer to the auditor’s report in the annual report for the Tawuniya 
Insurance Company (1987), pp. 17.  
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4.4.2.2 Mudarabah contract:  
The relationship between the company and the policyholders at first glance, is an Anan 
company52 and a trading company Mudarabah at the same time, with regards to invested 
contributions that have been accrued. This is religiously permissible, as separate contracts are 
permissible, and can be combined together in one contract. In accordance with Albahooty 
(1051H) in defining the Anan company as having two types. Thus53 one of which “involving 
two or more funds, to be staffed by one provided that its profit is more”; and “The company, 
which applied this contract has two conditions: the first is Anan when considering that the 
money is paid by both parties; and the second is (Mudarabah) trading off whereby that work is 
from one party plus a profit on its money, as the work of one of the wealth of others, and 
part of profit.”54 
 
 
 Figure 4.1: Model applied in Al-Noor Takaful in South Africa. 
                                                
52 In Islamic fiqhi it is a partnership whereby both partners invest a definite sum of money and definitely profit 
share. Please refer to Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee, Dar alkutub for publishing, edition 3, 
1997, Beirut., Ibn Rushd Alhafeed.(595H).Bidait-ul-almujtahid. Supra footnote 31, vol. 2, pp. 269. 
53 All that is needed in this regard is type one as an important addition; and there is no need to mention type 2. 
54 Albhooty. (1982) Kashaf Alqinaa. Supra footnote 44, vol. 3,  pp. 497.  
166 
 
 
Thus in the insurance company the money is submitted by contributors, policyholders, and 
work that is carried out by the company. This means that the work is done by the shareholders 
for the benefit of all parties, against a certain percentage of profit, to be taken from the profits 
of the insured after the distribution of a certain amount of profit at the beginning.55 
 
However has this contract really been applied in Saudi Arabia? To properly answer this 
question, there should be a review of pillars and conditions of its validity in Islamic 
jurisprudence to determine how it applies to this contract.  
 
A.  The pillars of trading off the (Mudarabah) contract must be applied in the contract: 
 
Mudarabah has three pillars in Islamic jurisprudence which are: contracting parties, the form, 
and the subject.56 
1. Contracting parties: Represent the company as the first contractor, and the 
policyholder as the second contractor. Thus the first pillar of trading is achieved.  
2. The Form: The contract takes a written form which is legally permissible. Whereas 
trading is held for all evidence of its customary meaning, whether said or written. This 
is because the purpose is related to the meaning of the transaction on this matter. 
 Can we derive the meaning of trading of Mudarabah from insurance policies issued by 
the company?  
 
An insurance policy is the primary source through which to identify the intention of the 
insured associated with the contract, through the form of the contract, and their own words. 
Therefore, there is no such indication or mention of Mudarabah in the company policies, or 
intentionally manipulating or trading Mudarabah on the basis of the parties; but as explicit 
provisions which are the intended basis of the contract for the insured to collect the amount of 
insurance at the time of particular risk described in the contract. Therefore trading or 
                                                
55 Aljorf. AS. (2009) The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems,  Supra footnote 16, pp. 66. 
56 Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee , supra footnote 52, vol. 5, pp.20. However, it has been 
an argument between Fiqhi schools on the number of Mudarabah pillars, so Hanafi considers it tow, Maliki and 
shafie they stated four and finally Hanbali confirms five. And in my point of view i think the three pillars 
mentioned above are the most affective factors in this transaction.  
167 
 
investment of money is not intended for itself, but is a continued complement, for the purpose 
of the basic contract, and signing the document of acceptance from the insured with all its 
contents consider an acceptance of the rules of the foundation in general, and in particular 
Articles showing that the purpose of the company is to carry out the regulation of cooperative 
insurance. It may have all that it has to do so as to achieve this purpose, such as: investment in 
funds accumulated as a result of the participation of the insured, also the existence of trading 
as a secondary intention of the contract is a custom of insurance companies. Therefore, the 
custom of insurance companies is to retain a portion of the contributions collected in order to 
settle daily payments, and invest therein, but as this custom is not known by many of the 
policyholders and the system is essentially impossible be found in different condition for 
many people. It must be noted in the insurance policies that there is trading Mudarabah as a 
complementary intention, or an assistant to complete the basic intention in insurance, and 
making all required articles on investment process in the form of an annex to the insurance 
policy57.  
3. The subject: That which is held as trading in capital as well as work58, and is realised 
here in the insurance company contract, as the insurance contributions as collected 
from the insured, and the work products of the company in this area are to the benefit 
of policyholders. Therefore, trading Mudarabah is not fixed in all respect of 
contributions, because trading is not the main intention of the contract, but is fixed for 
the remainder of contributions after the allocation of the conventional component to 
pay future potential compensations59.  
 
B. Conditions of validity for Mudarabah contracts must be applied to the contract:  
 
Scholars have provided for some conditions to validate Mudarabah contracts, notably:  
                                                
57 Ahmed Saado Aljorf (2009) .The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems.  Supra footnote 16. P 67 
58 Capital and work considered as a separate pillars in Maliki, shafee and Hanbali Schools.  
59 Alkhwaiter. A 2005. AlMudarabah in Islamic Sharia.Arabic.Dar almaseer. Dammam.2005 1st edition.p 40. 
Aladawee.A 1992. Hashiaat Aladawee. Dar alfikir. Beirut.1992.v2 p266. Alabdary.M 1398H.Aljaj wall Ekleel. 
Dar alfikir. Beirut. No date. Alsharbeeny .M.mugny Almuhtaj. Dar alfikir. Beirut. No date. V2p 117.Alsaid. A. 
Eaanat Altalebeen. Dar alfikir. Beirut. No date.v 3p99. Alshafee .1984. Nihayat Almuhtaj. Dar alfikir. 
Beirut.1984. v5p5. Musa. M1998. Privet Companyin Sharia and Law.Arabic. Dar Alasima. Riyadh 1998.2ed 
edition. p58. Ibn qudamah Almaqdisy(1223AC)(620H). Almugnee. supra footnote 52. v 5 p20.  
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1. Capital should be in cash form60. It is recognised that all contributions or premiums 
are considered as trading capital in the Mudarabah model, which always takes the 
form of cash.  
2. Capital shall be a certain and known amount61, when making a contract, and this is not 
recognised here in this application for the following reasons:  
• Private invested capital of the insured is composed of two main parts: 
- A part allocated for collected contributions to meet daily claims, and one for trading 
and investment. It this second part that constitutes the first section of the capital of the 
insured, which is relied upon, because it is always there and known to the company 
only, as there is no indication of its liquidity size in regards to insurance policies. It 
appears in the Basic System of the company, and in the annual accounting reports 
issued by the Company62, and also appears in the annual financial reports that provide 
details of the general investment income and not the invested capital exactly and its 
value63. 
- The allocated portion of contributions or premiums is required to meet daily claims by 
following certain technical guidelines. The allocated portion depends initially on 
estimation and expectation as based on particular information, and real previous 
statistics. Also, this does not necessarily mean that the part mentioned be used in full 
as compensation, it may also have part of that money left from a compensation fund, 
which can then be turned into investment, as is evident in the second section of the 
invested capital, allocated to policyholders. This is also an unknown amount for both 
parties prior to the termination of allocated time for this section, as is necessary to meet 
daily payments throughout this period. However, there is a difference between the 
gross written premium (GWP) which has been collected already from the insured and 
the net written premium (NWP), which is retained by the company itself after paying 
re-insurance and deducting whatever has been collected in the current period and is 
related to dangers faced in the coming year. It has been a custom among insurance 
companies to re-insure part of the policies issued by it, and so retain a portion thereof 
                                                
60 Albahooty. Kashaf Algenaa. almaktabbah alislamiah for publishing edition D.T. (1982).Beruit.v4 p82-84. 
61 Ibid. v4 p498-507. 
62  I tried to find this figure by reviewing the Annual report 2011 of Tawuniya’s  Company, which is the biggest 
insurance company in Saudi, to assure this information and found as it confirmed above.   
63 Aljorf. AS (2009) .The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems.  Supra footnote 16. P 68 
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to be determined based on the financial capacity of the company based on some 
technical aspects. Further, this portion is not fixed but varies from year to year 
depending on certain circumstances.  With this type of ignorance regarding the size of 
capital investment, subscriptions of reinsured policies represents a subtraction of the 
invested capital, and this is not known at the time of contracting with the 
policyholders. Normally it is not known until the end of year64. Thus, this applications 
do not comply with the Mudarabah condition that confirms Capital shall be a certain 
and known amount.   
- In the case of reinsurance ignorance applies in the case of the company’s transaction. 
Some companies accept re-insurance operations policies issued by other companies; 
namely, these companies work as reinsurers and third party insurers. The consequences 
of this process is conversion of the contributions of such policies as accepted for 
reinsurance, minus what is paid for the company's original commissions (the second 
party), management expenses, and reinsurance of the company by a fourth party. Such 
contributions lie within the ownership of the insured (Takaful Fund) without the 
shareholders as soon as the contract is signed and the capital invested; thus, through 
this procedure an unknown sum is expected by the policyholders and the company65. 
Thus, the capital is still not certain and known, and so does not comply with the rule of 
Mudarabah in Islamic Sharia. 
 
• The two contracting parties must stipulate their share of the profit at the time of 
signing the contract, and this profit must be known as any specified percentage in 
advance on the contract, such as 10% for trader (Mudarib), and 90% for capital owner 
(rabullmal) or so on66, but this is not realised here; as article 70 of the Implementing 
Regulations of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law (IRCICCL) 
provided, the Company has the right to obtain 90% of the net surplus67. 
Therefore, there are some observations to be made on this subject:  
 
                                                
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.P70 
66 Albhooty (1982). Kashaf Alqinaa. Supra footnote 60 .v4 P498. 
67 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.(SAMA) available online at: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/InssuranceLib/IIR_4600_C_ReguExecutive_En_2005_08_18_V
1.pdf  
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A. Surplus represents the difference between the total number of premiums and the 
incidences of compensation, less marketing, administrative and operational expenses 
and the cost for necessary technical provisions. Thereby, surplus is not a consequence 
of investment operations, of which the company would have no right to receive a 
portion. On the other hand, the company usually receives administrative expenses to 
cover their efforts. Therefore, some Islamic companies are stipulated to receive a part 
of the surplus due to the good performance of the company; this is as a reward for 
good performance and is linked to good financial and administrative performance in 
equitable proportion. 
 
B. Company’s net surplus shall be determined by adding or subtracting the investment 
return of the policyholder’s invested funds, and subtracting the general expenses 
related to the policyholder’s portion of the investment activities68. Furthermore, based 
on return on investment the company can get a part of this investment in the event of 
being a quality trade partner (Mudarib).  
 
Accordingly, in view of the above, the relationship between the company and the total insured 
may be described as a fee based agency for the management and regulation of insurance with 
the deceit (Gharar) in wage, and thus the fee based agency contract is void. On the other hand, 
what is relevant to the investment of funds, is that the company is a joint trader (mudarib), 
thus each policyholder is an owner of the capital (Rabuallmal). Therefore, it is also an 
absolute trade, but one that is still restricted or temporary in terms of time because the contract 
period is only one year; therefore, I can confirm that according to Islamic rules of Mudarabah 
this fake application is void as well, for two reasons, the first is ignorance in terms of the 
amount of capital and the second is that the company will take a share of the surplus which it 
is not entitled to. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
68 Ibid.Art 70.d. 
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4.5 Legislative qualification of The Council of Cooperative Health 
Insurance (CCHI) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 
 
To achieve the considerable critical legal analysis necessary for The Council of Cooperative 
Health Insurance function, we need to comprehend the tasks and duties as compared with the 
rights and whether these duties and rights comply with the Islamic Sharia rules and the 
constitution of Saudi Arabia. This qualification can be illustrated through the relevant articles 
and the description of the tasks performed by the Council will be received as follows:  
 
1) Article IV.A of the CCHI rules stated: Health Insurance Council established under the 
chairmanship of the Minister of Health and the membership: 
A. A representative at the level of Under Secretary of the Interior Ministry, the Ministry 
of Health, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy, Ministry of Commerce, nominated by their destinations. 
B. A representative of the Council of Chambers of Commerce and Industry nominated by 
the Minister of Commerce, a representative of the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
nominated by the Minister of Finance and National Economy in consultation with the 
Minister of Commerce. 
C. A representative of the private health sector and two representatives from the health 
sectors and other government nominated by the Minister of Health in coordination with 
their respective sectors. These are appointed members of the Council and are to renew 
their membership by decision of the Council of Ministers for a period of three years, 
subject to renewal. 
D. A representative of the private health sector, together with two representatives from the 
health sectors and other government officials nominated by the Minister of Health in 
coordination with their respective sectors.  
Members of the Council are appointed and their membership identified by a decision of the 
Cabinet for a period of three years subject to renewal69.  
2) Article 5 of the same rules stated: The Health Insurance Council overseeing the 
implementation of this system, has to in particular do the following: 
                                                
69 The council of Cooperative Health Insurance Ruls. Article 4 available at: 
http://www.cchi.gov.sa/en/Rules/Pages/default.aspx  
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A. Prepare a draft executive regulation of this system. 
B.  Issue the necessary decisions for regulating changes to the application of the 
provisions of this Regulation, including the identification of stages of the 
application, identifying family members of beneficiaries covered by the warranty 
and discerning how the percentage contribution of the beneficiary and the 
employer affect the value of participation in regards to cooperative health 
insurance, as well as to determine the upper limit of that value based on specialised 
study, include the insurance accounts. 
C.  Rehabilitation of cooperative insurance companies aiming to work in the field of 
cooperative health insurance. 
D.  The adoption of health facilities provides cooperative health insurance services. 
E.  Determine the fees for the rehabilitation of cooperative insurance companies to 
work in this area, and the fees for the adoption of health facilities that provide 
cooperative health insurance services, after ascertaining the opinion of the Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy. 
F. The issuance of Financial Regulations to the Board of health insurance revenues 
and expenditures, including salaries and bonuses, after taking the opinion of the 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy. 
G.  Issuing internal regulations to regulate the functioning of the Council. 
H.  Appointment of the Secretary General of the Council as to the nomination of the 
Minister of Health, and the formation of a secretariat determining its tasks70. 
3)  Article (57) of the Implementing Regulations of the CCHI stated: The Board shall 
control the comprehensive health insurance coverage, and make sure that the parties to 
the relationship of health insurance to the implementation of tasks and responsibilities 
entrusted to them under this Regulation71. 
4) Article (58) of the same Regulation stated: The Council may request any information 
and data from the institution, insurance companies and other parties concerned with 
any matters pertaining to work on health insurance, and the Board in individual cases, 
especially with regard to items of public health insurance request forms and other 
publications used by the health insurance company in correspondence with employers, 
                                                
70 Ibid. 
71 The Implementing Regulations of the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance. Art.57 available at: 
http://www.cchi.gov.sa/en/Rules/OList/Pages/Chapter7.aspx  
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beneficiaries and service providers as well as any contracts signed based on the 
management’s company health insurance claims72. 
5) Article (36) regarding the supervision fee was based on the statement: The fees for the 
Cooperative Health Insurance Council are intended to oversee the implementation of 
the cooperative health insurance system at one percent of the premiums for health 
insurance from insurance companies, as qualified by the audited financial statements 
for the previous year. This is so as to be considered in relation to the appropriate figure 
and the possibility of reduction after three years since the application in coordination 
with the Foundation.73 
6) Article (38) of the same Regulation describes the financial resources of the Council  
which state that the Council is funded through the following: 
A. The fees for qualifying and annual renewal of insurance companies. 
B. The fees for qualifying and annual renewal of the management companies and 
health insurance claims 
C. The fees for the adoption of annual government health service providers and 
non-governmental organizations. 
D. The fees for the Cooperative Health Insurance Council to use to oversee the 
implementation of a cooperative health insurance system with  one percent of 
the premiums for health insurance; insurance companies are qualified 
according to the audited financial statements for the previous year. 
E. Other financial fines are owed to the Council as well as required by the 
Commission for violations of the provisions of the cooperative health insurance 
specified in Article (101) of these Regulations. 
F. Donations, gifts and investment returns. 
G. The amount of money collected from other sources such as the publication of 
magazines, brochures, business consulting or training that may be carried out 
by the Council74. 
7) Article 46  relevant to the fees of the rehabilitation of insurance company, which is 
different from supervision fees, states that: 
                                                
72 Ibid. Art 58 
73 Ibid, a  
74 Ibid. 
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A. The Board shall receive a corresponding financial support for the rehabilitation of 
insurance companies, amounting to one hundred and fifty thousand Saudi Riyals only. 
B.  The Board shall receive a counter for the renewal of financial rehabilitation of the 
cooperative health insurance companies amounting to fifty thousand Saudi Riyals for 
each year required after the expiry of the first three years of rehabilitation75. 
8) However, Article 10 Rules for Collection of Financial Consideration against 
Supervision of Implementation of the Health Insurance Regulation stated. In the case 
that an insurance company makes delayed payment of the financial consideration, a 
delay penalty equivalent to (5%) shall be levied against  the claim amount for each 
month or a part thereof…… and no objection by the company (if any) shall prevent 
payment of the delay penalties relevant to the Council’s entitlement from the company, 
provided the Council shall issue a subsequent claim to the original one including the 
total amount of the delay penalties due76.  
Based upon the above, it is evident that the Board of the Council of Cooperative Health 
Insurance CCHI is not a party to the insurance contract, so it is a governmental supervisory 
body. Therefore, there is no relationship between councils and policyholders; these are paid in 
return for supervising insurance companies and the application of the Council of Cooperative 
Health Insurance rules regarding its Implementing Regulations, which represents 1% of total 
premiums. There are interesting observations on this subject as follows: 
a. It has been recognised that premiums or participants in a cooperative insurance concept 
belong to policyholders, not the insurance company; nor are they the property of state, and 
therefore, the Council has no right to cut 1% off the premium, unless it is prescribed in the 
rules that the Council is the agent for those policyholders in control of insurance 
companies and therein, which will be considered as an agent fee. It also has no right to this 
rate if the Council acts as an agent for insurance companies as well, because it should take 
this percentage from shareholders. Thus, it must be explicit in law what exactly the 
Council's relationship with both parties is in reference to holding health insurance.  
b. The Board will receive money from insurance companies in fines, as much as 5% of the 
claim following any delay by an insurance company in the payment of their supervision 
                                                
75 Ibid. 
76 Rules for Collection of Financial Consideration against Supervision of Implementation of the Health 
Insurance Regulation.Art. 10 available at http://www.cchi.gov.sa/Rules/Pages/list3.aspx   
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fee dues to the Board. This means that the Board is a creditor to the company in this 
claim. Thus, the fine is a usury Riba, which is religiously prohibited, this requires that an 
amount be increased by Riba, and this is evidence that there is a relationship between the 
Board and the insurance companies. The nature of the relationship is unclear, and whether 
the company is a party on its own behalf, or on behalf of policyholders or both is also 
unclear77. 
 
4.6 Surplus and its distribution: 
 
According to the implementing regulations of Saudi cooperative insurance, there are two types 
of surplus, one of these is available for distribution, and the other is not to be distributed. We 
may clarify these two types as follows:  
5.1 The Total Surplus:  
This is as stated in Article 70 of the Implementing Regulations for Law On Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies: (premiums) - (compensation + marketing expenses, 
administrative, operational and technical provisions necessary)78. It is not available for 
distribution, and this kind of surplus is not the result of efforts exerted by the company in the 
investment of the contributions.  
Net surplus: 
It has been to determine the net surplus as stated in the same article: 
• Total surplus + (the return on investment of insured - the policyholder’s portion of the 
investment expenses activities).  
Or: 
•  (total surplus) - (loss of investment operations + share of the expenses of 
policyholders realized by investment)79.  
This kind of surplus is available for distribution and is distributed as follows:  
                                                
77  Aljorf.AS (2009). The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems.  Supra footnote 16. P 75 
78The Implementing Regulations. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.(SAMA). Art. 70 supra footnote 10. 
79 Ibid.  
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A.  The insured party gets a percentage of 10% ten percent cash or a reduction in their 
premiums for the following year.  
B.  Shareholders get 90% ninety percent of the surplus, where this ratio is transferred to 
the statement of shareholders’ equity.  
 
In my opinion based on my research, there are some important observations regarding the 
distribution of surplus; these are as follows:  
a. The right to surplus applies to the policyholders because it is their own money and has 
been collected from their premiums. 
b. In case the shareholders and the Cooperative Health Insurance Council take something not 
allocated to them, and deprive policyholders of their rights; insurance companies get a part 
of the total surplus, which is one of the components of net surplus, which is not an income 
achieved by the company, and that is exactly the case for the Council of Cooperative 
Health Insurance.  
c. In case the shareholders and the Cooperative Health Insurance Council get a quota of the 
surplus in all cases, this in the form of positive or a negative investment returns i.e. in 
cases of loss. This has been cleared by the definition of net surplus (Company’s net surplus 
shall be determined by adding or subtracting the investment return of the policyholder’s 
invested funds, and subtracting the general expenses related to the policyholder’s portion 
of the investment activities). It is considerably well known that the trader Mudarib in 
Sharia, loses as a result of his work investigating the loss. This is arguably an aspect of the 
company's relationship with policyholders regarding the investment of contributions, in a 
trading Mudarabah relationship; let alone with the absolute absence of such a relationship 
between the policyholders and the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance80.  
 
 
 
                                                
80 Aljorf.AS (2009) .The Evaluation of Saudi Insurance Systems.  Supra footnote 16. P 77 
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4.7 Investment of Insurance Funds 
 
The Implementing Regulations of Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
has defined certain sorts type of investment funds, and percentages invested in each rate, as 
explained by some of the things related to investment as follows:  
6.1 Article 60 of the Regulation confirmed that: The company should follow a written 
investment policy to be approved by the Board of Directors for asset allocation, taking into 
consideration all the risks faced by the company and the environment that it operates 
under, and the fact that the company should perform analysis on a regular basis, and also 
study the risks surrounding the company and the regions in which it does its business, as 
the company must take appropriate actions to manage such risks, and to maintain a 
minimum risk analysis as follows: market risk and credit risk, interest rate risk (the 
existence of an important role for the interest rate), and the risk of currency exchange rates 
(because the number of investment rates is linked with certain external markets ), liquidity 
risks, operational risks, regulatory legal risks, re-insurance risks, as well as technical 
risks81. 
 
6.2  Furthermore, Article 61 of the same Regulation stated that : 
 
a. The Company shall, when formulating its investment policy, take into consideration 
whether the maturity of its invested assets is in concurrence with its liabilities 
according to the policies issued. The Company shall provide the Agency with an 
investment policy that is inclusive of assets distribution. If such an investment policy 
was not approved of by the Agency, the Company would adhere to the investment 
standards in Table (1), provided that investments outside the Kingdom shall not exceed 
20% of the total investment, in accordance with Article 59 (2). 
b. The Company shall take into consideration investment concentration risks. 
Concentration in an investment instrument shall not exceed 50% as one investment 
instrument is mentioned in table (1)82. 
  
                                                
81 The Implementing Regulations. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.(SAMA). Art.60. supra footnote 10. 
82 Ibid. Art.61. 
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Investment Type 
Percentage for 
General Insurance 
Percentage for 
Protection and Savings 
Insurance 
1. Saudi authorised banks 20% minimum 10% maximum 
2. Saudi Government bonds 20% minimum 10% maximum 
3. Saudi Riyals denominated 
investment funds 
10% minimum 15% maximum 
4. Foreign currency 
denominated investment funds 
10% minimum 10% maximum 
5. Foreign government’s bonds 
(Zone A). 
5% minimum 5% maximum 
6. Bonds issued by domestic 
companies. 
5% minimum 5% maximum 
7. Bonds issued by foreign 
companies.  
5% minimum 5% maximum 
8. Equities. 15% minimum 15% maximum 
9. Real estate in Saudi Arabia. 0% 5% maximum 
10. Loans secured by real estate 
mortgages. 
0% 5% maximum 
11. Loans secured by policies 
issued by the insurer. 
0% 5% maximum 
12. Other investments.  15% minimum 15% maximum 
Table 4.1 The Implementing Regulations, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency83 
 
Looking to the table however, it can be shown clearly that items number 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 
represent riba-based investment activities, because this generates a return with certain 
interest. Such items in general constitutes a maximum of 55% of the total investments in 
general insurance, and the first and second items represent at least 20% of the investment in 
insurance funds relate to so-called insurance protection and savings. Also, Items numbered 5, 
6 and 7 constitutes 15% of the total investment of the same type of insurance as a maximum.  
                                                
83   Table 1. The Implementing Regulations. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.(SAMA). Supra footnote 10. 
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However, I would like to have an example which is the NCCI insurance company, as stated in 
the annual report for 2010 in explanatory notes related to the Financial Statements report as 
follows: (Investment Income: The income on the investment is calculated on the basis of 
actual revenues after taking into account the original net amount and the commission rate. 
Investment income for insurance operations is primarily realised in the form of the 
bonds/treasury bills issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency SAMA, domestic and 
foreign investment funds as well as investments in stock market84).  
 
In other words, an important aspect of investments and insurance funds has already been 
realised in the riba-based asset, which generates revenue bonds and treasury bills issued by 
SAMA.  
 
There is no explanation of the situation regarding foreign funds, investment funds in stocks or 
in bonds, or both, and nor is there an explanation related to invested equity. This would be 
needed to clarify when a company’s shares are engaged in permissible activity, and when its 
shares are engaged in prohibited activities.  
 
Also interesting is that rates of illicit investments contained in the table for the general 
insurance are more than half.  
  
                                                
84 NCCI. The annual report for 2010. Supra footnote 38. p72 
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4.8 Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter to evaluate The Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies and implementing regulations, also the rules of the Council of Cooperative Health 
Insurance regarding Implementing Regulations from the perspective of Islamic Sharia Law. 
Furthermore, this chapter covered;  
• Insurance system and its consistency with the ruling regime in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.  
• Characteristics of insurance policy in the Saudi regime.  
• Legislative qualifications of the insurance company in collecting and investing 
contributions as well as payment of compensations. 
• Legislative qualification of The Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI) in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
• Surplus and its distribution. 
• Investment of insurance funds. 
 
However, the importance of this analysis is that Saudi Arabia confirms Islamic Sharia is the 
constitution of the Kingdom85, so that logically all the rules applied, particularly in the case of 
Insurance law must comply with Islamic Sharia teaching, and the importance of the 
geographic and political position of Saudi Arabia. The presence of the two holy mosques 
increase Saudi Arabia’s commitment to applying Islamic Sharia rules, as it is an example of 
applying Islamic Sharia among Muslim countries which have a majority of Muslims and are 
not applying Sharia rules in their constitutions.  
 
I have criticised the Saudi insurance system from the perspective of Islamic Sharia Law from 
multiple perspectives and found the following 
1. There is a mistake in the Legal constitution. Art. 1 in The Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies stipulates that “Insurance in the Kingdom shall be 
undertaken through registered insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner 
as it is provided within the article establishment of the National Company for 
                                                
85 The Basic Law of Governance, Part one General Principles, Art.1.supra footnote 4. 
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Cooperative Insurance....”86. However, this is a clear mistake in constitutional 
drafting. Many people interested in insurance are in a state of contradiction, about how 
the statute of the company is agreed upon by many researchers that are exercising an 
insurance business forbidden in some applications and provided by the system as an 
example that should be traced. Furthermore, the article added that: "in accordance with 
the principles of Islamic Shari’a "; such an addition is definitely in line with the regime 
in the country and is based upon the fact that the legislature, when drafting such a 
system has been aware that the National Company for Cooperative Insurance is to be 
criticised as far as Sharia scholars in the Kingdom are concerned. 
2. The concept of insurance in Saudi Arabia is similar with the conventional insurance 
from the logic and the application.  
3. The Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and The Rules of the 
Council of Cooperative Health Insurance and their implementing regulations do not 
reflect what is supposed to be in insurance in an Islamic concept based on donation; 
but they reflect the concept of conventional insurance based on a clear Financial 
reimbursement contract (Muawadah). 
4. All contracts between companies and insured persons are financial reimbursement 
contract and include a Gharar which makes this kind of contract is void.  
5. The relationship between the company and the total insured may be qualified as a fee 
based agency for the management and regulation of insurance with the deceit (Gharar) 
in the wage, and thus the fee based agency contract is void. On the other hand, what is 
relevant to the investment of funds, the company is a joint trader (mudarib), so that 
each policyholder is an owner of the capital (Rabuallmal), whereas it is also an 
absolute trading point. It is still restricted in terms of time because the contract period 
is only one year, therefore, I can confirm that according to Islamic rules of Mudarabah 
this invented application is void as well, for two reasons, the first is ignorance in the 
amount of capital and the second is that the company would take a share of the surplus, 
which it is not entitled to take.  
6. The distribution of the surplus does not reflect what should be an Islamic insurance 
concept. The shareholders and the Cooperative Health Insurance Council has a right 
which is not allowed to them, and involves depriving policyholders of their rights, as 
                                                
86 Supra. Foot note 6.  
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insurance companies get a part of the surplus, which is not an income achieved by the 
company, and that is exactly the case for the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance. 
7. The existence of investment funds are not following Islamic Sharia rules as this makes 
the treatment with companies forbidden. An Islamic finance company must follow 
Islamic rules and all transactions to be considered as permissible Halal financial 
products even in terms of assets and investment87. However, Article 61 of the 
Implementing Regulations confirms the allowance of all companies to invest in items 
representing riba-based investment activities, such as Foreign and Government Bonds, 
Saudi Riyals Denominated Investment Funds and Foreign Currency etc... 
8. The legitimacy of cooperative insurance in Islamic thought does not necessarily mean 
the legitimacy of the applications of the Insurance companies. 
9. The existence of an Islamic Sharia committee at insurance companies does not mean 
the legitimacy of the contracts or the financial treatments and transactions made by 
these companies.   
Therefore, I do believe that the Saudi governor should set an independent central Sharia 
board88 and gives all the required authorization for observation and redrafting of all articles 
being criticised in this thesis and by researchers and Islamic scholars.    
Whereas, this chapter presented a critical analysis of Saudi Arabian insurance Law according 
to Islamic Sharia, the next chapter will be about the application of cooperative insurance in 
Saudi involving two cases study: 
1. The National Company for Cooperative Insurance NCCI, which is the biggest one in 
Saudi insurance market. 
2. Alrajhi Takaful Company. 
 
 
                                                
87 For, example trading in wine in Islamic Sharia is forbidden, thus, all wine company’s shares are forbidden and 
not permissible for trading.    
88 I have mentioned this in my recommendations in the last chapter. 
CHAPTER 5: APPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIC INSURANCE IN THE KINGDOM 
OF SAUDI ARABIA (USING NATIONAL COMPANY FOR COOPERATIVE 
INSURANCE (TAWUNIYA) AND AL RAJHI COMPANY FOR COOPERATIVE 
INSURANCE (AL RAJHI TAKAFUL) AS CASE STUDIES). 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has witnessed a significant growth in population, with the 
number of inhabitants reaching 27,136,977 people, according to the preliminary results of the 
population census for the year 2010, compared to the 23.7 million inhabitants at the end of 
2006.1 This growth is accompanied by an increase in the demand for insurance services in 
general, and individual insurance services in particular, including both health and vehicle 
insurance. This will motivate insurance companies to not only expand, but to also increase 
their demands for reinsurance.  
 
The Saudi insurance sector has thirty-two insurance companies trading in the stock market.2 
Among the most prominent is the Saudi National Company for Cooperative Insurance 
(Tawuniya), which highlights its importance as the largest and oldest company in the Saudi 
insurance industry. The Cooperative Insurance Companies Control System has been drafted 
based upon the statutes of the company.3 Al-Rajhi Cooperative Insurance (Al-Rajhi Takaful) 
is an important company, its strength lying in the Al-Rajhi financial institutions in Islamic 
finance, and is accompanied by the desire of shareholders to provide insurance products in line 
with Islamic laws. Certain applications of both companies for the concept of Islamic 
cooperative insurance, in terms of model and existing regulations in the company, as well as 
financial policies in place and the role of the Sharia Board, will be explored in the evaluation 
of this work, without infringement to the Islamic Sharia.  
 
                                                
1 General Statistics & Information Authority, Ministry of Economy & Planning. Available online:  
http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/  
2 Tadawel, available online: http://www.tadawul.com.sa   
3 The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, Art. 1, 2004, 
SAMA. Available online: http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/Pages/LawsandRegulations.aspx 
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5.2 The National Company for Cooperative Insurance (NCCI) (Tawuniya) 
The National Company for Cooperative Insurance (NCCI) is a Saudi joint-stock company, 
founded in 1985 in accordance with Article 3 of the statute of the company: ‘the purpose of its 
establishment is to engage in practicing cooperative insurance and everything related to such 
actions inclusive of agencies, re-insurance and other works such that all is in accordance with 
Islamic Sharia.’4 The company is prepared to undertake any steps necessary in order to 
achieve its purpose, provided that they are in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law. 
The company started with a capital of 500 million riyals; the current capital is amounts to SR 
750 million in the year 2011. It is considered to be the parent company in the world of Saudi 
insurance, the largest of the insurance companies operating to have obtained a classification 
‘A’ from Standards and Boards (S & P).5 
In 2007, the company established the Sharia Board, as it has convened as much as sixty 
meetings since its foundation up to 2011, during which time it reviewed many collaborative 
documents and passed thirty-one new insurance products. 6 
 
5.2.1 APPLICABLE MODEL 
 
The company applies the cooperative insurance model, as it provides the policy of Medical 
Malpractice Insurance and Public Liability: ‘the cooperative company in its capacity as 
director on behalf of the policyholders (the insured), to run the insurance operations as well as 
resulting rights and responsibilities in virtue of the statute of the company working on the 
principle of cooperative insurance. For this purpose, the company manages two separate 
accounts, namely the shareholders’ account and the Insurance Operations Account.’7 The 
company determines the net surplus of the policyholders’ account at the end of each financial 
year, after deducting the company’s fees and expenses in return for its management of the two 
insurance and investment operations. All or part of any net annual surplus resulting from 
                                                
4 The Statute of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance. Art. 3. Edition 2011.  
5 The Annual Report for NCCI, 2010. PP14- 15  
6The Regulation of Sharia Board of The National Company of Cooperative Insurance, 2007. Unpublished 
documents p. 1. 
7 NCCI. Medical Malpractice Insurance and Public Liability insurance policy available online : 
http://www.tawuniya.com.sa/Home/IndividualsInsurance/PropertyAndCasualty/MedicalMalpracticeInsuranceInd
ividual/tabid/450/Default.aspx. 
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insurance operations is distributed among the policyholders.8 Therefore, the company creates 
two separate accounts: shareholders’ account and insurance operations account. 
 
Each account is charged with all relevant expenses and revenues. The company undertakes 
management in return for the fees, which are interpreted as general, administrative, sale, and 
marketing expenses. This is set under the costs and expenses in the insurance operations 
account; it is non-specific, but depends on the needs of the company’s management of the 
operations account.9 
 
As for investment in this model, the relationship between the company and the policyholders 
can be accommodated as a company of both shares and speculation at the same time. This is 
with respect to the investment of contributions accumulated by the company, which is 
religiously permissible, as both contracts are allowed separately and may therefore be 
combined into one contract. Albahooty (1051H) defined the Anan company as having two 
types,10 ‘involving two or more funds, to be staffed by one provided that its profit is more’; 
‘The company, which applied this contract has two conditions: the first is Anan when 
considering that the money is paid by both parties; and the second is (Mudarabah) trading off 
whereby that work is from one party plus a profit on its money, as the work of one of the 
wealth of others, and part of profit’.11 In other words, the money is provided by the company 
(the shareholders) and the policyholders, with the work being carried out by the company, i.e. 
the work is performed by shareholders for the benefit of all parties, in return for a certain 
percentage of profit, to be taken out of the profits of the insured after the distribution of profit 
on a certain initial amount. 
 
                     
                                                
8 Ibid.  
9 Supra footnote 5 and 7. 
10 In this regard, type one as an important addition, and there is no need to mention type two. 
11 Albahooty. M (H1051). Kashaf Alqinaa. Kitab- u-alshirkah, Dar Alaam Alkutub 1997 Lebanon, vol. 3, pp. 
497.  
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Figure 5.1: NCCI Model 
 
5.2.2 DEFINITIONS 
 
In its application of this model, the company adopts all definitions contained in the 
Implementing Regulations of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law in Saudi 
Arabia:12 
 
• Company: A public joint-stock company, conducting insurance and/or reinsurance 
activities. 
• Insurance: Mechanism of contractually shifting the burdens of pure risks by pooling 
them. 
• Reinsurance: Transfer of the insured’s risk from the insurer to the reinsurer, and to 
indemnify the insurer by the reinsurer for any payments made to the insured against 
damages or loss. 
• Insurer: An insurance company that accepts insurance contracts directly from the 
insured. 
• Insured: A person or juristic entity, who has entered into an insurance contract. 
                                                
12The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies. Supra 
footnote 3, p. 1. 
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• Insurance Policy: Legal document/contract issued to the insured by the insurer, setting 
out the terms of the contract to indemnify the insured for loss and damages, as covered 
by the policy against a premium paid by the insured. 
• Contribution (Premium): Amount offered by the insured to the insurer in exchange 
for the insurer’s acceptance to indemnify the insured for loss/ or damages resulting 
directly from a covered risk.  
• Beneficiary: A person or juristic entity to whom the benefit(s) is assigned as a result 
of a covered loss, under the terms of the insurance policy.  
 
In view of the above definitions, and emphasising the words of reimbursement (Muawadah) 
therein, it is found that the contractual relationship between the policyholders and the 
company is a financial reimbursement relationship, as it does not appear in the texts of the 
company systems or its insurance policies or definitions. This denotes any reference to 
donation, meaning that the contractual relationship is based on the principle of indemnified 
security that commercial insurance is forbidden in Islamic Sharia. According to El-Qara 
Daghi,13 the passing of cooperative insurance is required to be in line with Islamic Sharia in 
the following ways: 
 
1. The principle of donation, as the policyholders donate their premiums and returns in 
cooperation for the benefit of the cooperative insurance account. This is expressed in 
the cooperative company as the insurance operations account.  
2. The formation of Islamic Sharia Board for fatwa and supervision, and all decisions to 
be binding under the management.  
3. The company should act as an agent in the management of Islamic insurance business.  
4. The company should establish a separate account for the money of the policyholders, 
as well as their returns.  
5. The surplus of insurance belongs to the insurance policyholders.  
6. As the company invests in the insurance funds account on the basis of trading 
(Mudarabah), there must be a provision in the contract of insurance to state the 
required percentage of profit realised for both parties.  
                                                
13  El Qora Daghi.A (2006). Islamic Insurance. Dar Albashaer Alislamiah. Burit, Lebanon., p. 172–73. 
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7. The company treaty is not obliged to any compensation in the case of deficit in the 
insurance operations account, and its money is not in opposition to the insurance 
liabilities. 
8. The company should, through its own account, bear its own expenses and not add to 
the insurance operations account; profits on its money should also be paid back into it.  
 
It is thus clear that the company in the applied model is not compliant with the teachings of 
Islamic Sharia, through a number of issues that will be explored in more detail. 
 
5.2.3 INSURANCE ACCOUNT, OR INSURANCE PORTFOLIO 
 
The insurance account, or portfolio, has been defined in the Implementing Regulation of the 
Cooperative Insurance Companies Control as a reciprocal exchange, which equates to an 
unincorporated association in which each insured insures the others within the association. 
Each participant in this pool is both an insurer and an insured. An attorney administers the 
exchange, including paying losses, investing premium, recruiting new members, underwriting 
new and renewal business, receiving premium, and exchanging reinsurance.14 The company 
has provided in Article 43, first/1, that ‘An account is allocated for contributions from the 
insured to the company in return for their insurance for risks specified in insurance policies 
issued by the company on their behalf’, and, in second/2, that ‘An account is allocated for 
compensations from the company to the insured in the event of risks covered by it’.15 It 
should be noted that the system does not make any reference to the intention to donate a 
payment, or whether this account is or is not a legally independent entity within the company. 
 
5.2.4 COMPANY’S COMMITMENT TOWARDS OPERATIONS ACCOUNT, OR INSURANCE 
PORTFOLIO  
 
                                                
14SAMA . Implementing Regulation (2005),supra footnote 3. p. 2. 
15 The Statute of NCCI, Article 43, supra footnote 4, p. 14. 
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The company manages the business and undertakes to provide funding for the insurance 
portfolio (insurance operations account) when needed; the company therefore believes that it 
deserves its share of the surplus for its management, in addition to ensuring payment. 
Furthermore, its role in this instance is to act as a guarantor when there is a deficit in the 
operations account, but not to be a lender. However, on 20/01/2004, the company amended its 
memorandum of association to grant authority to the Board of Directors to determine the 
method by which surplus of insurance operations is deposited.16 The company statute has 
granted such permission to the Board of Directors, as stipulated in Article 43, first/5.17 
 
A question arises here: Is it permissible to take a charge in return of warranty? Is this 
commitment in accordance with Islamic Sharia?  
 
According to Al-Khathlan (2011), receiving a commission against the issuance of the letter of 
guarantee, i.e. the insurance policy, is not permissible, as taking a charge in return for 
guarantee is forbidden in Islamic Sharia. The concept of a guarantee is that it is a contract of 
charity and leniency, which is subsequently not allowed to receive compensation against 
security. As mentioned above, this is not acceptable because no return may be taken and there 
is no compensation for it. This has been adopted as per the four Islamic Fiqh Schools, i.e. 
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'I, and Hanbali.18 The Council of International Islamic Fiqh Academy of 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference explained the following in in its second session during 
the conference in Jeddah, 22–28/12/1985: ‘Second: The guarantee is a donation intended to 
give charity, and scholars decided that it is not permissible to take a compensation on bail, 
because in the case the guarantor gives an amount of security similar to the loan with interest 
to the lender, that is legally forbidden as it is some sort of usury (Riba)’. It also decided the 
following:  
 
                                                
16 The Annual report of NCCI, 2010, note no. 1, general, p. 68. 
17 The Statute of NCCI, Article 43, supra footnote 4, p. 14. 
18  Al-Khathlan. S. (2011). The FIqh of Contemporary Financial Transactions, Mosque of Sheikh El Islam Ibn 
Tayemia, Riyadh. http://www.taimiah.org/index.aspx?function=item&id=932&node=2448 
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First: The letter of guarantee issuer should not take a certain payment in return for the 
warranty, usually taking into account the amount and duration of warranty, whether with or 
without a coverage.  
 
Second: Administrative expenses for the issuance of the letter of guarantee of its both types 
are permissible religiously, taking into account not to increase the same pay and, in case of 
cover whether whole or in part, it may be taken into account in estimating the expenses for 
issuing the letter of guarantee what it may be required to perform the actual task for such 
cover.’19 
 
5.2.5 COMMITMENT TO THE APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAW 
 
The company confirms its commitment to the provisions of Islamic Sharia in all its works and 
activities, in accordance with Article 3 of the company statute.20 This is carried out under the 
supervision of a Sharia Board, established on 25/2/2007, and composed of selected specialists 
in Sharia law and jurisprudence of transactions, who have an interest in insurance business and 
investment. The Board of Directors is appointed, as well as its members, in order to adopt the 
regulations. The Sharia Board attempts to set out the steps that need to be taken by the 
company, as a means of achieving its commitment to a legitimate approach to their 
transactions; the decisions are binding to the company.21  
 
5.2.6 POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE SHARIA BOARD (TAWUNIYA) 
 
Article 5 of the regulation of the Sharia Board emphasises the powers of the body,22 as it 
states:  
                                                
19 Resolution of Islamic Fiqh Organisation, no. 12 (12/2), regarding letter of guarantee, 1985. 
http://www.shareah.com/index.php?records/view/action/view/id/4038  
20 The Statute of NCCI, Article 3–2, supra footnote 4, p. 2. 
21 The Regulation of Sharia Board of NCCI, 2007. Unpublished documents. Article 2/A, supra footnote 6, p. 1. 
22 The Regulation of Sharia Board of NCCI (2007), supra footnote 6. 
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A. ‘All financial transactions relating to the company’s insurance operations and 
investment in favor of policyholders are subject to account the approval and control of 
Sharia Board, as the decisions of the body should be binding to the company.’ 
B.  It performs the following tasks:  
1- Give the final credit of Sharia-based auditing of the company’s system and 
regulations relating to its internal processes, as regards both insurance 
operations and investment in favor of policyholders. 
2-  Provide a statement of Sharia ruling in all transactions of the company 
insurance operations and investment related to the policyholders’ account and 
subsequent contracts, agreements, forms, procedures manuals, etc., and also 
disclose the required notes on, and ways to, solve and overcome any problems 
in making proper Sharia decisions in this regard. 
3- Provide a statement of Sharia ruling on what is offered to the board, with 
reference to formulas and new products related to the insurance operations or 
investment of the policyholders’ account, and to issue decisions and Fatwas 
accordingly.  
4- Verification of the company’s commitment, in all its dealings on the processes 
of insurance and investment of policyholders’ account, being in line with 
decisions and Fatwas of the board, and, making sure of correct implementation, 
the board may assign one of its members, or one of the Sharia controllers, to 
conduct periodic visits for the purpose monitoring or assigning a specific 
control task.  
5- Providing advice and guidance in referrals by the company to the board, 
including all legitimate queries.  
6- Receiving comments and statements regarding the Sharia aspects of all 
transactions of the company, internally or externally, and responding to them as 
such. 
7- Assigning one or more observers of Sharia to perform any duties assigned to 
him by the board, including audit and control tasks. The board is entitled to 
assign one such controller in attending its meetings, but he shall not have the 
right to vote. The board may choose a third party to carry out Sharia 
observation, to be contracted by the company’s management.  
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8- Taking decisions on Sharia performance reports, which are sent to the board 
from auditing and regulation institutions that are mandated to do so.  
9- Prepare reports at the end of each financial year, including a summary of the 
decisions and opinions issued about the company transactions. and disclosing 
the company’s commitment during the year, including the contents according 
to the decisions of the scope of work and observations that may be given in this 
regard.  
10- Issuing a leaflet of advisory opinions of the Sharia Board and its research. 
 
It should be noted that the Sharia Board has broad powers, in order to maintain the 
commitment of the company to all Sharia controls in its work and decision-making, which are 
binding to the company, but it is still subject to the authority of the Board of Directors 
administratively, as Article 2/B of the Regulation of the Sharia Board provides for ‘The 
constitution of the Sharia Board and choosing of members is by the Board of Directors and the 
Sharia Board shall be independent in its field of specialization for all departments of the 
company’.23 
On the other hand, the disadvantages of this situation for the Sharia Board members will 
reduce their scope for independence, and therefore all members should be nominated by 
policyholders as a means of ensuring that all decisions are Sharia-dependent.  
 
5.2.7 SURPLUS 
 
The company follows the Implementing Regulations of the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control System on the equivalence of the surplus, as per article 70/2/ C, D, and E, as the 
company should take into consideration the following when preparing a list of insurance 
operations: 
 
                                                
23Ibid. 
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C) At the end of each year, the total surplus representing the difference between (a) and 
(b), less any marketing and administrative expenses, necessary technical provisions, and other 
general expenses related to the operation of insurance, shall be specified. 
D) The company’s net surplus shall be determined by adding or subtracting the investment 
return of the policyholder’s invested funds, and subtracting the general expenses relating to the 
policyholder’s portion of the investment activity. 
E) 10% of the net surplus shall be distributed to the policyholders directly, or in the form 
of a reduction in premiums for the following year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus shall 
be transferred to the shareholders’ income statement.24 
 
As such, it is emphasised in Article 43/5/A of the Statute of the Company that shareholders 
deserve their share of surplus, as a result of exposing them to their right of insurance against 
risk, which has been defined under the Insurance Companies Control Article (70/2/e), with 
90% going to shareholders and 10% to policyholders. Thus, the company follows the system 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which is specifically contrary to Islamic 
Sharia law, as the insurance portfolio belongs to the policyholders, confirmed by a number of 
scholars of Sharia law, and should not be taken from them unless with their consent.  
 
A question arises here, as to whether the deducted 90% of the surplus that the company 
claims in return for exposing the shareholders’ equity to insurance risks, is a fair value for 
policyholders? 
 
When considering the company’s financial policies, a safe back-up policy has been found to 
be necessary, based on several types of reserves, such as: 
 
1. Capital reserve: as much as 500 million riyals. 
                                                
24 SAMA. Implementing Regulation, 2005, supra footnote 3, p. 23. 
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2. Statutory reserve of the company: in accordance with Article 44/2 of the Statute of the 
Company, 20% of the net value of the profit is withheld as a regular reserve; such 
withholding should be canceled if the total has reached 100% of total paid capital.25 
3. Technical reserves: to be deducted from the insurance operations account, according to 
the balance sheet in 2010 and under the Liabilities and Surplus of Insurance 
Operations,26 which includes:  
I. Reserve Takaful operations. 
II. Reserve discontinuing operations.  
III. Claims under settlement. 
IV. Unearned insurance commissions. 
 
In the case of a deficit in the accounts of insurance (insurance portfolio), the company shall 
withdraw technical reserves first if the coverage is accomplished, otherwise the Statutory 
Reserve and Capital shall be transferred in accordance with this arrangement.  
 
Accordingly, in reference to the balance sheet, it is found that, in 2010, the reserve account 
insurance operations reached more than 3 billion 9 hundred million (3900,000,000) SAR, 
while the total capital reserve and statutory reserve reached one billion. This means that 
reserves of insurance operations belonging to the policyholders reached more than the capital 
reserve and statutory reserve combined, which both belong to shareholders approximately four 
times over. Does it seem reasonable to deduct 90% of the surplus for the possibility of their 
equity being at risk, which is covered by Insurance Operations Account of more than four 
times of the total capital reserve and statutory reserve? 
 
This shows clearly that the ratio is exaggerated and unfair to the policyholders, taking money 
out against a possibility. Thus, it is a deceit, which is forbidden in Islamic Sharia. However, 
fixing such a high percentage, as much as 90%, confirms that the objective is to capture the 
surplus, as it is essentially from the perspective of the insurance industry, due to the 
                                                
25 The Statute of NCCI, article 43, supra footnote 4, p. 16. 
26 The Annual Report of NCCI, 2010, supra footnote 17, P. 57.  
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commercial nature of the insurance company. Therefore, the end result of this legislation is to 
make insurance more profitable for shareholders, thereby strengthening the insurance market, 
regardless of the rights of policyholders and Sharia law.  
 
5.2.8 INVESTMENT 
Article 7 of the Statute of the Company states that ‘The Company invests in money 
accumulated from the insured and shareholders in the company in accordance with the rules 
established by the Board of Directors’.27 
Therefore, the company’s 2010 annual report on investment is divided into two parts:28 
 
1. The insurance operations account invested in:  
a. Mutual funds or shares (domestic and external). 
b. Companies in which it owns shares, namely:  
i. The Cooperative Company for Real Estate Investment.  
ii. Nagm for Insurance Services.  
2. The shareholders’ account invested in:  
a. Mutual funds or shares (domestic and external). 
b. Companies in which it owns shares, namely:  
i. United Insurance Company.  
ii. Waseel Company for providing application services.  
 
Whereas Article 3 of the Statute of the Company explains that ‘the company has the right to 
carry out its purposes whether in the field of insurance or investing its funds, provided that it is 
in accordance with the provisions of Islamic Sharia, so the company can move the immovable 
or cash funds and sell, exchange or lease them, directly or through companies to be 
established, bought by it or jointly with third parties.’ The company may have an interest in, or 
shares with, bodies engaged in activities similar to its own, cooperating with the company in 
order to achieve its purpose, or to incorporate or buy them as the company carries out the acts 
                                                
27 The Statute of NCCI, Article 43, supra footnote 4, p. 3. 
28 The Annual Report of NCCI, 2010, supra footnote 17, p. 79–82.  
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mentioned in the article, both within or outside the Kingdom, and in accordance with the 
provisions of Islamic Sharia.29 The company is found to be investing in funds, stocks, and 
bonds, domestic and foreign affairs. As a number of Sharia scholars denied the bond, because 
it is seen as some form of usury, the company may have violated some of its investments 
through this article of the Statue of the Company; furthermore, the company contravened the 
Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law, Article 1, which stipulates the application of 
cooperative insurance in a manner not contradictory to Islamic Sharia.30 
 
5.2.9 OVERALL OPINION ON THE APPLICATIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE COMPANY FOR 
ISLAMIC COOPERATIVE INSURANCE, AND ITS COMPLIANCE WITH ISLAMIC SHARIA 
 
The NCCI confirms that it has applied the concept of cooperative insurance and that, so as to 
achieve this, it had to separate the shareholders’ account from the policyholders’ account 
(insurance operations account), but the contractual relationship in the company’s model was 
not clear on several aspects:  
 
• Realisation of Paid Agency in the Relationship Between the Company and 
Policyholders 
 
The NCCI ‘Tawuniya’ considers itself to be an agent for the policyholders in the management 
of the insurance portfolio (insurance operations account) and receives a certain amount of pay 
in return. Tawuniya adopts a particular accounting method, charging the costs and expenses in 
relation to its performance in its role as agent to the insurance operations of its personnel, 
costs of underwriting and insurance policies, and expenses of excess loss, among others. It 
adds all revenues, including investment income, to the account of the insurance operations, 
which is acceptable both from technical and accounting perspectives, but does not refer 
explicitly to the fees of agency; this is supposed to be a specific value, in order to match the 
contract in accordance with the teachings of Islamic Sharia. It does not refer to its fees of 
                                                
29 The Statute of NCCI, article 3, supra footnote 4, p. 1. 
30  SAMA, 2004, Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law. Available online: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Insurance/InssuranceLib/4600_C_InsuraLaw_En_2005_08_17_V1.pdf  
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investment in policyholders’ funds, either, whether the contract is Mudarabah or Anan, which 
should be determined by the company, in terms of the proportion of profit from investment, 
and be brought to the shareholders’ account as investment dividends. This also takes into 
account the value of the agency fees, as they are supposed to cover all expenses, in addition to 
the profit that is supposed to be earned by the company as a paid agent. However, what 
actually happens, is that the mixing of funds, which confirms that the company considers all 
its accounts as a single entity, resembles the work of commercial insurance.  
 
The NCCI Tawuniya seeks to earn profits from net surplus by first deducting 90% as per 
article 70/2/ E and adding this to the shareholders’ accounts as a net profit; this leaves a 
residue of 10% for the policyholders, so there is no clear distinction between NCCI Tawuniya 
in its application of cooperative insurance and conventional commercial insurance. The only 
difference is in its separation of accounts (the shareholders’ accounts differs from those of the 
policyholders). However, traditional insurance applications depend on a single account being 
considered the company’s legal entity, and, in the end, surplus is considered as net profit. This 
is different in Takaful and cooperative insurance, as the company then acts as a paid agent 
with its own entity and account, whereas the policyholders’ account is an independent entity 
with its own account. 
 
• The Relationship Between the Policyholders 
 
The financial reimbursement contract Muawadah is one of the most prominent features of 
conventional insurance contracts, as it is considered to be a contract in which deceit is present. 
Therefore, Muslim scholars turn contracts of insurance from Muawadah into donation 
contracts, which intend for the subscriber to pay insurance premiums on a voluntary basis, as a 
means of calculating the insurance operations, and thus have the right to benefit from such 
donations.31 This is not on the basis of a trade-off, however, as money to be paid as a result is 
compensation money, because the contracts of donation are without deceit, and upon looking 
at the documentation of Tawuniya and its systems, all the definitions adopted by the company, 
as per the definition of insurance policy and premium subscription, refer to the Muawadah, not 
                                                
31 This topic was explored in the preceding chapter 3, p 27- 45. 
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to donations. Consequently, contracts emerging from the relationship between the 
policyholders are contracts of deceit, which constitutes a violation to Islamic Sharia.  
 
• Distribution of the Company’s Surplus 
In the distribution of surplus, the company relies on the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law (SAMA), which was adopted based on the Statutes of the National Company for 
Cooperative Insurance (Tawuniya). The company stresses that the maturity of the surplus, or 
at least part of it, is against the management of the operations account, in addition to the 
guarantee, with deficit for the Insurance Operational Account. In Islamic Sharia, this warranty 
forms a charity contract and, therefore, accrual of such surplus to the company against security 
is contrary to Islamic Sharia.  
 
• Investment 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Statute of the Company, which were asserted in the SAMA 
regulations, the company confirms its commitment to the teachings of Islamic Sharia, with 
regard to investment. However, in the annual report of 2010, investments in domestic and 
foreign funds and shares, both in the shareholders’ account and policyholders’ account, and 
this type of investment is contrary to the Islamic Sharia.  
 
• Sharia Board and the Application of Islamic Sharia 
Based on the company’s commitment to the provisions of Islamic Sharia, the Sharia Board 
was established in 2007, creating a team of elite specialists in Sharia and Islamic finance. 
During four years, the board held a number of meetings, reviewing cooperative insurance 
policies and approving many products, as well as reviewing and approving the investment and 
private savings system for the personnel of the company.32  
 
There is a degree of irony in these facts, however. On a disciplinary level, the powers and 
functions of the board are confined to the works and activities of insurance operations 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
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account,33 which would be out of the control and power of financial practices and investment, 
which lies with shareholders’ account, as well as at an administrative level.  
With regard to the review of policies, there remains a level of deceit as a result of financial 
reimbursement contracts in the insurance policies, as well as contractual relations in the 
company. On which aspect of Islamic Sharia has this been legitimately adopted? Did the 
Sharia Board notice the deceit in the insurance policies? Or did the board authorise traditional 
commercial insurance, which is forbidden by a number of scholars and jurisprudential 
academies, as it opposes the approved system of Cooperative Insurance Companies Control, 
2004?  
From the investment aspect, the company still comes under criticism in some ways by those 
interested in this field, as the insurance company invests in financial products that are illicit, 
such as international funds and bonds. So what has the Sharia Board been doing during the 
past four years in the evaluation of legal drafting for the company’s investments? 
 
From the above, it is already evident that the Sharia Board requires greater effort in the 
development of its structure and management performance, and to enhance the regulatory 
activity for evaluating activities, acts, documents, and investments of the National Cooperative 
Insurance Company (NCCI). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 The Regulation of Sharia Board of NCCI, 2007, article 2/A, supra footnote 6.  
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5.3 Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance (Takaful Al-Rajhi) 
The Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance is a Saudi joint-stock company, founded on 
1/6/2009; its licensing was approved by Royal Decree No. M/6, dated 2/6/1424 AH. The 
capital of the company is 2 hundred million Saudi riyals (200,000,000).34 The company’s 
vision is to be one of the leading companies in the provision of insurance services to 
cooperative public service customers seeking insurance products that are compliant with 
Islamic Sharia.35 
5.3.1 APPLICABLE FORM 
 
The company depends its management on the hyper model, based upon a paid agency contract 
in the management of portfolio and Mudarabah for investment. The contractual relationship 
between the participants is founded on donation, as in paragraph two of the bases and 
principles upon which the company operates. The subscriber (policyholder) consolidates with 
the rest of participants (policyholders), as they donate their subscriptions in the portfolio of 
Takaful, in order to cover the risks that may fall to any of them in accordance with the 
principles of Takaful, as prescribed by the Sharia Board of the company.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           Figure 5.2: Al- Rajhi Takaful Model 
                                                
34 The statute of Al Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance. Art 7. 
35 Alrajhi Takaful. Company Profile. (2011). P17 
36 Alrajhi Takaful. Car Insurance Policy 2011. The Bases and Principles upon which the Alrajhi Takaful 
Company operates Takaful Fund. Paragraph (1/2). 
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5.3.2 DEFINITIONS 
• Insurance Policy: In the company prospectus, the insurance policy is defined as ‘a 
contract in which a participant enters with the rest of the participants to disperse the 
risks that fall to any of them using a way of donation’.37. In the terms and conditions 
of the insurance policies, the company states that the policy evidences what is specified 
by the schedule or policy, or any attached annexes or supplements.38 
• Premium (subscription): This is the amount payable by the policyholder to the 
Takaful fund during the period of insurance. In this respect, whereas the policy does 
not provide explicitly for donating the premium, it does confirm in its introduction that 
such premium must be paid for donation.39 
• Insurer: This is the Takaful portfolio that is managed by the insurance company, 
accepting insurance directly from the insured on its behalf.40 
• Insured: The person or legal entity in a portfolio of Takaful, looking for coverage 
upon the occurrence of risk under the insurance policy.41  
• Insurance Portfolio (Takaful portfolio): A fund to cumulate the contributions of 
policyholders (subscribers) to donate to, and so as pay for, coverage. This portfolio has 
independent legal entity status separate to the company, and is run by the company on 
behalf of its policyholders (subscribers) on the basis of a paid agency model.42 
• Status of the Company’s Portfolio of Takaful: According to the fundamentals and 
principles governing the exercise of company’s cooperative insurance operations, as 
approved by the Sharia Board, claims of coverage should be directed initially to the 
portfolio of Takaful as the insurer party, so losses that may result from such claims are 
attributed to the portfolio. Whereas the legal statement in the company’s system links 
such losses with the financial situation and the impact on its financial results, for this 
purpose, and to assess the financial situation of the company in the future, any 
                                                
37 Al-Rajhi Takaful, the prospectus of the company, 2008. 
38Al-Rajhi Takaful, ‘Car comprehensive insurance policy’, 2011. Al-Rajhi Takaful, ‘Car third party insurance 
policy’, 2011. Al-Rajhi Takaful, ‘Insurance policy for commercial vehicle’, 2011.  
39 Ibid, definitions, paragraph 2/1. 
40 Al-Rajhi Takaful, the prospectus of the company, 2008, supra footnote 42, definitions, p. 25. 
41 Ibid, p. 25. 
42 Ibid, p. 24. 
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connection with loss of the portfolio or debts related to it will consider the company as 
lender or loser guarantor of portfolio Takaful.43 
 
5.3.3 COMMITMENT TO THE APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW 
 
The company is committed to abide by the provisions of Islamic Sharia in all aspects, under 
the supervision of the Sharia Board, who are experienced in financial transactions. The general 
assembly appoints the Sharia Board members and adopts all its regulations. The Sharia Board 
sets out the steps to be taken by the company in its efforts to commit to a legitimate approach 
in its dealings and decisions, which are binding for the company. It is also interested in 
assessing the legitimate performances of all the company’s activities through a special 
department. At the end of the year, the Sharia Board issues a legitimate control statement in 
the general assembly’s meeting.44  
 
5.3.3.1 The Mechanism for Achieving Legitimate Compliance 
 
The Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance is obliged to achieve the requirements of 
Sharia in all its workings, in accordance with the vision of the Sharia Board thereof. The 
Sharia Board considers every insurance product upon completion of its technical structure, 
studying the legal and legitimate aspects. The Sharia Board also receives reinsurance 
agreements and investment contracts that the company intends to conclude.  
 
A Sharia Board has a legitimate department that is a preparatory and regulatory control 
system, called the Sharia Auditing Department. It prepares issues to be submitted to, and 
briefed by, the board.  
 
                                                
43 Ibid, p. 26. 
44 Ibid, p. 15. 
203 
 
5.3.3.2 Functions of the Sharia Auditing Department 
 
The Sharia Auditing Department carries out the following tasks:45 
1. Verify any activity, product, service, or contract in progress within the 
company, passed by the Sharia Board. 
2. Review forms, contracts, policies, and contracts before use. 
3. Make sure that the company, in all its branches and internal and external 
departments, is committed to implementing the decisions of the Sharia Board. 
4. Validate the company’s commitment to abide by Sharia Board legitimate 
policies. 
5. Implement field control visits to departments of the company and its branches 
on a regular basis.  
6. Prepare a periodic report containing the results of field control of activities and 
processes; identify notes related to Sharia aspects, with respect to the areas of 
company.  
7. Raise awareness of the Islamic economy in general and Islamic cooperative 
insurance systems, in particular within the company. 
 
It is notable that Sharia Board in Al-Rajhi Takaful is vested with broad powers, so as to 
maintain the company’s system in accordance with Sharia requirements in all its dealings. The 
members therein are appointed by the general assembly and do not report to the Board of 
Directors, which gives a greater level of independence to its decisions. 
 
The Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance aspires to have all its products comply with 
Islamic Sharia, in view of the decision taken by the Sharia Board. The company has two main 
categories of insurance services. The first pertains to general services, such as insurance on 
properties, against liability, and maritime insurance. The second contains new insurance 
services that are allocated to certain categories, such as home insurance, travel insurance, and 
                                                
45 Al-Rajhi Takaful, Sharia Auditing Department, ‘Functions of the Sharia Auditing Department’, unpublished 
document.  
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accident insurance. In order to select and maintain a superior insurance portfolio, the company 
aims to take prudent steps in the fields of vehicle and medical insurance.46 
 
5.3.4 SURPLUS 
 
The company follows the Implementing Regulations of SAMA, Article 70/2/e, thus providing 
for Article 43/5 on the distribution of net surplus, which distributes 10% to the insured 
directly, reducing premiums for the following year, and deposits 90% into the shareholders’ 
account.47 
 
As previously stated in the Islamic insurance model, the surplus belongs to the policyholders, 
who are entitled to grant a part thereof to the company as a reward for good performance. 
Therefore, the company’s Sharia Board tries to abide by such principles. The breach in the 
Implementing Regulations of SAMA, Article 70/2/e, regarding how the surplus distribution 
was treated, prompted the Sharia Board to decide, as per decree no. 3 on 26/7/2009, upon the 
following: 
 
1. The insurance surplus is due to insurance portfolio, as it is representative of the surplus 
of its funds; the company may be granted a part of surplus as a fixed grant according to 
the Jua’la48 contract, based upon the following reasons:  
1.1 Compared to the admissibility of agreement that a client gives his agent, the 
surplus of money is paid to him upon performance of his work.  
1.2 Due to the company’s efforts to achieve the surplus. 
 
2. It should take into account the following conditions: 
2.1 The existence of certain work done by the company as indicated in 1.2.  
                                                
46 Al-Rajhi Takaful, the prospectus of the company, 2008, supra footnote 42. 
47 The Statute of Al_Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance, article 43, insurance operations account/5. 
48Jua’la is an Arabic term, ‘an agreement where one party commits to pay a determined sum to the second party 
when achieve a specific result at specific or unspecific time’. See Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions Standars (AAOIFI), available online: http://www.aaoifi.com/ 
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2.2 This should be under the explicit condition of a defined percentage in the 
contract, concluded by participants.49 
 
In principle no. 6 of the fundaments and principles of the company’s insurance policies it is 
found that: 
 
Distributable surplus of Takaful portfolio = (total contributions + profits of investment in 
Takaful portfolio + re-Takaful commissions + amount refunded from dangers that have been 
covered previously) - (agency fees + amount of re-Takaful + claims + share of speculator 
[company] out of investment + debts + reserves variance). 
 
Therefore, the company will act as it deems fit in the interests of the portfolio, within the 
limits of the following options:  
 
A- Reduction of contributions over the coming years.  
B- Distribution of surplus, in full or in part (at least 10%), annually to all participants 
in proportion to their participation, regardless of who has been covered for damage that 
has occurred, or not covered due to no misfortune.50 
 
To this end, although the company has apparently committed itself to implementing regulation 
of insurance companies, it recognises the entitlement of the insured for more than 10%, and 
refers to its belief that the surplus should be awarded to policyholders, not shareholders. 
However, the provisions of SAMA force the company to such formulation, and the Sharia 
Board emphasises that the surplus of insurance is due to the insurance portfolio. As it is a 
surplus of its funds, the company may grant a part of the surplus as a royalty, based upon the 
aforementioned conditions. 
                                                
49 Decision no. 3 on 26/07/2009, the Shariah Board of Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance, 
unpublished document. 
50 Al-Rajhi Takaful . Principles and bases to be stated in all insurance policies, no. 60. 
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5.3.5 OVERALL OPINION ON THE APPLICATIONS OF THE AL-RAJHI COMPANY FOR 
ISLAMIC COOPERATIVE INSURANCE, AND ITS COMPLIANCE WITH ISLAMIC SHARIA 
 
The Al-Rajhi Takaful Company for Cooperative Insurance confirms that it has applied the 
concept of Islamic cooperative insurance. So as to achieve this, it had to separate the 
shareholders’ account from policyholders’ account, but the contractual relationship of the 
company’s model remains clear from several aspects: 
 
Realisation of the Paid Agency Concept in the Relationship Between the Company and 
Policyholders 
 
The company considers itself to be an agent for the policyholders in the management of 
insurance portfolio, and receives a certain amount of pay in return (as an agency fees), which 
is then added to the policyholders’ account in the form of expenses. A particular accounting 
method is adopted, however, that charges the costs and performance-related expenses to the 
insurance operations account of its personnel, including the cost of underwriting and insurance 
policies, and the expenses of excess loss.51 It is considered an acceptable technical accounting 
procedure, which defines the agency fee. In terms of investment, on the other hand, there is no 
accumulated surplus to be invested because the company is new. 
 
Al-Rajhi Takaful seeks to accrue profit through net surplus and agency fees, which 
demonstrates a clear difference the application of cooperative insurance in contrast to 
conventional commercial insurance, as it represents the separating of accounts (the 
shareholders’ account differs from that of the policyholders) and the clearing of agency fees. 
Conventional insurance applications depend on a single account however, as the company is a 
single legal entity, and any surplus belonging to it is ultimately considered net profit. 
Therefore this is the distinguishing feature between Takaful and cooperative insurance, as the 
company acts as a paid agent and has its own entity and account, whereas the policyholders’ 
account is an independent entity with its own account. 
                                                
51Al-Rajhi Company for Cooperative Insurance, review report (2011) , p. 5. 
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The Relationship Between the Policyholders 
 
The reimbursement contract (Muawadah) is one of the most prominent features of 
conventional insurance contracts, as it is considered to be one in which deceit (Gharar) takes 
place. Therefore, Muslim scholars turn their intention to contracts of insurance, from 
reimbursement contracts to donation contracts, as the subscriber’s intention is to pay their 
insurance premiums to the insurance operations account on a donation basis, and to have the 
right to benefit from such donations.52 This is not on the basis of reimbursement, as money is 
to be paid as resultant compensation so that the contracts of donation are without deceit. 
Considering the documentation of Al-Rajhi Takaful and its systems, all the definitions adopted 
by the company are as per the definition of insurance policy and premium with reference to 
donation, and contracts emerging from the relationship between the policyholders are 
subsequently contracts of donation, with no deceit, and are thus compliant with Islamic Sharia. 
 
Distribution of the Company’s Surplus 
 
For the distribution of surplus, the company adopted the law of Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies. They stress that the deducting of the surplus, or part of it, is against the 
management of the operations account and does not guarantee the account in the case of 
deficit. It has already been noted that this guarantee in Islamic Sharia is one of a charity 
contract, and therefore cannot be compensated. SAMA, in its formulation and division of 
surplus at 90% for shareholders and 10% for policyholders, consequently forced the company 
to insert such ratios into its policies. This maturity has been welcomed by the Sharia Board, 
which stressed that an insurance surplus is due to the insurance portfolio, as it represents the 
surplus of its premiums, and the company may thus grant an insurance surplus based upon 
Jua’la. Furthermore, the share of the surplus belonging to the company is not in return for 
warranty, but as a reward for good performance, so that the company grants a minimum of 
10% for the policyholders and receives no more than 50% out of the surplus itself, which does 
not violate Islamic Sharia.53  
                                                
52 This topic was explained in the preceding chapter 3, p 27-45. 
53 Al-Rrajhi Takaful, Sharia Auditing Department, supra footnote 50. 
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Investment 
 
Investment is pursuant to the provisions of the Statute of the Company, as asserted by the 
SAMA regulations. Therefore, the company is able to confirm its commitment to the teachings 
of Islamic Sharia with regard to investment, but as it was only founded in 2009, there is less 
opportunity for surplus to be invested, except for some simple investments in the domestic 
stock market. This is in favor of the shareholders, as the Sharia Board has allowed to the 
company to make such investments. 
 
Sharia Board and the Application of Islamic Sharia 
 
To support the company’s commitment to the provisions of Islamic Sharia in all its acts and 
activities, the Sharia Board was established in 2009, created by an elite of specialists in Sharia 
and Islamic finance. It plays a critical role in legislation and control. The company has sent a 
number of officials abroad, in order to receive the benefit of international experiments in 
Islamic insurance applications, to countries such as Malaysia and Sudan. The officials have 
had good experiences, but continue to require more, including on an administrative level, so 
the board has a special department and a number of efficient individuals who coordinate tasks 
such as reviewing and developing policies, as well as following up company activities and 
auditing performance in compliance with board decisions. It has a clear connection to the 
company’s other departments, so as to bring about products that are compliant with the 
standards of Islamic Sharia and Islamic insurance.54 
 
As stated above, it is clear that the board, despite its distinguished role, needs to put in greater 
effort in the development of its administrative structure, and for officials to assume their duties 
and enhance their controlling activities, as a means of assessing the activities, works, policies, 
and investments of Al-Rajhi Takaful.  
 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
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5.4   Recommendations 
1. Article 1 of the law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies stresses that 
insurance companies should work in accordance with Islamic Sharia, but there is no 
indication that firms should be accountable in case of violation, or that there are fair 
penalties for such violation.  
2. Considering the policyholders’ account, experts on Islamic finance as an independent 
legal entity face various challenges, such as:  
a. Policyholders do not know each other.  
b. Their interests are different.  
c. There is no authority or committee to represent them in the company. 
 
Islamic financial experts therefore assumed that the policyholders should be an independent 
entity, with the right to determine what is given to the company from the surplus as a reward 
for good performance, or from a share of investment profit, which forms part of a default 
model that is far from reality. Thus, the recommendation for the existence of a body to 
represent policyholders is important, in order to defend their rights, and establish investment 
policies and administrative operations for their account or portfolio of Takaful. This body 
should direct the Board of Directors of the company to also direct the policyholders’ account 
in following such policies, and to be properly accountable for performance.  
 
5.5  Conclusion 
The study aimed to evaluate the law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, as 
well as the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance, their implementing regulations and the 
applications of the National Company of Cooperative Insurance NCCI, as well as Al-Rajhi 
Takaful; all in compliance with Islamic Sharia. The study included policies designed 
according to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, or SAMA. Evaluation has been carried out 
on theoretical and practical insurance, in addition to practical application of the model and 
eventually exploring the objectives of cooperative insurance, surplus distribution, and 
investment in insurance funds. The study revealed the following: 
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1. The Saudi insurance law is similar to conventional insurance thought, in terms of the 
purpose of the insurance, and in both constructive theory and practice of insurance, 
even that which has been asserted in the law to be in accordance with Islamic Sharia. 
2. The law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and its implementing 
regulations, and the rule of the Cooperative Health Insurance Council and its 
implementing regulations, does not reflect presumed insurance, as per Islamic thought, 
in terms of donations. It reflects the concept of insurance in terms of conventional 
thought, which is based upon reimbursement, and the possibilities and obligations of 
both parties. 
3. The insurance policies of the National Company of Cooperative Insurance NCCI do 
not reflect the requirement of cooperative insurance in Islamic thought in terms of 
donations, but rather the concept of insurance in terms of conventional thought on 
reimbursement, as the items in policies in many provisions provide explicit evidence 
towards the will for reimbursement.  
4. NCCI insurance contracts, in view of the relationship of a particular policyholder to the 
rest of the policyholders, represents financial reimbursement within the body, which is 
an obscene deceit and thus nullified as per Islamic Sharia. Al-Rajhi Takaful, on the 
other hand, succeeded in applying the donation concept to its contracts and removing 
the deceit therein, making them in compliance with Islamic Sharia. 
5. The distribution of surplus at NCCI does not reflect what is necessary in view of 
Islamic thought, whereas Al-Rajhi Takaful did succeed in correcting the fault in the 
implementing regulation, Article 70/2/c, d, and e, and is in line with Islamic Sharia.  
6. The presence of investment funds in NCCI, which are in violation of Islamic Sharia, 
affects the permissibility of dealing with such companies.  
7. The legitimacy of cooperative insurance, as based upon the proven assumption that it 
does not necessarily equate to the legitimacy of existing applications, is called 
cooperative insurance.  
8. The existence of Sharia Board bodies in a number of insurance companies does not 
necessarily guarantee the legitimacy of contracts and transactions of such companies. 
Therefore, Sharia Board bodies must be independent, so as not to be subject to a 
conflict of interests. 
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9. Contemporary insurance companies reflect the school of thought applied by insurance 
companies for the Sharia Board, which is shown through its approval of contracts and 
transactions of such companies.  
10. Depending on the statement of a minority of scholars, that all commercial insurance 
contracts are permissible, insurance systems, regulations, and policies of insurance 
companies operating in the insurance market are legitimately acceptable.  
 
In conclusion, it can be said that applicable insurance policies in Al-Rajhi Takaful comply 
with Islamic Sharia in general, whereas NCCI insurance policies are more in the line of 
commercial insurance than cooperative, which makes them inadmissible in Islamic Sharia, 
thus invalidating any dealings in them religiously or legitimately. This is based upon the 
provisions of Article 1 of the law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies: 
‘Insurance in the Kingdom shall be undertaken through registered insurance companies 
operating in a cooperative manner as it is provided within the article establishment of the 
National Company for Cooperative Insurance promulgated by Royal Decree M/5 dated 
17/5/1405 H, and in accordance with the principles of Islamic Sharia’.55. Therefore, a 
reformulation of the rules and regulations are seriously required, before a subsequent re-
drafting of the insurance policies. It is clear that the fixed hypothesis of the study is true. 
 
This chapter considered certain applications in NCCI and Al-Rajhi Takaful for the concept of 
Islamic cooperative insurance, in terms of model and existing regulations in the company, as 
well as financial policies in place, and the role of the Sharia Board in the evaluation of 
producing work without infringement to Islamic Sharia. The following chapter will be look to 
an Evaluation of the Application of Islamic Insurance Takaful. 
 
 
 
                                                
55 Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, available online: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/Insurance/InssuranceLib/4600_C_InsuraLaw_Ar.pdf  
CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF THE APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC INSURANCE 
TAKAFUL 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
 
Evaluating the applications and the experiences of the Islamic insurance concept Takaful is an 
important task. This chapter will evaluate the formulas and methods of attaining both Islamic 
and conventional insurance, considering commercial insurance, mutual insurance, and Islamic 
insurance. It is imperative to clarify all Sharia rules accordingly, with regard to the different 
insurance formula as described in the previous chapter, and to raise all objections to each 
formula and model, as presented by Islamic experts. The challenges facing the Islamic 
insurance industry may be determined through wider coverage of profitability proliferation of 
insurance needs, in terms of type horizontally and in terms of size and quality vertically. 
Finally, at the end of this chapter we will include some ideas for the possible enhancement of 
the Islamic insurance field. 
 
6.2 The Formula of Insurance 
Insurance formulas differ between organisations, however, if presented properly with 
companies in the private sector, they may be provided by the government or other 
organisations.1 The following sections will critically evaluate each formula: 
 
6.2.1 COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
A commercial insurance company is like other companies in that it aims to generate profit; it 
has capital and shares to be traded within markets, and its main objective is to generate profit 
for the company owners who pay out its capital and own its shares. These types of insurance 
companies are always called ‘owners’ companies’ and are limited liability companies. 
Therefore, the highest point of responsibility for a shareholder is the value of money he pays 
out to shares. An insurer is a company, not a shareholder. A shareholder cannot withdraw from 
                                                
1 El Qora Daghi.A (2006). Islamic Insurance. Dar Albashaer Alislamiah. Burit, Lebanon, p. 134. 
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the company, but he can sell his shares within the market. The insured buys an insurance 
policy and will then receive a commitment for compensation, regardless of the company’s 
financial position. The worth of compensation is an outstanding debt to be paid by the 
company, which it is not allowed to profit from2. 
 
A formula that was prohibited as per the decision of councils and bodies3 was breached by 
some contemporaries with regard to its permissibility, including Sheikh Mustafa al-Zarqa.4 
The justifications for this prohibition were in accordance with the decision of the Association 
Body, 1977. can be summed up as follows: 
 
1- A deceit, as the insured cannot know how much they will give or take at the time of 
entering into a contract. 
2- A form of gambling, because it is a fine without felony and a gain without charge, as 
well as being a gain with a non-equivalent charge. 
3- It includes the usury Riba, as if a company pays to the insured more than it has paid to 
it, it is a giving usury Riba Fadhl, and as it is paid after a period of time, it is also 
increment usury Riba nasee’a. 
4- It is some sort of forbidden bet, as it contains both ignorance and deceit through 
gambling. 
5- It involves the taking of money without charge, which is against Sharia rules. 
6- The legal obligation in insurance policy is itself an obligation that is not legally or 
legitimately required in Sharia teaching, because the insured did not initially cause a 
danger or any resulting damage.5 
 
                                                
2 Mishaal, A. (2009) ’The Evaluation of Cooperation Insurance Applications’. An Arabic paper presented at a 
cooperative insurance conference in Riyadh, p. 7 available online at: http://iifef.com/files/taameen/09.pdf 
3	
  See	
  Chapter	
  1,	
  p.	
  41–51.	
  
4	
  Alzarqa.M	
  (1980)	
  The	
  insurance	
  system	
  and	
  Islamic	
  Shari’a.	
  Islamic	
  Economic	
  book.	
  Development	
  conference	
  
in	
  Damascus.p279.	
  Alhamid.H.The	
  verdict	
  of	
  Shari’a	
  on	
  Insurance.	
  Dar	
  Alitsam.	
  Cairo.p16 
5 El Qora Daghi.A (2006) Islamic Insurance, supra footnote 1, p. 135. 
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6.2.2  NON-PROFIT INSURANCE COMPANY (MUTUAL INSURANCE): 
 
A non-profit insurance firm is a body owned by the policy holders (mutual insurance), as well 
as the insured, such as corporate shareholders who have the same rights as the non-corporate 
shareholders. It has no capital, as this is the result of the fees (i.e., the value of insurance 
policies) at the beginning of the company, which then accumulate reserves. The company pays 
an annual rent for the insured as an accounting profit; this may include work such as a re-
evaluation of companies in a manner that covers risk adequately.6 
 
The cooperative insurance formula, where the contributors are the policy holders, has its 
business run by a council on behalf of all participants. According to this formula, there are 
some applications from Sudan.7 
 
Legislative standard has pointed to such a formula as the so-called cooperative insurance; with 
reference to the standard text of such insurance, management is funded by a body selected 
from among the policy holders. There is also a formula contained within the decision of the 
Association Body on the subject of insurance. The transfer of consensus on the inadmissibility 
of such a formula is supported by few contemporaries, as it is understood that there is no 
consensus on its permissibility due to the fact that the formula is contradictory.8 
 
6.2.3 ISLAMIC INSURANCE COMPANY: 
 
Islamic insurance companies did not appear until the issuance of the Islamic council Fatwas, 
which provided the cooperative insurance formula as an alternative to the legitimately 
forbidden commercial insurance. 
                                                
6 Mishaal, A. (2009) The Evaluation of Cooperation Insurance Applications. Supra footnote 2, p. 8. 
7 Gassem Aly El-Shamsy, The mechanism of transfer from traditional insurance to Islamic insurance, IOFI, 
Islamic Banking Conference 2008, p. 4.  
8Al Thanian.S (1993) Alta'min wa'hkamh, Cultural books for publishing, Edition1, Beirut,  p 91–92. 
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Islamic insurance companies mainly specialise in money management and do not guarantee 
payment, as is the case with commercial insurance companies.9 
 
A cooperative insurance company is in charge of planning portfolios for insurance against car 
accidents. It determines the nature of risk and then conducts appropriate actuarial calculations 
and designs as a compensation program. The company calls upon the one who wants to 
participate in the portfolio to pay a specific premium commensurate with the risk. It then 
collects the funds into the portfolio managed by its investment, as mentioned, for the benefit 
of its respective owners. These funds remain the property of shareholders; the task of the 
company is to manage the same for their benefit. In case of any incident befalling to any of 
them, the company withholds some deductions taken from the money and compensates the 
party to the agreed extent. 
 
This portfolio is liquidated each year through the issuing of its final accounts. At the end of the 
year, if it is found that funds in the portfolio exceed the needs of people to whom 
compensation is due as a result of any negative impact, the company returns the exceeding 
amount to the participants of the portfolio. Furthermore, if funds are not sufficient to 
compensate all the people who have experienced a negative impact in that year, the company 
returns to the participants and asks them to pay an additional premium, as the idea of 
cooperative insurance is based upon ‘solidarity’ among participants in the portfolio, and does 
not guarantee compensation for affected participants, especially those who are no longer 
members of the portfolio. However, due to the difficulty of its claim to subscribers to pay an 
additional premium, the cooperative insurance companies provide interest-free loans from the 
owners of the company to the portfolio when it requires an increase, in order to return it in the 
next period. Therefore, the integration process takes place among participants in the present 
year, as well as those in preceding years. 
 
The relationship of the company to the portfolio is based on agency, as it manages a portfolio 
for the fee of a lump sum stipulated in the agreement and, if profit will be achieved, the 
participants will take a portion thereof. Additionally, any loss is borne by them, as the agent is 
                                                
9 For more information see Chapter 2.  
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entrusted and not guaranteed. This formula is most applicable to Middle Eastern and Arab 
countries10. 
 
The relationship could be based upon trading off (Mudarabah), thus the company is a trader 
who runs the portfolio with a portion of the profit earned from the investment. In this instance, 
the company does not deserve a share of the profit achieved. This formula is most applicable 
in Malaysia.11 
 
The formula is considered to be the standard, according to the terminology of Islamic 
insurance and as per the provision of insurance standards in such formulas. It is a job 
conducted by a corporation for a certain payment, so as to manage insurance works and 
investment in the fund assets.12 
 
The formula is not free of objections, however, as it was reported by Dr Rafiq Al-Masri that it 
is consistent with the opposition raised by Sheikh Taqi El-Othmani, see below:13 
 
1- The grant is in return, for a grant is considered a financial reimbursement and is no longer 
a donation. 
2- Deceit in this case is unforgivable, because the question relates to a financial 
reimbursement, not a donation. 
3- Compensation from the gift of reward should be known, because it is part of the rule of 
sale, and compensation in insurance is unknown. 
4- Obligation and the commitment to donate is problematic; supposing that it is acceptable, it 
should be returned in the form of a gift of reward. 
 
                                                
10 Gassem Aly El-Shamsy, supra footnote 7, p. 4. Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 10. 
11 Gassem Aly El-Shamsy, p. 4.  
12 Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 11.  
13Al-Masri.R , El-Othmani.  ‘Is Wakf an alternative for cooperative insurance’, an abstract to Wednesday 
weekly Conversation in Islamic Economics Research Center, King Abdul-Aziz University, 19/10/2005. 
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6.3 Evaluation of the Islamic Insurance Industry 
 
In preparation for this theses, a great deal of research and study was undertaken with regard to 
the Islamic insurance industry. The following conclusions were apparent: 
 
1. The first Islamic insurance company was established in Sudan in 1977, but did not 
develop in the way in which Islamic banks are characterized14. There is no doubt 
that the tools and formulas of Islamic banks have evolved the level of investment 
and financing, followed by variations of sheltering and hedging; nevertheless, the 
formulas of Islamic insurance companies were frozen in terms of shape. They 
failed to provide some insurance services offered by traditional insurance 
companies, such as health insurance, or even car insurance, goods, and other 
properties that require the highest quality; although in terms of legitimacy they 
were not an obstacle to such developments15. 
 
2.  Contemporary applications of insurance do not lend any importance to the formula 
of cooperative insurance, as described in the Association Council Decision, and do 
not support such formulas, experiment, or even consider their effectiveness in 
achieving the purpose of insurance on properties and people in the first instance. 
Thus the industry remains in need of support for such applications of formula, in 
order to enrich the experience, diversify applications initially, and to be in 
accordance with a formula that is not exposed to the problematic concept of 
Islamic insurance, which is based on donation and management.16 
 
3. The Islamic insurance industry in its current dominant form, based upon the 
formula of insurance management by an investment company with capital 
independent from the accounts of participants, is not an attractive formula for 
investment in terms of profitability. It may not allow the director to receive a profit 
from the process of insurance itself (i.e., from the Takaful Fund or the surplus), but 
                                                
14 Islamic bank began work in 1975. 
15Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 12.  
16  El Qora Daghi.A (2006) Islamic Insurance, supra footnote 1, p. 138. 
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to profit instead from the management of the insurance process. Perhaps this 
explains the lack of exposure of the insurance industry in Islamic banks that were 
hijacked from usurers and non-Muslims, who do not believe in the concept and 
who are often from the East and West, and thus desire to achieve their money 
objectives through legitimate channels, acquiring a surplus of Islamic money. 
 
4. Related to the above, is that traditional insurance companies have not yet 
experienced a great change of turning to Islamic companies. The transition has 
become a prominent feature in the last two decades at the level of traditional 
banking and investment, as well as in financing companies. 
 
5. The Islamic insurance industry did not exceed the bottleneck with regard to the 
necessity for conducting reinsurance by an Islamic insurance company, rather than 
undertake it through a conventional insurance company on the basis of necessity or 
need. It does not appear that Islamic insurance companies in their current structure, 
based on a formula of either donation or management, are qualified enough to 
overcome this hurdle in the near future, but this structure may not allow for the 
existence of any attractive profitable elements. These would create insurance 
companies that would capable of covering huge amounts of financial insurance for 
fleets of aircraft, ships, or the establishment of Islamic reinsurance companies.17 
 
6. Many conferences and seminars have discussed cooperative insurance re-inventing 
the wheel, however, and reiterate the discussion of issues in relation to adapting 
cooperative insurance and the differences between this and commercial insurance. 
They then explore certain known and settled issues at the level of conventional 
insurance as a solution, such as insurance on debts. They do not find legitimate 
conditioning to be acceptable.18 Furthermore, based upon the legal documents that 
solve all problems of legitimacy, and especially the deceit, a donation is adjusted 
on the basis of the relationship between the participants, Takaful Fund, and the 
                                                
17 Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 13. 
18 See all Arabic papers presented in Cooperative Insurance Conference in Riyadh 2009. Available online at: 
http://iifef.com/files/taameen/   
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operator. Upon which basis the relationship between the insurance company and 
the Takaful account is adapted.  
 
7. Straightforwardly, the challenges facing the Islamic insurance industry, which may 
be deduced from of the above, are as follows: 
Profitability. 
Proliferation. 
Wider coverage of insurance needs horizontally in terms of type, and vertically 
in terms of size. 
Quality.19 
 
8. The success of the Islamic insurance industry hinges on challenges requiring 
review, in the form of insurance based on donation and management as a single 
formula for the industry, which monopolised the term ‘Islamic insurance’ 
according to the terminology of the Islamic Sharia standard on insurance issued by 
the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI). Therefore, the capacity for research and development should be 
dedicated to finding alternative formats, which are more efficient in terms of 
economics and legitimacy. This thesis, however, adopts the idea of reconsideration 
of commercial insurance in its existing form, as well as considering the possibility 
of adapting to the legitimacy of acceptable formulas according to Islamic Sharia 
rules. This theses attempts to cover some approaches that are supportive of the 
research in this respect. 
6.4 Approach to the Need for Reconsideration of Insurance 
 
This approach is confined to the addressing of insurance of ‘things’, not people; the 
reconsideration of insurance can apply to the latter, however, as some forms of governmental 
insurance can be easily apprehended from the perspective of this approach. The required 
reconsideration is in this case based on the need to tackle the reasons for the prohibition of the 
commercial insurance formula, which consists of deceit (Gharar) with financial 
                                                
19Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 13. 
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reimbursement and gambling. Thus, destabilising the aforementioned reasons require 
discussion, analysis, and consideration of the possibility of denial and removal, while 
maintaining the image of modern commercial insurance as a formula based upon profitability 
and religiously acceptable methods, as follows: 
 
6.4.1 Insurance specialists would themselves deny insurance gaming in practice in the 
insurance industry, and limit it with several conditions to keep it separate from 
gambling. However, Algari (2009) stated the similarities between gambling and 
commercial insurance, as well as the requirements that make insurance different from 
gambling, as follows:20 
 
6.4.1.1 Insurance resembles gambling in that both the gambler and the insured pays a fixed 
amount of money and then later receives another; he may earn that amount many 
times and will probably lose all of what he has paid to the insurance company. 
People still compare the insurance contract with gambling; indeed, it was stated 
that some judges in British courts in the eighteenth century did not see a difference 
between gambling and insurance. They did not need to originally judge that the 
insured should own an asset in order to insure it, because they were measuring it by 
virtue of gambling laws and governing it in conformity with the laws that organise 
risk and betting (as gambling was not forbidden to them) until the Marine 
Insurance Act was issued to prevent it in 1906 section 4(1) “Every contract of 
marine insurance by way of gaming or wagering is void”21.22 
 
6.4.2  Specialists of insurance note that there are certain substantial differences between 
insurance and gambling, and that the similarity does not deny the fact that the two 
contracts are different from each other for the following reasons: 
 
                                                
20  Algari.M (2009). Cooperative Insurance. Unpublished paper. However, this paper I have read its hard copy in 
(2009) and I am wondering whether it is published or not, also I tried hardly to find its published copy but there is 
nothing.  
21  Marine Insurance Act MAI 1906. available online at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Edw7/6/41/section/4  
22 See more Algamdi, E. (2006) Insurable Interest in Property Insurance: A Comparative Study Amongst 
English, Canadian and Saudi Arabia Laws. UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, 
FACULTY OF LAWS 2006. P46-49 
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6.4.2.1  Mishaal (2009) stated that the gambler pays a sum of money to generate potential 
risk, upon which a loss of money paid is based, or a profit of that amount many 
times. This risk does not exist in nature, but is made by gamblers and only 
generated when each participant pays his stake in gambling (such as a lottery). At 
the end of game, a winner wins and a loser loses. However, insurance is concerned 
with something that is out of the will of all parties, relating to real risks resulting 
from acts of God, in consequence of fatal accidents, and the misfortunes that could 
affect wealth or children. Thus, the purpose of paying a premium is not to make 
profit from risk, but rather to protect oneself and compensate for damage. They 
differentiate from speculative risk, therefore, as it can be either profit or loss; risk 
in insurance is called pure risk, because it can only be a loss or keeping things as 
they are. For example, if a man bought some shares for investment purposes, he is 
liable for profit and loss: an insurance company cannot insure those shares against 
loss, as this is the first type of risk, and would become gambling, not insurance, if it 
conducted business.23 
 
6.4.2.2  Gambling is a means of becoming rich, because if the gambler benefits from such 
a game he grows richer than he was prior, and if he loses he becomes less affluent 
than before. Therefore, insurance is not merely a means of being rich, as it is 
limited only to compensation for damages, and concerns the same amount or even 
less. 
 
6.4.3 There is no doubt that the reasoning adopted by the concept of insurance is negative, 
due to the fact that people use this method for the purpose of gambling. Therefore, 
laws governing the work of insurance, as well as companies specialising in this field, 
are keen to adopt new methods and to set out restrictions and procedures that ensure 
that an insurance contract does not turn into a means of gambling. For example: 
 
6.4.3.1 Insurance companies do not accept insurance against all risks; the insured must be 
within insurable interest, which includes conditions such as the lessee having a 
direct interest in what is insured, like that of a property or car originally owned by 
                                                
23 Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 15. 
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the insured or mortgaged by them, provided that such interest would have existed 
at the time of incident. If there was an incident when an insurance policy was 
created (such as insuring a house), which then does not exist at the time of, for 
example, a fire (if the house is sold), the owner does not deserve compensation. 
The purpose of this requirement is so insurance cannot be seen as a means for 
dishonest enrichment.24 
 
6.4.3.2  Insurance coverage does not only fall to the extent of damage, as it is not a means 
to become wealthier or to generate incentives for the risk of speculating an 
incident, so as to gain the compensation. If the insured has protected his home from 
fire for the sum of £1 million, for example, which would have been the value of the 
house when the policy was issued, and if at the time of an incident occurring the 
value does not exceed £750,000, the insured may only get the second amount due 
to this being the amount of damage befalling to him at the time of incident.25 
 
6.4.3.3 Most regulations presented by insurance policies ensure the need for the insured to 
give up to the insurance company everything he can obtain as compensation for 
damage from the person who caused it. If he is insured and the incident is caused 
by an additional party and he deserves compensation, then he has no right to file a 
suit against this party and get compensation from him in excess of what he has 
received from the insurance company, as he is not worth anything. However, if 
what he gets from the insuring company is less than the amount of real damage, he 
will then get compensation from the party (or insurance company thereof) that is 
equal to the difference between these two amounts. Such laws give the insurance 
company the right to pursue associates in case of any damage that may occur and 
caused by an actor.26 
 
                                                
24 Algamdi, E. (2006) Insurable Interest in Property Insurance: A Comparative Study Amongst English, 
Canadian and Saudi Arabia Laws. Supra footnote 22.  P65 - 90.  
25Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 16. 
26  Alrajhi Takaful, car comprehensive insurance policy, 2011, p. 4, article (20/5). 
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6.4.3.4  Laws in insurance policies do not allow for an asset to be insured by more than 
one company; if this does happen, the insured does not deserve to receive the 
amount equivalent to the damage shared between the insured persons.27 
 
6.4.3.5  Insurance of assets below their real value is not allowed, so the insured and the 
insurer will share the risk in order to reduce the so-called moral hazards in 
contracts. The insurance company obliges the insured by paying a portion of the 
amount of compensation as an excess28 amount; this is for the purpose of keeping 
an insurance contract away from the realm of gambling.29 
 
6.5 The suspicion that insurance could be a form of gambling originated with the idea of an 
abstract guarantee with regard to money and work. Is it consequently possible to modify 
this abstract concept into a form of insurance that is linked to money and work 
themselves? Theoretically, it is conceivable that the answer is yes, but it seems there is an 
urgent need to put such formulas into practice and test them, explained as follows: 
 
6.5.1 From the outset, it should be clear that the focus is on the prohibition of a guarantee 
without work, thus the modification of a guarantee is dependent upon the type of work 
that is legally considered to be a gateway to the passing of commercial insurance in its 
current form of profitability. In response to those who consider insurance permissible, 
it is confirmed that insurance is intended to provide a form of safety, and is a real 
benefit to be traded from.30 However, Al-Suwailem (2009) has opposed this, saying 
that this statement demonstrates the imbalances in the insurance contract, as safety is 
not only to encounter risk and that the presence of security equates to the absence of 
fear and a lack of risk. While the insurance company does not aim to protect the 
insured asset, nor to the prevent risks entailed, which is not the intention of any 
contract, it does aim to financially reimburse the effects of a particular risk. Therefore, 
if there is loss, the company compensates the insured person, as formally agreed. 
                                                
27 Ibid., article 6.14. 
28 The North American term is deductible.  
29 Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 17. 
30  El Qora Daghi.A (2006) Islamic Insurance, supra footnote 1, p. 151–54. 
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However, the difference between prevention of risk and compensation of subsequent 
effects may prove confusing for many people, thus in Islamic Sharia jurisprudence 
preventing a risk is work and the contract of this work is a honesty contract,31 while 
the contract to compensate the effects of risk is a guarantee contract. So the insurance 
contract is a guarantee contract due to it being a financial reimbursement between the 
premium and the amount of compensation. There is no reason why work should feature 
in such financial reimbursement. This is unlike commercial contracts, which reduce the 
potential risks by, for example, guarding, as the guardian contract is a honesty contract 
and thus a physical work that would reduce the likelihood of risk, whereas an 
insurance contract is a financial reimbursement contract on the warranty, wherein there 
is no room for work. On the other hand, insurance contracts do provide that, should a 
risk lie outside the authority of the insured person. Therefore, from the evidence, it is 
clear that if the work of the insurance company is to prevent risk, it is a permissible 
form of work, which receives an insurance premium as a reward for such work.32 
 
6.5.2 Linking insurance with money or work, however, turns a guarantee into a legitimate 
reason for attaining profit, which is in accordance with Islamic Sharia pursuant to 
legitimate rule (Alkharaj–bi-aldaman).33 Consequently, the insured gains the security, 
considered to be Alkharaj, and will pay a premium for a deserved guarantee. 
Therefore, if this was an accepted idea, the thinking should then be focused on how to 
convert the guarantee from an insurance company into a dependent guarantee for 
money or work. Simply put, in case the work is used by the concept of a guardian 
contract by an insurance company acting as a guard for certain types of property, the 
insurance contract then involves a form of work and a guarantee is therefore based 
                                                
31 In Islamic Sharia fiqh contracts, all contracts are categorised to many different types, such as DONATION 
CONTRACT, A FINANCIAL REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACT (Muawadah), OBLIGATORY CONTRACT, 
A SUBMISSION CONTRACT, etc. The Honesty contract is one of them, therefore under each type there are 
plenty of applications and sub-contracts. For more information, see to Alzarga, M. Almadkhal Alfiqhi 
Alaam.Puplished by Dar Alqalam, Damascus edition (2004) p. 630–47. 
32 Alswailim, S. (2009) makes a standpoint in cooperation insurance, an Arabic paper presented at a cooperative 
insurance conference in Riyadh, p. 16, available online at: http://iifef.com/files/taameen/09.pdf 
33 This rule in Islamic jurisprudence is the answer to many financial transactions that take place between buyer 
and seller, so alkharaj means the profit or the gain, and bi-Aldaman means the warranty. The concept of this rule 
is that, unless the buyer gets a benefit from the transaction, they should provide a guarantee for during the time in 
which the commodity was held. For more information, see Alshafee, Alum. An Arabic book published by Dar 
Almaarifa Beirut (1990), available online at: 
http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?idfrom=6120&idto=6120&bk_no=31&ID=2484 
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upon a guard in the event of damage. As for the guarantee associated with money or 
property, it is easy to imagine that an insurance company would own movable goods, 
such as import and export goods, from their source and subsequently transfer 
ownership to the insured after the end of the period of risk. They would then take 
compensation plus the price of cost, as stated in the insurance premium. This solution 
could be a significant burden on the insurance company through ownership of all of 
what it is going to be covered by such policies, and later paid for. However, the natural 
gap between freight and paying out the price to the supplier can be exploited, as the 
insurance company can postpone the payment until the sale of the goods. The 
guarantee associated with money and work, as with insurance on homes and palaces, 
requires some equipment to either be sold by the insurance company or that an 
insurance company must be involved in the maintenance, in addition to the necessary 
guarding.34 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion: 
Some of the proposals expounded in this essay may seem inapplicable at first glance, and may 
be a shock to some researchers. However, the importance of such ideas can be confirmed as a 
means of stimulating researchers to think seriously about the possibility of development in the 
insurance industry through a profitability formula. In other words, if the Islamic financial 
industry has an Islamic insurance formula based upon financial reimbursement, it would 
adequately generate an incentive for the establishment of Islamic insurance companies with 
huge capitals, which would cover all insurance needs regardless of value, and allow the 
establishment of Islamic reinsurance companies as well. 
In conclusion to this research, the following can be recommended: 
1) The importance of working with government agencies and Islamic financial 
institutions, as well as Islamic insurance companies, to activate the application of 
cooperative insurance formula, in which policy holders run the company according to 
the formula established by the decision of the Muslim World League Council in 1978. 
                                                
34 Mishaal, A. (2009) supra footnote 2, p. 18. 
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2) To mobilise the efforts of the researchers within research bodies in universities and 
support institutions at the level of the Islamic financial industry to reconsider the 
Islamisation of commercial insurance on properties in their current formula. This is 
based upon financial reimbursement through the modification of the idea of an abstract 
guarantee into the idea of money or work, as well as the suggestion of certain methods 
for transforming this idea into a practical reality, via the according formulation of 
insurance products. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION;  
 
7.1 Summary of the key point in this thesis 
 
7.1.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Commercial insurance was imported to Arab countries from the west in the 19th century and 
introduced a foreign concept to Muslim Arabs. The emergence of insurance contracts in Arab 
and Muslim countries has meant that Islamic scholars and legal experts now pay considerable 
attention to this matter.  
 
Muslim scholars have varying opinions about insurance. Insurance policies that earn interest 
are generally considered to be a form of Riba (usury) and some even consider policies that do 
not earn interest to be a form of gharar ( uncertainty). Some argue that gharar is not present 
due to the actuarial science that underpins the underwriting.  
 
However, Insurance is theoretically acceptable to the Islamic mindset; therefore, Al Sanhoury 
(1964), stresses Insurance as being only an organised form of co-operation between a group of 
people. One that is intended to pay for risks and therefore subdivided, so that if some were at 
risk, everyone faces it together with only a small sacrifice from everyone; this means, that then 
they can avoid severe risk and damages that would have beset them without this cooperation1. 
Al Zarqa (1980) adds that the concept informing the minds of Sharia law scholars regarding 
the insurance system is that it is a cooperative solidarity system which leads to fragmentation 
of the parts associated with risk and calamities that are then distributed among group insured 
persons through the use of compensation to pay an injured person from the proceeds of 
premiums instead of damage being the responsibility of the injured alone. It is often said that 
Islam in all its legislations concerning the organisation of social and economic life aims to 
establish a society based on mutual cooperation and absolute solidarity of rights and duties2.  
 
                                                
1	
  Alsanhoury.	
  Alwaseet.	
  Supra.v7,	
  p.1218	
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On this basis, there is no doubt that this idea is acceptable in Islamic law and consistent with 
the purposes of the law to cooperate for better outcomes; it is an Islamic demand underpinning 
the majority of the provisions of Sharia, as it called for cooperation and social solidarity, 
Furthermore, Islam has enjoined Zakat and instituted a system describing it for the deserving 
poor, debtors, and wayfarers so long as it remains within the lines of expenditure for 
protection; also offering a system of expenditure on relatives, and a system of ransoms 
“Alaaqlah”3, in addition to the duty of the State in providing a proper life for individuals and 
in assuming its responsibility to pay debts for individuals in case of death with nothing left to 
creditors.  
 
However, from the perspective of Islamic law, the problem of the applied aspect of insurance 
is represented in the drafting of contracts in the light of capitalist thought, which does not 
observe religious aspects, making the aim to profit in any way possible. This may lead us to 
accept the notion, as mentioned previously, to change such contracts and means to make them 
comply with the principles and concepts of Islamic law, taking into account such projects as 
profitable business. 
This chapter will present a summary of the critical issues that have been discussed, analysed 
and explored in this thesis. 
7.1.2 THE MODELS OF TAKAFUL 
Takaful in recent times has been recognised by modern Islamic experts as an alternative 
product to offer conventional insurance. This is because it is free from unlawful elements like 
gambling, Riba (usury) and uncertainty. The thesis identified the subject matter of the Takaful 
contract by answering the question; Do Takaful applications provide suitable solutions to 
resolve insurance problems?  
However, there are significant discussions amongst modern experts concerning Takaful and 
the extent to which it is a pure donation contract, a cooperative mutual contract or a contract of 
exchange in relation to conventional insurance. In the analysis of the models and their 
approaches, I have studied all the models applied worldwide which are: 
• Mudarabah Model; 
                                                
3 Supra, chpter 2, footnote 117.  
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• Wakhalah with fee Model; 
•  Whakalah with Waqf Model; and 
• the hyper model Agency-Mudarabah model. 
However, I discovered that the Mudarabah and the Wakalah are contracts of exchange 
(Muawadah). Thus, there is no difference between conventional insurance and mutual 
insurance because both clearly include the elements of exchange (Muawadah); so the 
policyholders apply to the company to obtain compensation from the fund, but the element of 
doubt remains as to receipt of compensation. The only real reason for a policy holder to apply 
to such a fund is because it is restricted to policyholders only.  
The only model I found which complies with Islamic Sharia law is Wakalah with Waqf.  
The South African Takaful introduces 10% administration fees – to be collected from gross 
premiums (this means Waqf assets and its profits). This application means it is then non-
compliant with Islamic Sharia law because the fee of the agent (nazer-u-alWaqf, as confirmed 
in all Fiqhi schools) must be collected from the surplus only; not from the Waqf Fund, unless 
the participant knows in advance that an administration fee will be collected from the 
premium, in which case the intention of the donor in this situation will then be different and so 
will comply with Sharia, because the intention of the payment will be split into two parts; one 
for the Waqf and the other for the administration fee.  
However, nowadays, Takaful has become a system rather than a financial product. This makes 
it more preferential than conventional insurance. Policy holders can collect profits and create a 
savings pattern through such investments. Further, Takaful can be considered a new income 
channel on the grounds of support by a social institution, and thereby benefit the spending 
(Infaq) sector. 
7.1.3 SAUDI INSURANCE LAW 
 
The importance of analysing Saudi Insurance laws and regulations is that Saudi Arabia 
confirms Islamic Sharia as the constitution of the Kingdom4, so that logically all rules 
                                                
4 The Basic Law of Governance, Part one General Principles, Art.1. 
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applied, particularly, in the case of Insurance law must comply with Islamic Sharia teaching 
and any regulation or statute that violates Sharia principles should be void and have, in 
principle, no effect. Therefore, the question asked is: To what extent does the legal framework 
of insurance in Saudi Arabia comply with Sharia law?   
Answering this question was difficult and I have critiqued the Saudi insurance system from the 
perspective of Islamic Sharia Law from multiple perspectives and found the following; 
1. There is a mistake in the Legal constitution. Art. 1; The Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies stipulates that “Insurance in the Kingdom shall be 
undertaken through registered insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner 
as it is provided within the article establishment of the National Company for 
Cooperative Insurance....”5 However, this is a clear mistake in constitutional drafting. 
Many people interested in insurance are in a state of contradiction, about how the 
statute of the company is agreed upon by many researchers that are exercising an 
insurance business forbidden in some applications and provided by the system as an 
example that should be traced. Furthermore, the article added that: "in accordance with 
the principles of Islamic Shari’a"; such an addition is definitely in line with the regime 
in the country and is based upon the fact that the legislature, when drafting such a 
system was aware that the National Company for Cooperative Insurance is subject to 
criticism as far as Sharia scholars in the Kingdom are concerned. 
2. The concept of insurance in Saudi Arabia is similar to that associated with 
conventional insurance from the perspective of the logic of the application.  
3. The Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and The Rules 
attributable to the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance and their implementation 
regulations do not reflect what is supposed to be in insurance in an Islamic concept 
based on donation; but they reflect the concept of conventional insurance based on a 
clear financial reimbursement contract (Muawadah). 
4. All contracts between companies and insured persons take the form of a financial 
reimbursement contract and include a Gharar which makes this kind of contract void.  
5. The relationship between the company and the total insured may be qualified as a fee 
based agency for the management and regulation of insurance with the deceit (Gharar) 
in the wage, and thus the fee based agency contract is void. On the other hand, what is 
                                                
5 Supra. Foot note 6.  
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relevant to the investment of funds, is that the company is a joint trader (mudarib), so 
that each policyholder is an owner of the capital (Rabuallmal), whereas it is also an 
absolute trading point. This then is still restricted in terms of time because the contract 
period is only one year; therefore, I can confirm that according to Islamic rules of 
Mudarabah this invented application is void as well, for two reasons, the first is 
ignorance in the amount of capital and the second is that the company would take a 
share of the surplus, which it is not entitled to take.  
6. The distribution of the surplus does not reflect what should be an Islamic insurance 
concept. The shareholders and the Cooperative Health Insurance Council invoke a non-
permissible right that involves depriving policyholders of their rights; insurance 
companies receive a part of the surplus, which is not an income achieved by the 
company, and that is exactly the case for the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance. 
7. The existence of investment funds does not follow Islamic Sharia rules as this makes 
trade with companies forbidden. An Islamic finance company must follow Islamic 
rules and all transactions should be considered as permissible Halal financial products 
even in terms of assets and investment6. However, Article 61 of the Implementing 
Regulations confirms the allowance of all companies to invest in items representing 
riba-based investment activities, such as Foreign and Government Bonds, Saudi Riyals 
Denominated Investment Funds and Foreign Currency, etc. 
8. The legitimacy of cooperative insurance in Islamic thought does not necessarily mean 
the legitimacy of the applications of the Insurance companies. 
9. The existence of an Islamic Sharia committee within insurance companies does not 
guarantee the legitimacy of the contracts or the financial treatments and transactions 
made by these companies.   
Therefore, I do believe that the Saudi governor should set up an independent central Sharia 
board and give it all necessary authorisation for the observation and redrafting of all articles as 
criticised in this thesis and by researchers and Islamic scholars.    
 
 
                                                
6 For, example trading in wine in Islamic Sharia is forbidden, therefore, all wine company’s shares are forbidden 
and not permissible for trading.    
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7.1.4 THE CASE STUDIES IN THIS THESIS  
 
Using a qualitative methodology, the aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of the law 
on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, as well as the Council of Cooperative 
Health Insurance and their regulations affecting the applications of the National Company of 
Cooperative Insurance NCCI, as well as Al-Rajhi Takaful, and in so doing to find the answer 
to the following question;  
Do the applications of Takaful companies in Saudi Arabia meet Sharia law requirements? 
Therefore, to find precise outputs the study included policies designed according to the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency SAMA. Evaluations were carried out on the doctrine of the 
companies, in addition to practical applications of the model and eventually also exploring the 
objectives of cooperative insurance, surplus distribution, and investment in insurance funds.  
Ultimately, the study revealed the following: 
1. Saudi insurance law is similar to conventional insurance thought, in terms of the 
purpose of the insurance, and in both constructive theory and insurance practice, 
even that which has been asserted in the law to be in accordance with Islamic 
Sharia. 
2. The law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies and how it 
implements regulations, and the rule of the Cooperative Health Insurance Council 
and its implementation regulations, does not reflect presumed insurance, as per 
Islamic thought, in terms of donations. It reflects the concept of insurance in terms 
of conventional thought, which is based upon reimbursement, and the possibilities 
and obligations of both parties. 
3. The insurance policies of the National Company of Cooperative Insurance NCCI 
do not reflect the requirement of cooperative insurance in Islamic thought in terms 
of donations, but rather the concept of insurance in terms of conventional thought 
on reimbursement, as the items in policies in many provisions provide explicit 
evidence towards the will for reimbursement.  
4. NCCI insurance contracts, in view of the relationship of one policyholder to the 
remainder of the policyholders, represent financial reimbursement within the body 
which is an obscene deceit and thus nullified as per Islamic Sharia. Al-Rajhi 
Takaful, on the other hand, has succeeded in applying the donation concept to its 
233 
 
contracts and removing the deceit therein, ensuring they comply with Islamic 
Sharia. 
5. The distribution of surplus at NCCI does not reflect a necessity in view of Islamic 
thought, whereas Al-Rajhi Takaful did succeed in correcting the fault in the 
implementing regulation, Article 70/2/c, d, and e, and so is in line with Islamic 
Sharia.  
6. The presence of investment funds in NCCI, which are in violation of Islamic 
Sharia, affects the permissibility of dealing with such companies.  
7. The legitimacy of cooperative insurance, as based upon the proven assumption that 
it does not necessarily equate to the legitimacy of existing applications, is referred 
to as cooperative insurance.  
8. The existence of a Sharia Board bodies within a number of insurance companies 
does not necessarily guarantee the legitimacy of the contracts or transactions of 
such companies. Therefore, Sharia Board bodies must be independent, so as not to 
be subject to conflicts of interest. 
9. Contemporary insurance companies reflect the school of thought applied by 
insurance companies for the Sharia Board, which is demonstrated through its 
approval of contracts and the transactions of such companies.  
10. Depending on the statement of a minority of scholars, that all commercial 
insurance contracts are permissible, insurance systems, regulations, and the policies 
of insurance companies operating within the insurance market can be accepted as 
legitimate.  
 
 It can be observed that applicable insurance policies in Al-Rajhi Takaful comply with Islamic 
Sharia in general, whereas NCCI insurance policies are more in the line with commercial 
insurance than cooperative, which makes them inadmissible in Islamic Sharia, thus 
invalidating any dealings in them. This is based upon the provisions of Article 1 of the law on 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies: ‘Insurance in the Kingdom shall be 
undertaken through registered insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner as it is 
provided within the article establishment of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance 
promulgated by Royal Decree M/5 dated 17/5/1405 H, and in accordance with the principles 
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of Islamic Sharia’7. Therefore, a reformulation of the rules and regulations is urgently 
required, to precede any subsequent re-drafting of the insurance policies. It is evident that the 
fixed hypotheses in this study are true. 
 
7.2 Recommendations  
 
I believe that the main objective of this thesis is to contribute rational, scientific and specific 
recommendations to improve regulatory effectiveness in Saudi Arabia, and I can confirm all 
are relevant to SAMA. 
Thus, this thesis adopts the following recommendations;  
1) To stress the importance of working with government agencies and Islamic financial 
institutions, as well as Islamic insurance companies, to activate the application of 
cooperative insurance formula or Takaful, in which policy holders run the company 
according to the formula established by the decision of the Muslim World League 
Council in 1978. 
2) The Saudi insurance market has some negative points regarding the level of regulations 
or applications. Therefore, SAMA is responsible for paying more attention in this 
regards to persuade insurers to operate in line with the principles of Sharia. SAMA 
should establish an independent body (Central Islamic Supervisory Sharia Board). This 
body could provide positive advice to the Saudi insurance sector and explain to the 
public, issues to consider regarding insurance. Thus: 
I. The Central Islamic Supervisory Sharia Board can gather with Senior Sharia 
scholars and financial specialists to devise solutions to any Islamic insurance 
issues may arise in Saudi insurance sector. 
II. The Central Islamic Supervisory Sharia Board should demand pure Islamic 
Takaful regulations and applications for insurance companies and demand 
correction to all actions that do not comply completely with Sharia; such as 
investment and surplus of policyholders’ premiums. 
                                                
7 Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, [Available online: 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/Insurance/InssuranceLib/4600_C_InsuraLaw_Ar.pdf, viewed June 2012].  
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III. The Central Islamic Supervisory Sharia Board should revise all insurance laws 
and implementing regulations and raise all legal suggestions and drafting to 
SAMA to finalise the proper procedure. 
IV. The Central Islamic Supervisory Sharia Board should supervise and ensure 
that all its considered decisions and rules are accurately applied by all 
insurance companies.  
Based on this, I am sure that this body and any actions it proposed will increase 
the level of confidence among people and improve the reputation of the Saudi 
insurance market. Also, they will serve to enhance public awareness of the 
importance of insurance needs, and will accordingly lead to increased demand for 
insurance products amongst Saudi society. 
3) SAMA should adopt an institute of insurance and accordingly run courses in Insurance 
to enhance the technical knowledge in this sector.  
4) It is necessary also to emphasise the importance of mobilising the efforts of researchers 
within research bodies in universities and supportive institutions at the level of the 
Islamic financial industry to reconsider the Islamisation of commercial insurance on 
products in their current formula. This formula is based upon financial reimbursement, 
and is a modification of the idea of an abstract guarantee associated with the idea of 
money or work8, as well as a suggestion of certain methods for transforming this idea 
into a practical reality, via the formulation accorded to insurance products. 
 
7.3 Suggestions for further work. 
This study has concentrated on presenting the material from a legal perspective, therefore it 
did not extend to an examination of the general absence of public awareness about insurance 
in Saudi Arabia or the challenges or weaknesses faced by insurance companies in the country 
because both are closer to finance than legal matters. However, there are some additional legal 
subjects that should also be covered by researchers such as the fraud risk in the Saudi 
insurance market, and the extent to which it is committed by insurance companies or 
intermediaries selling insurance without a license or failing to compensate policyholders or 
people who are using insurance policies improperly. I do believe that further research is 
                                                
8 See more in chapter 6. P.14. 
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required for each subject separately or possibly comparative research; e.g. focusing on general 
absence and fraud risk, to determine whether there is a clear relationship or manifold 
differences.                                               
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GLOSSARY 
  
1. A1-Mudarabahh: A1-Mudarabahh is a financial technique applied via Islamic 
business partnerships, between two or more parties, where one party provides 
capital while the other offers a valuable service or skill, in a particular business, 
each sharing profits accordingly. Today’s Islamic banks and Islamic insurance 
companies operate based on the principles of Mudarabahh, an alternative to the 
interest based-transaction. In other words, Mudarabahh involves interest free 
profits and loss sharing transactions. 
2. Alaaqlah: Alaaqlah are the male factions of a tribe whom relevant to the killer 
from his father’s side. Here, Arab traditions advocate that, in the case of murder, 
the Alaaqlah collect blood money (Diyah) from each of the tribe’s males to be 
paid to the victim’s family.  
3. al-iltizam bi alta‘weed: the obligation to indemnify. 
4. Alkharaj–bi-aldaman: In Islamic jurisprudence, the term Alkharaj–bi-aldaman 
relates to a large proportion of financial transactions that take place between 
buyer and seller. Basically, alkharaj means the profit or the gain, and bi-Aldaman 
represents the warranty. The assumption behind this rule encourages that, unless a 
buyer gains immediate benefit from the transaction, he/she should be provided 
with a guarantee during the period in which a commodity is being held.  
5. Almunahadah: Almunahadah is a type of company promoting companionship, 
where members place food on one sheet and distribute it among themselves 
equally. 
6. Alrushud: reaches mature mind. 
7. alsiyasah al-shari’yyah: it is an Islamic principle means the Legitimacy Policy. 
8. Alwali: guardian. 
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9. Anan Company: In Islamic Fiqhi, an Anan company is a partnership whereby 
both partners invest a definite sum of money and definitely profit share. 
10. Aqd: contract. 
11. BOTTOMRY : A ancient type of insurance  when the master of a ship signifies 
money borrowed against the bottom or keel of it; this forfeits the ship itself  to the 
creditor, if the money is not paid at the time appointed with interest at the ship's 
safe return.  
12. FIQHI: Fiqhi refers to Islamic jurisprudence which deals with the observance of 
rituals, morals and social legislation. Fiqhi is an expansion of Sharia law based 
directly on the Quran and Sunnah complementing the evolving 
rulings/interpretations of Islamic jurists .   
13. Fiqhi: Islamic Jurisprudence. 
14. Gharar: uncertainty. 
15. hibah althawab: gift for compensation. 
16. hibah mutlaqa: absolute gift. 
17. Hibba: gift. 
18. Holy Quran: divine book of Muslims, the main source of sharia law. 
19. Ijarah: rental. 
20. Infaq: spending. 
21. Jahalah: ignorance. 
22. Jua’la: Jua’la is an Arabic term, ‘an agreement where one party commits to pay a 
determined sum to the second party upon achievement of a specific result at either 
a specified or unspecified time’. 
23. kheyar al’aaib: defect option. 
24. kheyar alwasf: option of description. 
25. Mahalul-Aqad: Contract subject matter. 
26.  Masalaha mu’tabara: valid public or donator interest. 
27. mu’awadah: reimbursement. 
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28. Muamalat: Commercial transactions. 
29. Mudarabah: share in profit. 
30. Mudarib: means entrepreneur. Mudarib is basically the trader or person carrying 
out business in line with the Mudarabah model, thus sharing subsequent profits or 
losses accordingly. 
31. Mufawadah: Mufawadah represents a transaction in Islamic law where each 
member of the contractual party deputises the other in all matters relating to 
money and management. Mufawadah is prohibited by the Hnbali, Maliki and 
Shafee schools because it constitutes a guarantee despite the element of ignorance 
hindering both parties (Jahalah). Hence, in Islamic law, an individual cannot say 
“I will guarantee you” and/or “make you an agent in”, as the subject matter must 
be defined in both contracts. However, this is not the case with contracts based on 
Mufawadah.  
32. Musharaka: partnership. 
33. Musharakah : Means Partnership. 
34.  Nazer- u- alWaqf: is the person or entity that looks after the endowment (waqaf). 
35. Rabui-ul-Mal: capital owner. 
36. Ra's-ul-Mal: capital money. 
37. Riba Alfazal: is intended to increase an indemnity in a unified manner for 
example where wheat is exchanged for wheat, with a certain increase 
38. Riba Alnaseiaa: is a loan of money taken for a known period of time, proportional 
to increases in the amount of the loan and accordingly, increases in debt, as well 
as duration. 
39. Riba: usury or interest. 
40. Sharia: The system of Islamic law which is based on the teachings of the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah. 
41. SOKRAH: The word (SOKRAH) originally comes from a French word ‘securite’, 
and in Arabic, means insurance or guarantee. 
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42. Sunnah: The traditions and sayings of Prophet Mohammed (SAW), this is the 
second most important source of Sharia law. 
43. Ta’awun : mutual assistance. 
44. tabadul al-qurud: mutual exchange of loans. 
45. Tabarru: voluntary contribution. 
46.  Tabaruu al-mukarama: generosity donation. 
47. Takaful: Takaful is an Arabic term meaning mutual responsibility, used as an 
alternative term to Islamic insurance.  
48. Takharuj and Mubarahah: These are Arabic terms employed linguistically to 
convey the process of getting out of, or being released from, or disappearing from, 
a contract for example. In a more technical sense, term refers to the legal 
procedures involved in participant cancellation of an insurance policy, be they the 
company or an individual. 
49. Tameez: a discerning minor. 
50. uqala’a: persons of senses 
51. Wakalah: agency 
52. Wakeel: agent. 
53.  Wakf: endowment.  
54. Walaa almualah: is a contract in Islamic sharia means the loyalty contract. 
55. Waqf: This term embodies charity, religious endowment and the testamentary 
bequest of real estate. In Sharia law, Waqf also denotes the termination of an asset 
and/or the transfer of ownership of valuable property into the ownership of Allah, 
declaring perpetual usufruct for religious, charitable or pious purposes. 
56. Wasiyyah: will 
57. Zakat al-Fitr: an obligation charity to be paid directly after Ramadan (the month 
of fasting for Muslims). 
58. Zakat: an obligation charity. 
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